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Abstract 
In the last two decades significant economic reforms have taken place in what were once purely 
socialist economies. Most importantly, these economies have undergone a sweeping process of 
internal and external trade liberalisation by gradually moving towards a system of fully-
functioning competitive markets. Along with this, there have been profound changes in 
institutional arrangements and, in particular, changes in property rights that allow for some 
form (in varying degrees) of private ownership and control. The results have been striking. 
Vietnam, for example, has experienced what many people may well regard as a miracle, or at 
least the beginning of one. From being a large importer of rice and other foodstuffs in the 
1980 's, Vietnam has now become the third largest exporter of rice in the world, all without a 
significant increase in capital or labour inputs and with virtually no technological change. 
This dissertation focuses directly on the effects of this trade liberalisation. It provides 
a theoretical and empirical analysis which explains the increases in both rice output and its 
growth in terms of the incentive effects that result from changes in property rights and market 
structures. It argues that private ownership and control of property and competitive pricing 
and market structures induce individuals to work harder and use land more efficiently. 
The theoretical analysis contains both a static and a dynamic model of the effects of 
internal and external trade liberalisation on agricultural growth. In the static model land and 
labour are measured in terms of efficiency units which include the optimal choice of effort in 
both work and the exploitation of land, thus incorporating incentive effects, whereas changes in 
the definition of the profit function measure changes in market structures that accompany 
economic reform. The derived form of the institutional production function and the resulting 
comparative statics effects show that total factor productivity, the optimal choice of effort, and 
rice output increase directly with the extent of trade liberalisation. 
The empirical analysis considers the specific case of rice production in Vietnam as an 
application of the theoretical models. Given estimated results for the share parameters of 
labour, land, current inputs, and capital in the rice production function we show that the 
growth in factor productivity that results from changes in market structure and incentive effects 
is the most important explanatory factor for the increase in rice production, and that each new 
stage of trade liberalisation results in new and higher steady-state values for rice output. 
Indeed, based upon a construction of the timescale for the system to reach a vicinity of the 
steady state, it is shown that even with an assumed zero rate of growth in the 'Solow residual ' 
conzponent of total factor productivity that trade liberalisation alone may increase the 
production of rice by an order of two or three times its initial value. Competition, changes in 
market structures and property rights, along with the enhanced incentives that go with it, 
matter most. 
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Chapter 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of economic reforms in some transitional agrarian economies there has been 
a significant increase in agricultural production. In this regard, Vietnam has 
experienced what many people may well regard as a miracle, or at least the beginning of 
one. From being a large importer of rice and other foodstuffs in the 1980' s, Vietnam 
has now become the third largest exporter of rice in the world, all without a significant 
increase in capital or labour inputs and with virtually no technological change. In fact, 
output in the agricultural sector as whole literally doubled from 1981 to 1993 (General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam, GSO, various years).1 This dissertation is concerned with 
this striking phenomenon, in particular, and how economic reform has affected 
economic growth and efficiency in transitional economies in general. It constructs and 
empirically tests a model (a static version and its dynamic counterpart) which explains 
the increases in rice output and the effects on growth as a result of the enhanced 
1 In China the comparable figure for the period 1978 to 1984 is 61 percent (Lin, 1991 ). 
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incentives to work hard and use land more efficiently. The vehicle which allows for 
these incentive effects to take place and to have such an impact is the institutional 
change, including relevant changes in market structure, associated with internal and 
external trade liberalisation. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 defines the concepts of internal 
and external trade liberalisation as used in this dissertation. In order to provide an 
overall context for the models that follow, Section 1.2 provides an archetypical 
characterisation of the transitional periods involved in moving from a Soviet-type 
command economy to a fully-functioning market economy. Section 1.3, finally, gives 
an overview or the plan of the rest of the dissertation. 
1.1 The concept of internal and external trade liberalisation in transitional 
. economies 
In the simplest terms, internal trade liberalisation in transitional economies is the 
process of the 'freeing-up' of the domestic market. In terms of its implications for 
producers and consumers, that process includes three main components: the freedom to 
purchase and sell goods rather than having them allocated and their use regulated 
through a state administration; the removal of price controls and other interventions by 
the government thus allowing prices to reflect their 'real' or market value rather than a 
state-planned and often compulsory low price; and the removal of barriers to market 
entry so that competition between different firms and industries becomes possible. 
Internal trade liberalisation is important for creating a fully-functioning market 
economy but it is not of course synonymous with the 'opening up' of the international 
Introduction (Ch. I) 4 
market. External trade liberalisation in transitional economies not only means the 
lowering of domestic trade restrictions as is normal in market economies,2 but it also 
includes the following: the decentralisation of the government trade monopoly and the 
creation of a competitive environment among trade organisations; the freedom to 
purchase and sell all goods on the international market, via (for example) private trade 
organisations; and the removal of all trade barriers to international markets. Besides 
this, external trade liberalisation requires the imposition of necessary reforms in 
exchange rate policy. These include the unification of multiple exchange rates (into a 
single market rate) and the achievement of an appropriate exchange rate which reflects 
more closely the 'real' true value of domestic currency. 
Moreover, internal and external trade liberalisation must also be accompanied by 
key changes in the institutional framework, ones that allow the farmer to become the 
sole decision-maker in the productive unit. The process of changing property rights and 
the move toward complete privatisation is the central feature of this general institutional 
change. 
1.2 Moving from a Soviet-type command economy to a functioning market 
economy: transitional periods 
Although the specific form of economic liberalisation may vary between different 
transitional economies, certain steps, according to Perkins (1994), must be taken if the 
system is to evolve into a fully-functioning market economy. First, the economy must 
achieve macro stability, meaning an acceptable level of inflation and a financially stable 
2 It is noted that although international trade negotiations have succeeded in reducing tariffs to very low 
levels, national governments can still resort to intricate policies to protect their domestic industries from 
foreign competition ( see Vousden, 1992, p .xi). 
I•· 
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international balance of payments. 3 Second, inputs and outputs must be available for 
private purchase and sale on the market, rather than being allocated administratively 
through a state bureaucracy. Third, prices must reflect real market-values rather than an 
imposed or planned price. Fourth, barriers to market entry must be removed so that 
competition between different localities and firms is possible. Finally, key changes in 
the institutional framework must be established and enforced so that decision-makers 
have an incentive to maximise profits and cut costs (Perkins, 1994). In addition, in rural 
areas, there must be a de-collectivisation of rural society and a gradual freeing-up of 
domestic markets through trade liberalisation (both internal and external) of agricultural 
commodities, combined with the privatisation of property rights. 
For our purposes, the main transitional periods in agriculture begin with the 
cooperative or communal system, proceeding through a period of de-collectivisation in 
rural society and finally with a move toward the eventual freeing up of internal and 
external markets. The exact sequence in that process is not necessarily the same in 
different countries (McKinnon, 1993). For example, in China the process of de-
collectivisation and internal trade liberalisation happened more or less simultaneously 
(Perkins, 1994). However, in Vietnam, de-collectivisation started in 1981, but the 
process of internal and external trade liberalisation did not begin until eight years later 
(Fforde and Vylder, 1996). In Russia, de-collectivisation began in 1988, but the process 
of internal trade liberalisation is still far from completed (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992). Nevertheless, there are still some central characteristics that can be attached to 
these transitional periods, ones that apply to all transitional economies. They are 
3 
Some argue that the transitional economy can still achieve a fully-functioning market economy without 
the condition of macro stability (see, for example, Fforde and Vylder, 1996). 
i: 
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described as follows. 4 
(a) The cooperative-communal era 
A crucial principle of Soviet command type economies is that the State must strictly 
control all commercial activities. The strict control of domestic commerce means that 
the State regulates all rights of purchase and sale through an administrative system at a 
low planned and compulsory price. This results in a complete absence of domestic 
markets for both goods and factors in the cooperative-communal era. Further, the strict 
control of foreign trade means that external trade is only carried out by a few state 
trading monopolies under a planned exchange rate regime, one which does not reflect 
the 'real' or true value of the domestic currency. For a long time, the former Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) controlled the majority of trade activities among 
many former socialist countries through Trade Agreements, in which the exchange rate 
was decided by agreement and did not reflect the real value between exported and 
imported goods. Overvalued, multiple exchange rates and trade subsidies were popular 
and caused domestic prices to be isolated from changes in world prices (Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, and Perkins, 1994). 
This period of the cooperative-communal era is also characterised by the 
compulsory state-acquisition of agricultural production, and collective property rights. 
The communal form of agricultural production causes problems due its compulsory 
rather than its voluntary nature. In the usual context, through its accompanying 
economies of scale, the cooperative (potentially) can provide gains over the small and 
4 
The particular sequence (and the characteristics) of the transitional periods for the case of Vietnam is 
discussed in Chapter 2 below. 
11; 
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fragmented family farms in the form of: (i) risk sharing, especially in primitive 
agriculture, which is highly dependent on such exogenous variables as the weather and 
pests; (ii) the capacity to improve backward technology, poor infrastructure and poor 
irrigation systems; and (iii) the improvement in the allocation of resources such as 
labour, draft animals and farm tools according to peak-load problems in the farming 
year or across various regions or farms themselves. 
Nevertheless, a main problem with the commune, one which stems from the 
compulsory characteristics of the cooperative form, relates to the absence of the right to 
withdraw from the collective. Indeed, according to Lin (1990), the absence of the right 
to withdraw has a significant impact on the incentive structure within the collective. 
When there is freedom to exit, the members of the collective can decide at the end of 
each production round whether or not they will continue to participate in the next round. 
Those who find that they are better off being members of the collective will retain their 
membership, otherwise, they will withdraw from the collective. The compulsory nature 
of the cooperative reduces the motivation for efficient operation and often eliminates the 
gains from any economies of scale in the second and subsequent rounds. It eliminates 
the motivation for efficient outcomes and a fair distribution income by management. 
In any case, to make a collective into an efficient institution also requires an 
effective means of supervision, and this is often impractical if not impossible. A self-
enforcing agreement among collective members in which each one promises to provide 
as much effort as possible on their household farm is perhaps an effective alternative 
when supervision is too costly (Telser, 1980), but this obviously may still result in 
problems such as waste and shirking. Moreover, income distribution in the cooperative 
I 
I 
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is solely based on the counting of work points rather than on efficiency criteria, and 
since household endowments vary, it is clear that some well-endowed households will 
be hurt by a work-point system and the elimination of any dividend payments (Chinn, 
1980). 
Finally, as a matter of both principle and practice in the collective-communal 
system, the State absolutely controls the property rights to land, and all other important 
assets in agriculture. The sole 'landlord' ( the State), through centralised management 
and a strict planning-bureaucracy, controls all output targets and operations as well as 
the choice of investment for production. In this system of production, the farmer's role 
is only that of a 'mandatory worker', so to speak. As such, there are no clear incentives 
for the farmer to work harder or to exploit the available natural resources more 
efficiently. The State also controls the sale and allocation of all outputs and inputs 
through a state commercial network, and with it determines the prices of all inputs and 
outputs. A network of commercial cooperatives, which are owned by the State, 
provides the necessities and indeed that network virtually ensures a scarcity of consumer 
goods for farmers. Because there is a total absence of both domestic and international 
markets for agricultural goods the State administratively allocates inputs and outputs, 
via a state bureaucracy, with compulsory prices set at arbitrarily low levels. All 
available studies of this period are uniform in their criticism: the cooperative-communal 
period results in an agricultural industry that is characterised by low productivity and 
large inefficiency (for the case of China see (Lin, 1990), for Vietnam (Pham N Cuong, 
1991) and for Eastern Europe, see (Brada, 1986)). 
,., 
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(b) The de-collectivisation of rural society 
This period provides a first step or move towards the privatisation of property rights, but 
generally speaking a market for the sale or exchange of land is not yet established. De-
collectivisation not only provides more freedom over property rights, product choices, 
and investment decisions made by producers but also entails the removal of barriers 
imposed by centralised management and the planning bureaucracy. In this period, the 
farmer's role becomes that of a partial decision-maker in the system of production. 
Even though input and output markets do not fully exist yet, in that the State still 
controls or administers the allocation of inputs and outputs through a state bureaucracy 
at planned state prices, the farmer is granted the conditional right to control the sale of 
output so that he or she may opt (to some predetermined limit) not to sell goods at the 
State price. Consequently, the State may stipulate a higher state price in response, with 
free markets emerging (albeit to a limited extent) to absorb any residual output at a free 
market price. The farmer, in other words, cannot fully exercise the role of decision-
maker because he ( or she) can still not sell the entire output produced at domestic 
market-clearing prices or freely purchase factors of production in a market context. 
Therefore the incentive for farmers to work hard and exploit natural resources efficiently 
exists, but they are severely limited. 
(c) Internal trade liberalisation in agriculture 
In this transitional period, the system of domestic markets for agriculture is established 
so inputs and outputs are available for private purchase and sale on the market, at a 
'real' or 'fair' market price. The removal of barriers to market entry provides full 
ll 
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freedom of commerce in agricultural goods on domestic markets, and the full freedom 
of product choice and investment. The agricultural price for inputs and outputs 
(typically) increases to a true domestic market price and hence leads to more incentives 
for farmers as decision-makers to exploit labour and natural resources more efficiently. 
In this period, the farmer can exercise his or her full rights as a decision-maker and as a 
partial landlord. However, without external trade liberalisation the international market 
is not yet open, or rather it is governed by a strict state monopoly over international 
trade at an imposed exchange rate. The domestic price still does not reflect the world 
price due to the presence of multiple exchange rates (for different types of transactions) 
and trade subsidies. 
( d) External trade liberalisation in agriculture 
This period implies the complete ( or near complete) decentralisation of the state 
monopoly on foreign trade, and lower trade restrictions and open competition among 
private trade organisations. It also entails reforms in exchange rate policy, e.g., a switch 
from a fixed to a free or flexible exchange rate regime. Under trade liberalisation the 
prices of agricultural goods converge toward world prices. Because the market for 
agricultural goods is widened, the decision over product choice and investment by 
farmers is greater so that they now respond to incentives more fully and produce more 
efficiently. 
Indeed, with both internal and external trade liberalisation, along with changes in 
property rights, the farmer's role in production changes from that of a sole worker to the 
triple role of worker, manager and landlord. This means that the farmer can now have 
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three Goint) behavioural responses: as worker, economic decision-maker, and profit 
max1m1ser. The new roles for the farmer motivates ( or gives incentives to) the 
individual to provide more effort, to increase the utilisation of natural resources 
( especially land), and to use current inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides more 
efficiently. The farmer can only exercise the rights of decision maker and profit 
maximiser if the domestic markets for agricultural inputs and outputs exist. These 
rights can be broadened if international markets for agriculture are available. 
1.3 The plan of the dissertation 
A general overview of the dissertation is as follows: Part One (Chapters 1 and 2) sets 
out the main argument of the dissertation and discusses the general characteristics of 
trade liberalisation in transitional economies. Part Two (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) provides a 
detailed static model, the comparative statics effects, and a dynamic model of the effects 
of trade liberalisation on agricultural output and growth. Part Three (Chapters 6, 7 and 
8) applies and tests the models for the case of Vietnam. Chapter 9 gives some 
concluding remarks to the dissertation as a whole, and all of the various and extensive 
data sources and adjustments are compiled in the Data Appendix. 
In more detail, Chapter 2 (with the general discussion of Chapter 1 in mind), 
fully describes the relevant transitional periods and the process of trade liberalisation in 
the specific case of Vietnam. It begins with an overview of agriculture in Vietnam, and 
includes a series of descriptive statistics that detail the dramatic increases in agricultural 
output that occurred with economic reform. The precise institutional arrangements 
between the State, the cooperative, farm households, and the connecting markets and 
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market structures in the various transitional periods are described in detail. 
Chapter 3 constructs a static model of the effects of trade liberalisation on 
agricultural output. A key concept in this chapter is the notion of an 'institutional' 
production function; one which reflects not only the usual technical relationship 
between inputs and outputs, but also incorporates the fanners' response to the 
institutional and market arrangements within which they work. Effective labour and 
land is measured in terms of efficiency units in order to include the optimal choice of 
effort in both work and the exploitation of land, thus capturing the incentive effects that 
result from economic reform. With this, and the construction of an appropriate profit 
function, total factor productivity and the optimal choice of effort in the 'institutional' 
production function depend both on the price level and the structure of the goods and 
factor markets, allowing the effects of trade liberalisation (in theory) to be clearly seen. 
Based on this work, Chapter 4 provides a theoretical analysis of the comparative statics 
effects of internal and external trade liberalisation. The relevant effects are captured in 
terms of changes in both average goods prices and factor prices in various transitional 
periods. The growth in total factor productivity and changes in the optimal choice of 
effort with economic reform are also carefully analysed. 
Chapter 5 presents a dynamic model of the effects of internal and external trade 
liberalisation in agricultural growth. The static model of Chapters 3 and 4 is now 
extended to account for long-run effects, given the farmer's optimal intertemporal 
choices regarding effort, consumption, and investment, and the constraint of a profit 
function that incorporates different market arrangements that result from trade 
liberalisation. The basic idea is to analyse the resulting optimal transitional paths and 
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the new steady-state outcomes that are the result of the enhanced incentives to produce 
more, and more efficiently, in transitional economies. A comparison to a comparable 
growth model without incentive effects highlights the importance of the incentive 
effects (in terms of resulting changes in output, consumption, and so on) contained in 
the form of the 'institutional' production function. 
Chapter 6 is the first in a series of three empirical chapters. It begins with a 
detailed overview of rice production and the performance of the rice industry in 
Vietnam. In Vietnam, rice is not only the most significant source of nutrition for the 
Vietnamese people, it is also the major source of export revenue and, because of this, 
economic reform has impacted most on this sector. Based upon the models developed 
in Part Two, this chapter also provides an econometric estimation (needed later) of the 
share parameters of inputs in an 'institutional' form of a rice production function. The 
comparable measures for a 'technical' production function are also obtained. 
Given the static model of Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 7 provides an extensive 
quantitative analysis of the effects of internal and external trade liberalisation on rice 
production in Vietnam from 1976 to 1994. In terms of the 'institutional' production 
function we distinguish between two main reasons for the dramatic increases in rice 
output: the growth of factor inputs and the growth of total factor productivity. The 
latter, in turn, is decomposed into a growth rate in total factor productivity that results 
solely from the effects of internal and external trade liberalisation, and one that is a 
result of a host of items or 'unexplained residuals'. Across all transitional periods we 
show that the growth in factor productivity that results from internal and external trade 
liberalisation is the most important explanatory factor for the increase in rice 
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production. The incentive effects and the changes in market structure that accompany 
economic reform matter most. 
Chapter 8, finally, provides an empirical analysis of the transitional paths and the 
long-run steady-state values of capital and output for rice production in Vietnam. It is 
based on the dynamic model in Chapter 5. After a suggestive look at the data, we first 
compute the long-run levels of the capital stock for rice production in Vietnam in the 
various stages of trade liberalisation. Using these figures, we then calculate the speed of 
convergence or the timescale required for the rice industry to attain the 'vicinity' of a 
steady-state in each transitional stage and thus, combining the two steps, determine the 
steady-state levels for rice output in the period of output contracts compared to that of 
the 'freeing up' of domestic and international markets. We show (in a way fully 
consistent with the theoretical model of Chapter 5) that each new stage of trade 
liberalisation results in a new and higher steady-state value for physical capital and rice 
output, and that economic reform alone may have increased rice production by an order 
of two or three times the initial level given in the communal system. The positive 
effects of trade liberalisation are also seen through an analysis of the predicted 
transitional growth rates of rice output in the different stages of trade liberalisation, with 
the growth rate in the period of full-trade liberalisation shown to be much higher than 
that in the period of partial-trade liberalisation. 
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Chapter 
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN 
THE RURAL AREAS OF VIETNAM 
With the general nature of internal and external market liberalisation outlined in Chapter 
1 in mind, this chapter focuses on the case of Vietnam. As mentioned, Vietnam is an 
agrarian economy where agriculture clearly plays a major role and, as the result of 
sweeping economic reform, Vietnam has achieved remarkable success in increasing the 
output of rice and other food products. The idea here is simply to provide an overview 
of Vietnamese agriculture and a brief chronological account of the stages which have 
led to this remarkable success, with an eye to the theoretical and empirical analysis that 
is to follow in later chapters. Section 2.1 gives an overview of agriculture as an industry 
in Vietnam and provides some preliminary data on the growth of agricultural production 
and rice in particular. Section 2.2 classifies and describes the various transitional 
periods (toward fully free markets) experienced in the case of Vietnam, with a careful 
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description at each step of the institutional framework that prevailed. Section 2.3 
concludes. 
2.1 Overview of agriculture in Vietnam 
Located in South East Asia, Vietnam is long and narrow, with 33.1 million hectares in 
total area and a highly dense population of 74 million people (GSO, 1996). Indeed, the 
population density on agricultural land is 980 people per kilometre squared, and the 
population continues to expand at a rate of 2 per cent annually (GSO, 1996). 
Nevertheless, the tropical climate, with its high humidity and fertile lands, provides a 
natural advantage for agriculture, especially rice production, where the two large deltas 
of the Red and Cuu Long rivers are the dominant rice-supplying regions of the country. 
These two deltas contain most of the population and are situated over 1,000 kilometres 
apart in the north and south 1• There is also a small and narrow delta in the centre of the 
country, quite suitable for agricultural production. Even though humid and tropical 
weather dominates the entire country, there are some differences between the north and 
south. The monsoon-influenced north has four different or distinct seasons, while for 
the most part the rainy season dominates the weather in the south, with occasional dry 
spells. 
Vietnam is an agrarian economy with about 80.2 per cent of the population 
living in rural areas (GSO, 1996). The agricultural sector2, which accounts for roughly 
1 The division of the 'north' and 'south regions is based on the natural conditions of geography and 
process of liberalisation. The 'north' includes the provinces of the North Mountain and Midlands, Red 
River Delta and North Central Coast. The south includes the Central Highlands, east of the South and 
Cuu Long River Delta. 
2 According to the System of National Accounts (SNA) this includes crop cultivation, animal husbandry, 
and agriculture, but excludes fisheries and agro-processing. 
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50 per cent of material or non-service output and 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)3 provides jobs for 72.3 percent of the labour force of the country (GSO, 1995). 
Cultivated agriculture is predominant ( about 7 4 percent of gross agricultural output 
(GSO, various years)), especially rice production which constitutes ninety per cent of 
the output of food grains. As the most important industry in agriculture, at).Y change in 
rice production obviously causes a major change in agricultural output. 
The growth of agriculture, which includes cultivation and livestock production, 
since reunification (1976 to 1994) is indicated in Figure 2.1 (using the output of 1976 as 
a base figure). During the height of the collective system, the years 1976-80, the growth 
of agriculture, cultivation and livestock had decreased sharply. Since the first stage of 
economic reform in agriculture (beginning in 1981 ), until now, growth has increased 
steadily over time. The average gross index (1976=100) is 168.6 per cent, 156.3 per 
cent and 221. 7 percent for agriculture, cultivation and livestock respectively (Statistics 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery-SDAFF, GSO, various years). In other 
words, after more than a decade of economic reform, the output in 1994 is more than 
double that of 1976 for agriculture as a whole, cultivation and livestock respectively 
(SDAFF, GSO). 
During the process of economic reform, agricultural output has increased rapidly 
in terms of both cultivation and the size of the livestock industry, but the structure of 
agriculture has also changed with a relatively smaller predominance of cultivation 
generally. That tendency can be observed by the gross share of cultivation in agriculture 
3 There are some arguments that the actual share of agriculture in GDP is higher than the data show 
because the share of the service sector in GDP may be lower than 41.7 per cent, as reported (GSO, 1994). 
In fact, the reported data for the service sector (the new Statics National Account or SNA, applied since 
1993) makes the share of the service sector in Vietnam similar to that in some New Developed Countries 
(NICs)! 
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decreasing from 80 per cent in the l 980's to about 74 percent in the l 990 ' s (SDAFF, 
GSO, various years). 
Figure 2.1: The gross index of agriculture, cultivation and livestock production in 
1976-94 (at 1989 prices) 
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Such diversification was also a notable feature of cultivation' s structure. The 
rapid development of internal and external markets, and the added demands for new 
products that resulted, encouraged and enhanced the development of a variety of fruit 
and industrial crops, and in so doing more efficiently exploited the specific natural 
advantages of every region. However, as the major player in agriculture, the outstanding 
success of the industry as a whole is still explained by the extremely high growth rates 
of rice production. 
The growth of food grains and rice production (measured in terms of thousands 
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tons of rice equivalent) over the period 1976-94 is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The 
decreased trend in the period 1977-80 and the dramatic boost since 1981 until the 
present for food grains and rice production are notable features of this graph. From 
being a major food importer, Vietnam quickly met its internal demand for food stuffs 
and indeed soon became the third largest rice exporter in the world. 
Figure 2.2: The gross index of food grains and rice output in 1976-94 
Index (per cent) 
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2.2 The process of economic liberalisation in rural areas 
In the face of poor economic performance in the early 1980' s, and despite large amounts 
of Soviet assistance, the shortcomings of the socialist system characterised by central 
planning, administrative direction, rapid industrialisation and the expansion of state 
sector management came to be recognised. The prospect of declining Soviet aid added 
to the push for dramatic reform in the structure of the Vietnamese economy. In 1981, 
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under the pressure of a serious food shortage, the State had to partially give up its 
collective strategy and began a process of a partial de-collectivisation in agriculture, 
specifically by introducing the product contract system (Communist Party Secretariat, 
CPS, Order 100, 1981 ). Further, in April 1988, the fundamental reforms known as the 
renovation program (doi moi) were charted by a Politburo or Council of Ministers 
resolution (Communist Party Politburo, CPP, Order No 10). The product contract 
system in agriculture was improved and strengthened by the household contract system, 
which was accompanied by land allocations such as long-term leases to farm households 
and the liberalisation of agricultural markets. The reform was enhanced further by the 
development of changes in property rights and the process of markets liberalisation. 
Overall, the process of liberalisation has been undertaken gradually and 1n 
general terms it is comprised of three main periods: the period of the communal-
collective era (1975-80); de-collectivisation (1981-87); the gradual freeing up of 
domestic markets for agricultural goods; and external trade liberalisation (1988-89 until 
the present). 
(a) The compulsory collective regime in the state planned economy (1975-80) 
Soon after the reunification of Vietnam (1975), the State launched and strongly pursued 
the campaign of collectivisation for agriculture in the south (Communist Party of 
Vietnam, CPV, Order 24, 1975).4 At that time, the system of the compulsory 
cooperative was already established in the north for nearly two decades, or since 1958 
4The independent farming family fann was predominant in Vietnam for thousands of years before the 
socialist regime was established in the North in 1954. Since 1958 the cooperative has been the basic 
collective economic unit, to which most central and north Vietnamese farmers belong (Chu V Lam, et. al. 
1992,p.13). 
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(Chu V Lam, Nguyen T Nguyen, Phung H Phu, Tran Q Toan and Dang T Xuong, (1992, 
p.13) and Nguyen S Cuc (1995b, p.18). In fact, generally speaking, the compulsory 
collective regime (in the north and south) had control over all agricultural activities in 
Vietnam during the period 1976-80, and certainly so by 1980. However, there were 
clear differences in the level and content of the collective system between the north and 
south. 
During the wartime or before reunification, the cooperative in North Vietnam 
developed from a pure production unit into a social, economic and quasi-political entity 
(Fforde and Vylder, 1996). Again, generally speaking, the development of compulsory 
collectivisation in the north experienced four forms: the 'production collective ' (Tap 
doan san xuat); the 'exchange production group' (To doi cong); the 'low advanced 
cooperative' (Hop tac xa bac thap) and the 'advanced cooperative' (Hop tac xa bac 
cao). 
The 'production collective' was a primitive form of cooperative, in which 20-30 
neighbouring households combined their assets but still controlled ownership over their 
land. Incomes were paid in proportion to the assets contributed by each member. The 
'exchange production group' was the next step towards collectivisation, in which a 
group of households was involved in the exchange of labour, farm tools and draft 
animals. In the 'low advanced cooperative', households in one or two neighbouring 
villages combined their land, draft animals, farm tools and other assets. In the 
'advanced cooperative', all means of production were collectivised across several 
villages, or one commune. 
In 1975, the low advanced and advanced cooperatives were dominant in North 
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Vietnam. At that time, 97 per cent of farmers had joined cooperatives, with 88 per cent 
of cooperatives being advanced cooperatives. In 1979 (prior to economic reform), there 
were 4,154 advanced cooperatives at the commune size (Chu V Lam, et. al. (1992), 
p.39). 
The agricultural collective system in the south was different from that in the 
north because of. the specific characteristics for agricultural production in the south. 
First, there was a strong peasant middle class comprising about 70 per cent of all 
farmers and controlling about 80 per cent of the cultivated land (Chu V Lam, et. al. 
(1992), p.42). Secondly, the south had more advanced technology and more mature 
markets for agricultural commodities, all of which had been established before 
unification. In fact, a Soviet command-economy style of cooperative could basically not 
operate well in the south. Farmers in the south were much more experienced and 
comfortable with the operation of a market economy, and so were reluctant to adopt or 
implement any reasonable (not less unreasonable) commands from the State. 
In 1976-80, the form of the 'production collective' was popular in the south and 
dominant in the Cuu Long River Delta (CRD). At the end of 1980, in the south, there 
were 1,518 cooperatives and 9,350 'production collectives', involving 36 per cent of 
farmers in the south and 70 to 90 per cent of farmers in the centre region of the south of 
Vietnam (Chu V Lam, et. al. (1992), p.46). These 'production collectives' controlled 
nearly 95 per cent of the area available for cultivation (GSO various years). 
Basically, in rural areas of Vietnam, the administrative state system was 
comprised of four levels: the government, the province, the district, and the commune. 
In this period, on behalf of the State, the admirtistrative system managed all of the 
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activities in the cooperatives and controlled the entire range of activities of farmers. In 
terms of agricultural production, the farmer could not even decide the number or 
composition of his or her own labour force (Pham N Cuong, 1991, p.15). Given the 
differences between the types of collective in the north and south, the approximate 
relationship among the State, the cooperative, 5 the household or farmer and the free 
market in each local district is indicated in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3: The relationship among the State, cooperative, farm household and 
the free market 
Compulsory contribution output at 
the low state price 
INCOME FROM COOP;ERATIVE 
F 
Targets of 
prruction 
Labour force Order of work 
I 
I 
Labour and iJn·e5rment- - - - - - .!. 
l 
5 per cent land \' 
Non- rice out put 
~~~- ¼-:~:;:.:::-·- •.· .. ,-.,x-:.:;:.:..,t";;;;;"i•>,:, 
:S· 
INCOME FROM; FREE MARKETS 
t~ 
$ 
~} 
• I I -------------' 
Based on the state plan for the agricultural sector, the State Planning Committee 
(SPC) set production targets and plans, including the kinds of crop to be grown in each 
5 
For simplification I use the term 'cooperative' to mean both the low advanced and advanced cooperative 
(popular in the north) and the 'production collective' (popular in the south). 
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province, and provided guarantees of inputs to be supplied, such as fertiliser, chemicals 
and insecticide. The province detailed a sub-plan for each district, and the districts 
directly managed production for large advanced cooperatives while the commune 
managed small scale cooperatives (Che V Tan, 1982). 
After submitting to the State a quantity of rice (as a kind of tax), the remaining 
rice was divided by the number of work points earned by the farmers, where 10 points 
were equivalent to one working day. If an average dividend payment (in terms of rice 
equivalents) for one work point exceeded the maximum allowed, then the cooperative 
had to sell the excess rice to the State at the state price. That price was very low, 
perhaps equal to 20 to 30 per cent of the black market price (SDP, 1995a). 
In effect, the sole 'landlord' was the State (represented by the cooperative 
system), and the farmer was completely separated from land, and certainly so in terms of 
ownership rights. Indeed, the cooperative owned 95 per cent of the land of its members 
and all other assets, including draft animals and farm tools. Five per cent of land (the so 
called "five per cent land") was used by households for vegetable production and the 
breeding of pigs or chickens but the state still forbade private trade outside the local 
district. 
The centralised management and a strict planning bureaucracy controlled the 
targets and operations as well as the choice of investment. The cooperatives used 
brigades of cadres to direct labour working in their fields. The brigades6, were given the 
target plan by the cooperatives and were meant to deliver all output to the cooperative. 
The system relied upon a detailed framework of labour categorisation and norms in 
6 Brigade cadres were meant to control directly a labour force of over 100 farmers which turned out to be 
very difficult for the lowly educated peasant. 
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order to decide upon the inputs that would be needed to meet the output target, and also 
to calculate labour remuneration. Once again, remuneration in a cooperative was based 
solely on the labour contribution and took the form of work points. The income of a 
household depended on the number of work points earned by the family members and 
the average value of a work point. Because the farmer's income depends on the man-
days worked or work points, which were determined by inefficient and bureaucratic 
managerial staff, the actual distribution of income often turned out to be egalitarian. In 
this system the farmer was acted as a 'mandatory worker' and incentives to work hard or 
to exploit the available natural resources efficiently were absent. 
Not surprisingly, for the farm households, the "five per cent land" was the main 
source of income. They invested labour and resources to increase output from that land 
in particular. In fact, the output from the "five per cent land" was seen as compensation 
for food shortages because the payment in terms of rice from the cooperative was often 
not sufficient for survival. The residual product from the "five per cent land" ( except for 
rice and other key agricultural goods) was permitted to be sold in the local market at the 
market price. Even though small markets still existed in rural areas, the State absolutely 
controlled all marketing of rice. Legally, farmers could not sell rice or pigs or other key 
agricultural goods in the local district. 
Needless to say, there was a total absence of both domestic and international 
markets for agricultural goods in this period. The State was a monopsony purchaser of 
all output and supplied all main materials through the state commercial network. More 
over, the state strictly regulated the prices of inputs and outputs and administratively 
allocated inputs and outputs, via a state bureaucracy, with compulsory prices set at 
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arbitrarily low levels. 
As a result of the compulsory cooperative form and the repression of internal and 
external trade in the economy, there was no incentive for farmers to use natural 
resources efficiently. The output of agriculture as well as food grain production fell 
markedly in the period 1977-80 (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) causing Vietnam to import a 
large amount of foodstuff, mainly from the former Soviet Union. 
(b) De-collectivisation in rural areas and tightly controlled markets (1981-87) 
In 1979-80, the Vietnamese economy had experienced extreme crises ( e.g., very poor 
harvests, war with Cambodia, the end of aid from the Soviet Union), as a result of which 
a program of economic reform was implemented. The State attempted to overcome the 
economic crisis in particular by the de-collectivisation of agricultural production. On 
January 13th, 1981, the Communist Party Secretariat (CPS) issued Order No. 100, 
termed the 'Reform contracted work and expanded the use of output contracts with 
groups of workers and individual workers in the agriculture cooperative'. The output-
contract system was thus introduced whereby the land was allocated to peasants so that 
they could themselves organise the weeding and harvesting, with the remaining 
operations still to be carried out by the cooperative. A quota for produce or output 
delivery was fixed or based of the average yield of a plot of land in the previous three 
years. In this period, de-collectivisation partially removed barriers imposed by 
centralised management and the planning bureaucracy and provided more freedom of 
choice over decisions regarding production and investment. Therefore the role of the 
farmer became that of a partial decision-maker. In general, the relationship among the 
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state, the fann household and the market in each local district is as indicated in Figure 
2.4. 
Figure 2.4: The relationship among the State, cooperative, farm household and the 
free market 
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The State still kept control over all commercial activities at the state price, but 
the farmer could now control the output and distribution of his products so that the 
emergence of free ( or black) markets was unavoidable. In fact, in this period, two 
parallel goods markets were existed: the state market at the state or compulsory price ( at 
that time th·e state price was higher than in the previous communal period but still much 
lower than the market price), and the free market with free market prices. Thus, the 
State only partially controlled the goods market, but still fully controlled input supply 
(Nguyen T Khiem, 1995). In other words, although this period is characterised by a first 
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move towards economic liberalisation, generally, a system of full domestic markets was 
not yet established. The farmer became a partial decision maker but the incentives for 
him to work hard and exploit natural resources efficiently was very limited. 
Nevertheless, this system yielded positive results in output and incomes for six 
years but then performance deteriorated, for various micro and macroeconomic reasons. 
First, at the microeconomic level, while in principle the production quota was to be 
fixed for a period of five years, in practice it was often raised before the contract was 
due, minimising the possibility of surpassing the quota. The financial burden placed on 
the cooperative economy was very heavy on household incomes. In Cheung' s (1968) 
terms, the "output contract" could be compared to a fixed-rent contract in which the 
farm household bore most if not all of the risk, which is substantial in agriculture. As a 
result, farm households even returned land to the cooperatives as they were unable to 
deliver on their quotas. At the macroeconomic level, along with tightly controlled 
markets and other pricing policies, an extremely over-valued exchange rate policy 
caused serious problems for agriculture. Overall, the lack of coordination and the lack 
of the comprehensiveness of the reform program was the main cause of declining food 
production in 1987 and 1988 (see Figure 2.2). 
( c) The gradual freeing up of markets and trade liberalisation (1988-89 until the 
present) 
As a result (especially) of severe food shortages in 1987-88, the government recognised 
the problem with the old output-contracts system, and a clear renovation to the program 
was introduced by Resolution No. IO of the Politburo (April, 1988). Under these new 
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regulations, farm households were now linked to cooperatives by a contract allocating 
( conditionally private) land use and allowing for the bartering of outputs for inputs and 
service supplies. In short, the cooperative was changing from being a device for 
extracting surplus by the state to becoming a service cooperative (much like in Western 
farm communities). However, it still had control over land and water resources so that 
households had no access to land if they withdrew from the cooperative. 
The new "output contracts for farm households" were set out with the following 
stipulations: 
• The right of property. Land allocation was based mainly on the number of members 
of each household as well as their farming capacity. The farm household had the 
right of use over the land for 10 to 15 years. Draft animals, farm tools and some 
other collective assets were sold to farmers and became their private property. 
• The management of production. The cooperative concentrated on carrying out those 
major support activities which can best be done on a larger scale, such as irrigation. 
As a result, the number of cooperative cadres who did not directly undertake farming 
was reduced by as much as one half. The farm household had the full right to 
manage production. However, the kind of product to be produced was still 
determined by the cooperative just as in the traditional state planning top-down 
approach 
• Income distribution. After the crop was harvested, farm households paid tax and a 
compulsory charge on the output per area of cultivated land. Otherwise, the farm 
household had the right to retain the income from their production. Farmers no 
longer had to sell produce to the state at below market prices. Instead, they were to 
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pay agricultural taxes on the basis of the yield from the land they received ( on lease) 
from the cooperative. Indeed, the substitution of state procurement by a fixed tax 
removed one form of uncertainty, and in economic dealings between farmers and the 
State (via cooperatives or state trading companies) only one price was quoted as the 
'negotiated price'. Unless there was a contract, farmers were free to sell their 
product on the free market. But until 1989 the local authorities forbade the peasants 
from selling their products out of the local district. 
• The gradual freeing up of the state planned system. At the beginning of de-
collectivisation (1981-82) the state still controlled the price system for the majority 
of goods. Later, under pressure from farmers, 7 the price system was freed up. In 
1983, in order to absorb the left-over rice, the Central Price Committee (CPC) 
determined the "negotiated price" between the farmer and the state as being largely 
dependent on the market price and subject to mutual agreement. Under the hyper-
inflation of 1988-89, the state had to resort to the barter exchange of fertiliser for 
rice, e.g., 1 kg of urea = 2 kg rice (SDP, 1995a). Generally, the State was still a 
monopsonist in the purchase of rice and farmers could not sell rice outside the local 
district, again at least until 1989. 8 
Finally, in June 1990, the State cancelled the dual price system ( one state price 
and one market price) for most goods and for the exchange rate. There was only one 
7Farmers especially in the south rejected the idea of selling their left-over rice to the state at below-market 
prices and contracted production. The 'negotiated price' of rice in 1989 was so low, even lower than cost 
of producing (CPC, 1995a), so that many farmers in the south continued to reduce production rather than 
sell rice to the State. 
81n 1988, according to the Land Law (Congress Of Vietnam, 1988), or the new land for "output contract" 
system, production could also not be sold, leased or passed on through inheritance. Assuming that the 
farm household is a natural profit maximiser (Cheung, 1968), then the additional freeing up of some 
property rights was still required to generate more market-oriented incentives for the household. 
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market price and no restrictions on trade in rice or any other agricultural goods. Instead 
of being allocated administratively, inputs and outputs were now made available for 
purchase and sale in decentralised markets. At the same time, economic reforms spread 
to every sector of the economy, such as the banking system, finance, the price system, 
the foreign exchange rate, trade, and so on. In fact, the process of decentralisation of the 
state monopoly on foreign trade started taking place in 1989, (Riedel, 1995) and most 
quotas were eliminated and replaced by import duties, with rates initially ranging from 5 
to 50 per cent (United Nations Development Program, UNDP/ World Bank, 1994, p.48). 
Exchange rate reform had also been strengthened by changing from a multiple to a 
unified exchange rate, with liberalisation of controls on foreign exchange (Annual 
Reports by State Bank of Vietnam). 
In July, the 1993 Land Law (Congress of Vietnam, 1993) reinforced land use 
rights ( over the 1988 Land Law) by extending tenure over agricultural land to 20 years 
and introducing provisions for the selling, leasing, exchanging, mortgage, and 
inheritance of land. Ownership rights however, in principle, still belonged to the State 
(World Bank, 1995). 
In the most general terms, the process of economic liberalisation, especially 
internal and external trade liberalisation, had developed gradually and reached a 
substantial degree of completeness in or about 1989-90. Since then, farmers have many 
options over the production and sale of output. Farmers can choose the kind of product 
to produce, and the form and arrangement of their farm operations. They can also deal 
directly in the markets for inputs and outputs. (The relationship among the State, the 
farm household, domestic and international markets in this period is indicated as in 
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Figure 2.5.) 
Figure 2.5: The relationship among the State, cooperative, farm household, 
domestic and international markets 
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Trade has developed strongly and quickly throughout the economy. 
Decentralisation and the elimination of the state monopoly in foreign trade has provided 
opportunities for farmers to sell their products and buy necessities for production. The 
right to trade internationally has also been decentralised to provinces, districts and large 
companies. The State, however, still controls quotas or taxes and all licences to export 
rice, although illegal rice exports are undoubtedly still a common phenomenon which 
cannot be well controlled given the long borders between Vietnam, China and 
Cambodia. 
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
The process of economic reform in rural areas of Vietnam nicely illustrates the steps in 
which a transitional economy moves to a full functioning market economy. That 
process of internal and external trade liberalisation is clearly accompanied by key 
changes in the institutional framework. In Vietnam, such economic liberalisation 
started with the compulsory collective regime (1976-80), moved to and through the 
period of de-collectivisation with controlled markets in rural areas (1981-87), and 
eventually proceeded to the process of full market liberalisation (since 1988-89 until the 
present). This trade liberalisation in Vietnam has affected not only the structure and the 
price level of the goods and factor markets, but it has also provided clear incentive 
effects for the farmer to exploit land and labour more efficiently; incentive effects which 
have changed the farmer's function- from a sole and highly controlled 'mandatory 
worker' to the triple-role of a free worker, a manager and ( effectively) a landlord. 
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Chapter 
A STATIC MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL TRADE LIBERALISATION ON 
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 
The discussion of the nature of internal and external trade liberalisation in Chapters I 
and 2 above provides the background and motivation for a more rigorous analysis of 
how the process of trade liberalisation can affect agricultural growth and output in a 
transitional economy. This chapter presents a static model of the effects of liberalisation 
on agricultural output. The term 'static' here means that we consider all the relevant 
effects at a given point of time and treat variables such as the capital stock as 
exogenous. Central to the analysis is the concept of an 'institutional' production 
function, assuming optimal choices of inputs by economic agents, which expresses 
output as a function of institutional factors such as property rights, markets and work 
incentives. 
Section 3 .1 defines a 'technical' production which includes measures of 
effective labour and land, measures that incorporate the effort associated with working 
harder and using land more efficiently. Section 3 .2 constructs a comparable profit 
function for the representative farmer. Included here is the concept of net income that 
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partially captures incentive effects through changes in average output and factor prices 
at different stages of market liberalisation. Section 3.3 ties the concepts of Sections 3.1 
and 3 .2 together and derives the institutional production function. Section 3 .4 provides 
some concluding remarks and Appendices 3A and 3B collect technical details . 
3.1 The 'technical' production function for agriculture 
Assume that a farmer can choose the effort with which he or she works. If N represents 
the total number of workers and &1 is the effort of a typical farmer, the contribution of 
labour to output measured in efficiency units may be written as &1N ( see McMillan, 
Whalley and Zhu, 1989). In fact, the role of &1 should be interpreted broadly to include 
everything that determines the quality of labour, such as the farmer's willingness to 
literally exert more effort as well as the enhanced effects of removing externally 
imposed restrictions on the kinds of tasks a farmer may undertake. 
In the communal system the farmer did not have any choice in the types of crops 
to plant or the way in which the work was performed or the farm managed. After the 
process of trade liberalisation, farmers were allocated conditional property rights to 
land, and they were also granted the freedom to choose which products to grow. The 
individual farmer had the right to manage production and determine necessary input 
requirements. In other words, the farmer had an incentive to choose the optimal or most 
efficient manner to exploit a given area of land. 
Next, and likewise, let L represent total sown area and &2 be the effort involved 
in exploiting and managing the land, such as increasing (optimally) the number of 
different crops sown in a fixed area, at the appropriate time, or simply, the level of 
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planning involved in increasing the yield on a given amount of land. The value of &2 is 
thus considered as the optimal choice of effort in the exploitation of land, so that the 
total contribution of land to output measured in efficiency units is &2L. Based on the 
efficient exploitation of land, a farmer will use inputs (that is, variable costs of 
production) such as fertiliser, pesticides, and seeds in order to maximise profit. The 
fixed costs associated with capital, such as machines, tools and irrigation are also 
required. 
The empirical literature on aggregate agricultural production functions for 
twenty-two less developed countries (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985), and China (Tang, 
1980), indicates that a typical aggregate production function is adequately captured by a 
Cobb-Douglas form, with constant returns to scale. Assuming such, and using the 
concepts of effective labour and land above, the production function is given by 
Q = ao(&1N)a1 (&2L)a2 (K1)a3(K2)a4 (3.1) 
where Q, K1, and K2 represent total output, current inputs (other than land and labour) 
and physical capital respectively. Indexing by i, when necessary, the values ai define 
share parameters on factor inputs, restricted in such a way that O < a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 < 1 and 
a1 +a2 +a3 +a4 = 1. 
In per-capita terms, the quantity produced by a representative farmer q is thus 
Q a(N)a a(L)a(KI)a(K2)a q = N = ao&1 i N i &2 i N i N 3 N 4 (3.2) 
or 
q = ao&/1&2 a2 (l)a2 (k1)a3 (k2)a4 (3.3) 
where q, !, k1, k2 represent output, land, current inputs and physical capital per farmer 
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respectively, or more simply 
q = Be a,E a1 
I 2 (3 .4) 
for B = a O (!) a 1 ( k1) a 3 ( k2 ) a4, so that the form of production function for a representative 
farmer clearly includes the farmer's choices of effort to work harder or to use the land 
more efficiently. 
3.2 The profit function for a representative farmer 
The net income or profit (Il) for a representative farmer is equal to total income (y) 
minus total cost (C). We will consider how liberalisation in the goods and factor 
markets affects total income and total cost, so that the change in profits under the effects 
of trade liberalisation can be clearly illustrated. 
(a) Total income for a representative farmer 
We suppose that each farmer receives an income that depends on his or her contribution 
to production and is given by 
y = /Jp(q - d) (3.5) 
where p is the price of the agricultural good at which output is sold, 1 q is the quantity of 
per capita output produced by the farmer and d is a constant term that can be considered 
as the fixed rent or lump-sum tax the farmer has to deliver to the state for the right to 
use the property, regardless of yield. The value /J is the fraction of the additional 
1 
It is noted that the prices for output and inputs in the different years ( as used in the comparative analysis 
of Chapter 4 and the empirical study in Part Three) are required to be adjusted into constant prices given a 
base year or a constructed real price in terms of a specific numeraire. See Section DA.3 , Data Appendix, 
for a further discussion of how the prices in the different years can be calculated to obtain real prices for 
the case of Vietnam. 
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revenue generated that the farmer is allowed to keep, so that /3 can be considered as a 
share-cropping contract between the landlord (the state) and the farmer. Here, the value 
/Jp is defined as an average goods price and it includes three components given by 
/Jp = (/JoPs + f31PM + f32Pw) (3.6) 
2 
where L /3 i = I and Ps; p M, pw are the state price, the market clearing price and the 
i=O 
export price respectively; and /Jo, /31 and /32 are the fractions or shares of agricultural 
output allocated or delivered to the state, the domestic market, or sold internationally. 
As such, the relative values of the coefficients /Jo, /31 and /32 mimic or reflect the 
industrial structure of the goods market, or the extent to which private market 
competition ( or non-state intervention) predominates, or not. 
Indeed, equation (3 .5) does not indicate all the complexities of the various 
payment systems, but it can capture the main features of how the values of c, p and /3 
vary during the reform process. Under the communal system, after submitting the 
compulsory tax to the · state, the entire remaining output had to be sold to the state at the 
given state price. After the de-collectivisation of property rights and the granting of free 
management in production ( although there was still a tight domestic market, with state-
regulated restrictions on the quantity of agricultural goods sold), the farmer could keep a 
small amount of output and sell it in limited and very local domestic markets. After the 
opening-up of the domestic market, the farmer could keep the whole of net output ( after 
tax) and sell it freely in the market place, and finally, with the development of the 
international market for agricultural goods, the farmer could sell a fraction of net output 
(given as a state-restricted amount or quota) to the world market via state-owned trade 
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organisations at the world price. Various values for /Jo, /31 and /32 thus imply different 
prevailing regimes and induce different incentives (or not) for the farmer to maximise 
profits by working harder and using natural resources more efficiently. 
(b) The cost function for a representative farmer 
Assume that the farmer chooses inputs in order to minimise cost, and that the cost 
function for a representative farmer takes a Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to 
scale. Total cost for the assumed agricultural production function is given by2 
4 
TC= co TI wt; Q (3.7) 
i=I 
where TC, Co and wi (i= l ,4) represent total cost, a constant coefficient, and the factor 
prices for labour, land, current inputs, and capital respectively. Let Co be given as 
C - a -1 a 1-al a -a2 a -a3 a -a4 o- 0 I 2 3 4 (3.8) 
so that the value of C0 is constant and depends on the share parameters of inputs in the 
'technical' production function in a given or specific economy.3 
Defining 
4 
W(wi)=f1 
i=l 
wa; 
I 
as the average (real) factor price, the total cost function can be rewritten as 
TC= C0 W(wi )Q 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
so that from equation (3 .10) the cost of production ( C) for a representative farmer 
depends on the quantity produced and the average factor price and can be given as 
2 
See Appendix 3A for the relevant derivation. 
3 
If a 0= 1 and the values of a1, a2, a3 and a4 are estimated at 0.53, 0.1, 0.21 and 0.16 respectively for 
twenty LDC's (Hayami, and Ruttan, 1985) then C0 is 1.67. Likewise, the values 0.5, 0.25, 0.1 and 0.15 
for China (Tang, 1980) also imply that the value of C0 is 1.67. 
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C=C0 W(wi)q. (3 .11) 
It is understood that the average factor price depends not only on changes in 
factor prices per se but also on changes in the composition of inputs, and those in 
particular that now receive explicit income payments. During the process of 
liberalisation, factor markets changed considerably in terms of both their structure and 
their speed of development. At 'early' stages, some types of inputs were 'free' (such as 
the labour of the farmer), or unpaid, receiving only implicit or in-kind payments. With 
market liberalisation such payments became explicit. 
( c) Th~ net income or profit function for a representative farmer 
The various values for average output price (/Jp) and the average factor price (W(wJ) 
represent the different incentives given to the farmer in order to maximise profits by 
working harder and using natural resources more efficiently. If profit is defined as the 
difference between total income and total cost, then the profit function for the farmer is 
given from equations (3 .5) and (3 .11 ), or 
IT= /Jp(q - d) - C0W(wi )q (3.12) 
where the values of /Jp, Co and W(wJ are as given in equations (3.6), (3.8) and (3.9). 
Next, define the average weighted-cost share parameter m as the ratio between 
th .c: • d h . d . d W( wi) e average 1actor pnce an t e average output pnce, etem11ne as m = /Jp or 
W(wJ=m/Jp. (3 .13) 
This will make it possible to capture in the value m the effects of the relative changes 
between the average output price and average factor prices, given changes in both goods 
I,. 
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and factor markets at different stages of liberalisation. Substituting the value of m from 
(3.13) into (3.12), implies that the profit function for a farmer is now given by 
IT= ,Bp[ q(l-C0m)-d ]. (3.14) 
The farmer can thus produce agricultural output only when the cost per unit is (weakly) 
smaller than the price per unit of output, or when C0m is less than or equal to one. (In 
the long-run with constant returns to scale this value will be one, or economic profits are 
zero.) 
3.3 The derivation of the 'institutional' production function 
To complete the model, assume now that the farmer receives utility from income but 
dislikes the effort of hard work and the toil and effort of planning for the more efficient 
exploitation of the land. In general the utility function can be written as a function of 
profit and the optimal choice of effort, or U(II, &1, &2). The partial derivative of utility 
with respect to profit is assumed to be positive and its partial derivative with respect to 
each type of effort is assumed to be negative. 
By maximising the farmer's utility (with effort as arguments in the utility 
function), subject to a profit function, we can obtain solutions for the optimal choice of 
effort, or &1* and &2*. Substituting the values of &1* and &2* into equation (3.3) and 
multiplying by the amount of labour, gives ( as we will see) the new institutional 
production function. 
To do this, we assume the utility function takes the form 
z z 
&1 &2 
U(IT,&i, 8 2) = IT- z8 - z8 (3.15) 
~ 
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where 8 > 0 and z > 1 are constants, so that ( as noted above) the marginal disutility of 
effort, or &(-1 I <5 and &;-1 I <5, increases with effort. The effort-disutility coefficient, or 
z, is such that 
iJ 2 U I iJ& 2 I} 2 U I iJ& 2 
1 1 2 z - = & i !JU I iJ& i = & 2 oU I iJ& 2 (3.16) 
so that z measures the curvature of the utility function and is analogous to the 
'coefficient of relative risk aversion'. For simplicity, the utility function, or (3 .15), also 
implies that the disutility of effort is independent of the level of income. Substituting 
(3.5) into (3.15) gives 
z z 
] 
81 82 U(TI, &i, &2) = /Jp[ B&I a, &2 a2 (1 - Com) - d - z<) - z<) . (3.17) 
Consider the farmer's optimal choice of effort. Maximising (3 .1 7) with respect to &1, 
and &2 implies that the optimal value of &1 and &2 must satisfy4 
z-a2 a2 * -- --& = ( B a z a z ) z-a ,-a2 
1 1 1 2 (3.18) 
z-a 1 a 1 * -- --
82 = (B1a2 z alz )z-a,-a2 (3.19) 
for B1 = 6/Jp(l - C0m)B = 8/Jp(l - C0m)a O (/)a2 (k1 )a3 (k2 )a
4
• 
Substituting (3 .18) and (3 .19) into the per worker production function ( equation 
3.3), and multiplying both sides of that equation by N, converts back to aggregate 
variables (see Appendix 3B). This gives the institutional production function, or 
Q = A(N)Y1 (L)Yi (K1)Y3 (K2)Y4 (3.20) 
where the total factor productivity coefficient A is given by 
4See Appendix 3B for the relevant derivation. 
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_z_ a1+a1 a1 ~ 
A=(ao)z-a1-a1 [ 5/Jp(l-Com) ]z-a1-a2 (a1)z-a1-a2 (a2)z-a1-a1 (3.21) 
and the share parameter for labour, land, current input expenditures ( e.g., fertiliser) and 
capital in the institutional production function are respectively 
and 
za1-a1-a2 r1 = z-a -a I 2 
za2 
= a Y2 z-a1 - 2 
za3 
Y3 = z-a1 -a2 
za4 
Y4 = z-a1 -a2 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
Most importantly, the institutional production function, or equation (3.20), is 
distinguished from the 'technical' production function given by equation (3 .1) because, 
while (3 .1) reflects the technical relationship betweens inputs and outputs, equation 
(3.20) captures directly the farmer's response to the institutional arrangements (and the 
resulting enhanced incentives) within which they work. Note that the institutional 
production function is characterised by constant returns to scale, since 
r 1 + r 2 + r 3 + r 4 = z( a I + a 2 + a 3 + a 4) a 1 a 2 
z-a -a =l I 2 
(3.26) 
and that the institutional production function is expressed in terms of the observable 
labour and land input (N and L ), whereas the technical production function is expressed 
in terms of the unobservable efficiency measures of labour (&1N) and land (&2L). It is 
equation (3 .20) rather than (3 .1) that would be estimated by a conventional production 
function estimation, and the estimated factor shares would be r i rather than those of the 
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technical production relationship, or a;. The parameter A would be estimated as the 
coefficient for total factor productivity rather than the value a 0. 
Note too, that the parameters a0 and a1 are technologically determined and that 8 
and z are taste parameters, all of which are invariant to institutional form. The key 
variables are price (p ), the goods market share (/J), and the relative price change between 
average output price and average input price ( m). 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provides a model that shows the effects on agricultural output due to the 
enhanced incentives that result from liberalisation in transitional economies. Trade 
liberalisation, or the gradual "freeing-up" of domestic and international markets, 
accompanied by changes in the institutional framework ( especially with regard to 
property rights), can affect the amount of effort involved in the efficient exploitation of 
labour and land. 
On this basis, a key concept in this chapter is the notion of an 'institutional' 
production function, which reflects not only the usual technical relationship between 
inputs and outputs, but also incorporates the farmers' response to the institutional and 
market arrangements within which they work. In the institutional production function, 
total factor productivity and the optimal choice of effort depend both on the price level 
and structure of the goods and factor markets. These variables clearly differ from one 
stage of liberalisation to the next. The effect of each stage of liberalisation on total 
productivity and the farmer's optimal choice of effort is the central topic of the next 
chapter. 
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Appendix 3A: THE FORMATION oF THE cosT FUNCTION 
Consider the cost minimisation problem for agricultural production, as 
TC(w, Q) = min (wIN + w2L + w3KI + w4K2) N ,L ,K1K2 (3A.1) 
such that 
Q = ao (N)a1 (L)a2 (KI )a3 (K2 )a4 (3A.2) 
where w 1, w2, w3 and w 4 are the wage of labour, the opportunity cost of land, the price of current 
inputs and capital respectively. The appropriate Lagrangian function is 
.,j;=wIN +w2L+w3KI +w4K2 -A{ Q-ao(N)a1(L)a2(KI)a3(K2)a4 ] (3A.3) 
and solving in terms of first order conditions gives 
L = (wia2 J(N) 
w2aI 
(3A.4) 
KI = (wla3 JcN) 
W3a1 
(3A.5) 
and 
K2 = (wia4 JcN). W4a1 (3A.6) 
Substituting equations (3A.4)-(3A.6) into (3A.2) and solving gives 
N- Cw a1-Iw a2w a3w a4Q - 0 I 2 3 4 (3A.7) 
L _ C ( a 2 Jw al W a2 -I W a3 W a4 Q - oa I 2 3 4 
I 
(3A.8) 
K _ C (a 3 Jw al W a2 W a3 -1 W a4 Q 1 - 0 a l 2 3 4 
I 
(3A.9) 
and 
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K _ c ( a 4 Jw a1 w az w a3 w a4 -1 Q 2- o a 1 2 3 4 
1 
(3A.10) 
where 
C -1 l-a1 -a1 -a3 -a4 o = ao a1 a 2 a 3 a4 (3A.ll) 
Finally, substituting (3A. 7) through (3A. l 0) into the cost function or (3A. l) implies that 
TC= Co WI al W2 a1 W3 a 3 W4 a4 Q or TC= CoW(wi )Q (3A.12) 
where 
W(w )- w a1w a1w a3w a4 i- 1 2 3 4 · (3A.13) 
The cost function for a representative farmer is thus given by 
C= C0W(wi)q (3A.14) 
as in the equation (3 .11) in the chapter above. 
Appendix 3B: THE FORMATION oF THE 'INSTITUTIONAL' PRooucTION 
FUNCTION 
The idea is to maximise the utility function of the representative farmer given by 
z z 
&1 ~ 
U(TI, &i, 6 2) = IT- z8 - z8 (3B. l) 
for 
TI= [/Jp(l - C0 m)q - d]. (3B.2) 
The quantity produced by a representative farmer is 
q = ao&t1&2a1(l)a1(k1)a3(k2)a4 (3B.3) 
where q, l, k1. k2 represent output, land, current inputs and capital per farmer respectively, or 
q = B& a 15 a1 
1 2 (3B.4) 
for 
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B= ao(l)a2(k1)a3(k2)a4. (3B.5) 
The first order condition with respect to E1 is 
8[J & z-1 - = Rn(I - C m)Ba & a1-I & a2 - I = 0 O& /Ji-' 0 I 1 2 6 
1 
(3B.6) 
and solving gives 
8 z-a 1 = B a 8 a2 I I I 2 (3B.7) 
and 
• &1 = (a B & a2) v(z-a1) 
1 1 2 (3B.8) 
8U for B1 = 8/Jp(I - C0m)B. By symmetry, from-;:;-= 0, we get the result for the optimal value 
U&2 
of &2 as 
&; = (a B 8 a1 )11(z-a2) 2 1 1 . 
Next, solve equations (3B.8) and (3B.9) simultaneously, as follows. The value of 
B _ (8 z-a2 8 -a1); a = (8 z-a1 8 -a2); a 1- 2 I 2 1 2 1 
which implies that 
z 
a2 ~ (-)=(-z) 
al ~ 
and 
1 
• a2 - • 
8 2 = (-)Z Cl 
al 
Substituting the values (3B. l l) into equation (3B.9) gives 
I a az Jz-~ 1 
&1 =l a1B1 (a:) , ct' 
z-a2 a 2 
or &z-a1-a2 - Ba z a z so that I - 1 1 2 ' 
(3B.9) 
(3B.10) 
(3B.ll) 
(3B.12) 
I 
H~ 
/1· 
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z-a2 a 2 
& * = (B a -z-a-;) z-a,-a2 
I I I 2 (3B.13) 
with B
1 
= 5/Jp(I - C
0
m)a
0 
(l)a 2 (k
1 
)a 3 (k
2 
)a 4 • Substituting (3B.13) into (3B.11) gives 
z-a 1 a1 * -- --8 = (Ba z a z ) z-a1-a2 2 I 2 I (3B.14) 
and substituting (3B.13) and (3B.14) into the per worker production function, or equation 
(3 B .3 ), gives 
z-a2 ~ a, ~ z-a 1 ~ 
q _ B(B a z a z )z-a,-a2 (Ba z a z )z-a1-a2 - 11 2 11 2 (3B.15) 
so that, with the values of Band B1, 
z a,+a2 a1 a2 
q = [ao(l)a2 (k
1
)a3 (k
2
)a4 ]z-a,-a2 (o/3p)z-a,-a2 (a 1)z-a,-a2 (a2)z-a1-a2. (3B. l 6) 
Finally, multiplying both sides of equation (3B. l 6) by N converts back to aggregate variables, 
or 
z a +a a1 a2 z -- 1 2 ---- ---- I ---(a2+a3+a4 ) Q = (ao) z-a,-a2 [ 8/Jp(l - Com) ] z-a1-a2 (a I) z-a1-a2 (a 2) z-a1-a2 N z-a1-a2 
a 2z a3Z a4Z 
( /N) z-a1-a2 ( kl N) z-a1-a2 ( k
2 
N) z-a1-a2 . (3B.l 7) 
Define the total factor productivity A as 
_z - a,+a2 a, ~ 
A= (ao)z-a1-a2 [ 8/Jp(l- Com) ]z-a1-a2 (a1)z-a1-a2 (a2)z-a,-a2 (3B.18) 
where the parameter shares of labour factor, land factor, current input expenditures and capital 
in the institutional production function are respectively 
and 
z za1 - a 1 - a 2 r1 =l-----(a2 +a3 +a4)= z-a -a z-a -a I 2 I 2 
za2 r = a 2 z-a
1 - 2 
za3 r ... = a -a2 -' Z- I 
(3B.19) 
(3B.20) 
(3B.21) 
11: 
f I 
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r4=z-a1-a2 
za4 
(3B.22) 
so that value of Q in equation (3B. l 7), after substitution, can finally be defined or rewritten in 
the form of the institutional production function, or 
Q = A(N)Y1 (L)Y2 (K1)Y3 (K2)Y4 
as given by equation (3.20) in the chapter above. 
(3B.23) 
I 
11., 
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Chapter 
A COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS OF THE 
EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRADE 
LIBERALISATION ON AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
Given the effects of trade liberalisation, Chapter 3 provided the form of the 
'institutional' production function. Based upon this work, this chapter provides a 
simple theoretical analysis of the comparative statics effects that result from the various 
stages of internal and external trade liberalisation on agricultural growth. A key concern 
is the change in total factor productivity (A) and the farmer's optimal choice of effort 
( &1, &2) given changes in the average goods price (/Jp) and the average weighted-cost 
share parameter (m), or the average factor price (W(wi)), across different periods or 
stages of liberalisation. Section 4.1 deals specifically with the changes in the goods and 
factor markets, while Section 4.2 discusses the resulting effects on total factor 
productivity. Section 4.3 characterises the farmer's optimal choice of effort in different 
stages of trade liberalisation and, for completeness, Section 4.4 determines the share 
parameters of factor inputs in the institutional production function. Section 4.5 
concludes and Appendix 4A considers the case of changes in m specific to Vietnam. 
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4.1 The goods and factor markets in the different stages of trade liberalisation 
Based on the definitions in Chapter 3, recall that the average goods price (J3p) and the 
average factor price W(wi) reflect the price level and the structure of the goods and 
factor markets, whereas the average weighted-cost share parameter (m) reflects the 
relative changes between the goods and factor markets. As such, the analyses of the 
goods and factor markets can be characterised through changes in these parameters 
across the different (institutional) stages of trade or market liberalisation. 
(a) Changes in the goods market 
Return to the components of the average goods price f3p given in equation (3 .6), 
renumbered here for convenience 
f3p = (f3oPs + f31PM + f32Pw) ( 4.1) 
so that the average goods price (J3p) depends on the market shares allocated among the 
State, the domestic and the international markets (/30, /31 and /32), and the price levels (ps, 
p 1, p2) which differ from one stage of trade liberalisation to the other. Likewise, the 
various values of /3o, /31 and /32 represent the different structure of the goods markets in 
the different stages of trade liberalisation. 
In the period of the communal system, the fanner has to sell to the State the 
entire agricultural output at the low, state controlled price (ps). He ( or she) cannot freely 
sell products in the domestic or international market, so 
Poe= 1;/31c = O;f32c = 0. (4.2) 
111: 
1111 
lf 1 
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In the period of output contracts with a tightly controlled markets the farmer still 
has to sell the major share of output to the State at the low compulsory price, but he ( or 
she) can also sell a small fraction of output to the domestic market (/31 D), at the market 
price. In other words, the domestic market is operating but it is still tightly regulated 
and there exist two parallel price systems for agricultural goods (the state and domestic 
market prices). The values of /3 in this case are 
1 > /3 D > O· I > /3 D > O· fJ D = O· /3 D + /3 D = I 0 , 1 '2 '0 I (4.3) 
where /3 i° is very small. 
In the period of a free domestic market or a full internal trade liberalisation, the 
State allows the domestic market to trade freely. Freedom of purchase and sale of 
agricultural goods is permitted and the barriers to market entry are removed. The price 
controls by government are also removed so that the prices for agricultural goods reflect 
their real or market value. Under this regime, the farmer has the full freedom to sell 
products in the domestic market at the market price, but he still cannot enter the 
international market. Thus, under this regime, the market share components are 
determined as 
f3oM = O; f31 M = I; /3:1 = 0. (4.4) 
In the period of the opening up of the international market or that of external 
trade liberalisation, the State removes the trade barriers to international markets and 
decentralises the government trade monopoly. Moreover, the State implements the 
necessary reforms in exchange rate policy so that a new, more appropriate exchange rate 
more closely reflects the 'real' or true market value of the domestic currency. The 
farmer can thus export (via competitive trade organisations) a market share (j32w) of 
[l'I 
:( 
,,; 
fl 
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goods to the international market at a world price and also have the freedom to sell his 
product in the domestic market. Therefore, in this period, the market shares between the 
State, the domestic market and international markets are as follows 
/Jow = 0;1 > f31w > O;l > f32w > O;f31w + f32w = l. (4.5) 
Corresponding to the market shares /Jo, /31 and /32 are different price levels ps, p 1, 
p2 for the State, domestic and international markets respectively. Assume, as is the 
actual case for Vietnam (see the Data Appendix), that during the transitional periods, the 
product price increases over time in the different stages of liberalisation, or 
Ps <pD <pM <Pw· (4.6). 
This assumption comes from an argument (and actual fact) that in the communal system 
the State determines the price (ps) and that it is invariably lower than the market clearing 
price (pM) that corresponds to the period of free domestic markets. It is noted that the 
value of the export price in terms of domestic currency depends on the exchange-rate 
regime in place. In this case, we assume that with reform the exchange rate reflects a 
true market value, so that for the food-export economy the market clearing price (pM,) is 
lower than the export price (pw). 
(b) Changes in the factor market 
As mentioned earlier (Section 3.2, Chapter 3), the average factor price (W(wi)) is a 
measure of the explicit expenditure on inputs that farmers have to pay. Thus, the 
average factor price (W(wi)) depends on not only the level of each factor price but also 
on the degree or development of factor markets, especially (but not exclusively) for the 
cases in which previously non-tradeable goods or inputs become tradeable. In the 
11I 
10 I 
I 
•l' I 
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period of the communal system many kinds of inputs and were either non tradeable or 
unpaid, in that the farmer got them 'free' (e.g., allocated land and labour, the state's 
investment goods, and various subsidies). The cooperative then distributed income to 
farmers by egalitarian means depending on a work-point system, with no explicit wage 
rate being determined for labour. As such, we can assume that the main explicit 
payment for inputs is for current inputs or chemical fertiliser so that the average factor 
price is given by 
W(wi) = (w;)a3 (4.7) 
where w; is the state or low price of fertiliser. 
In the period of output contracts, with tightly controlled markets, the State 
loosens or opens up the input market, but mainly (in the case of Vietnam) just for 
materials like fertiliser and insecticide. In this period of time the farmer is able to 
purchase a small amount of such materials from private commercial companies at a 
domestic market price (w:1>w;), but with no other changes in the rest of the input 
market. The value of average factor price is still defined as in equation (4.7) but input 
prices as a whole rise due to the increase in the (two parallel) state and domestic market 
prices for fertiliser and insecticide. 
In the period of a free domestic market, the State permits the domestic market to 
trade agricultural inputs freely and the barriers to market entry are removed. Under this 
regime, farmers have the full freedom to buy inputs in the domestic market at market 
prices but they still cannot purchase inputs from the international market at the world 
price (which, again, in practice, is often cheaper than the domestic market-clearing 
price). The development of factor markets also cause some non tradeable goods such as 
,l 
m: 
i 
•' ' 
l 
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labour and land to become paid commercial goods, i.e., farmers are now able to hire 
labour or rent land so that these expenditures now become explicit. The average of 
factor prices is thus 
W(wi) = (w;1)a' (w:)a3 (w;1)a4. (4.8) 
Finally, in the period of the opening up of the international market, there is more 
freedom for state organisations or the private sector to enter the international market. 
With the exception of some trade restrictions such as quotas or taxes, farmers can buy 
( via the trade organisations) from the international market and have the full freedom to 
purchase inputs in the domestic market. If we assume that there are still restrictions in 
the market for land, the average factor price still follows equation ( 4.8), but current 
inputs are now purchased at the world price. However, if the land market also develops 
so that the State now permits the leasing, selling, mortgage and inheritance of land then 
all of the input factors are now included in the average factor price so that 
4 
W(wi) = TI (wt)a;. (4.9) 
i=1 
While it is clear that the liberalisation increases the number of inputs that are taken into 
account as explicit expenditure payments, it is not always clear whether the price of 
inputs as a whole becomes more or less expensive. For example, in the case of Vietnam 
with full market liberalisation (see Section DA.3, Data Appendix) the price of fertiliser 
became cheaper while the price of land and labour became more expensive. 
( c) The relative changes between the goods and the factor markets 
The analysis above discussed the changes in the goods and factor markets separately but 
the institutional production function used in Chapter 3 is expressed in terms of the 
,> 
l~i 
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average weighted-cost share parameter (m), which is the ratio between the average 
goods and average factor prices, or W(wi)I/Jp (see equation (3.13)). Depending on the 
specific situation of the economy and the pattern of development between the goods and 
factor markets, the possibility of changes in the value of mis clearly different. In what 
follows we discuss all the possible changes in m ( constant, decreasing and increasing). 
(1) m is constant (ms = mD = mM = mw >O), where ms, mD, mM and mw are the 
average weighted-cost share parameters in the communal era, the regime of output 
contracts with a tightly controlled domestic market, the free domestic market and the 
opening up of the international market respectively. This case corresponds to the 
situation where liberalisation happens simultaneously in goods and factor markets and 
so has the same proportional effects on goods and factor prices. The increase in the 
average price of agricultural goods (/Jp) occurs at the same time and in the same 
proportion as the increase in average factor prices, or (W(w;)). In other words, farmers 
benefit from higher goods prices as much as they suffer from the higher input prices. 
(2) m decreases (ms > mD > mM > mw >O). In this case the process of trade 
liberalisation causes the average product price (/Jp) to increase but average factor prices 
(W(wi)) decrease or increase by a smaller proportion than the average product price. 
This possibility arises from the fact that in the period of the communal system the 
farmer receives small subsidies from the State through cheap input supplies (mainly 
fertiliser and insecticide), but has to sell output at a very low price. Moreover, input 
supplies from the State in the communal period are usually in short supply so that the 
farmer usually has to compensate by purchasing inputs from the black market at above 
the market-clearing prices. With the freeing up of domestic and international markets 
... 
I 
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the main materials for agriculture become abundant at the market clearing or world 
prices, and undoubtedly the prices of some inputs become much cheaper ( e.g., imported 
fertiliser). If we also assume (what seems to be true) that the development of land and 
labour markets is slow and weak in transitional periods, so that the only explicit 
expenditures are mainly for fertiliser and pesticide, the possibility of a fall in m is quite 
reasonable. 1 This case can be seen by the example of rice production in Vietnam ( see 
Appendix 4A, and Table DA. I 0, Data Appendix). In short, the possibility of 
liberalisation causing a fall in m seems quite likely in transitional economies. 
(3) m increases (O<ms <mn<mM < mw). This is the case where the development 
of the factor market causes the wage rate (for hired labour), the opportunity cost of using 
land and the prices of current inputs and physical capital to become very expensive with 
the average factor price for input (W(wi)) increasing proportionally more than the 
average output price (/3p) . However, as discussed in (2) above, this case may be rare in 
transitional economies, particularly where markets for labour and land are poorly 
developed. 
4.2 The total factor productivity coefficient (or A) in the different stages of trade 
liberalisation 
We now consider the factor productivity coefficient. Substituting equation (3.6) into 
(3.21) gives a measure of total factor productivity, or A, describing in detail the various 
components of market shares and prices under different regimes, so that 
11n transitional periods, the markets for land, labour, and capital are typically less extensive and developed, so that the component of explicit payments for inputs is mainly that of current inputs. In this case, Appendix 4A shows that the possibility for increase in m may be very rare. 
... 
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A= [a;Ja1+a2 [ (/JoPs + /J1PM + /J2Pw )(1- Com) ]a1+a2 at1a;2 l z-a1-a2. (4.10) 
The value A thus represents the coefficient for total factor productivity which depends 
on the parameters a 0 , a 1 and a 2 • However, A is independent of the share parameters of 
current input expenditures (K1) and capital (K2) . Changes in property rights and 
liberalisation will affect the values of /J and p and so will clearly influence the value of 
A. However, the value of A also depends on how the average weighted-cost share 
parameter ( m) changes. 
From equation ( 4.10), the growth rate of total factor productivity is given by 
• • 
A= ( a 1 + a 2 J /Jp(l - C0 m). 
A z-a1 -a2 /Jp(1-C0m) 
For convenience we use the component /Jp(l-C0m), which is defined as the composite 
price between output and inputs, for the analysis to follow later. 
The approximate growth rate of total factor productivity from the specified 
period (1) to the next period (2) can be defined by 
A=A 2 -A 1 =( a1+a2 
A A1 z-a1 -a2 
2 1 l (/Jp) (1- C0m2) - (/Jp) (1- m1c) I 
(,Bp ) 1 (1- C0m1) j 
( 4.11) 
where /Jp
1 = (/JoPs + /J1PM + /J2Pw )1 and /Jp 2 = (/JoPs + /J1PM + /J2Pw ) 2 are the 
average price of output in periods 1 and 2 respectively and m1 and m2 are the average 
weighted-cost share parameters in periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
.... 
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(a) The growth of total factor productivity in the transitional periods of 
liberalisation 
Now we are in a position to examine how the value and growth rate of total factor 
productivity change in the different stages of trade liberalisation. Under the communal 
system, substitute the value of /3 in equation ( 4.2) into· ( 4.10) so that the value of 
productivity factor Ac is given by 
AC - [a z <) a1+a2 [ p (1- C m )a1+a2 a a, a a2] z-a,-a2 - 0 s oc 1 2 ( 4.12) 
Everything else equal, the value of the productivity factor in the communal system can 
be greater if the State sets a price (ps) which more closely reflects the real or market 
value of agricultural goods. But, in fact, for a variety of reasons, the compulsory (or 
state) price of agricultural goods is usually set very low so that the value of Ac is very 
small. 
Under output contracts the value of the total factor productivity coefficient (AD) 
also includes a partial term for the domestic market, or 
AD = [ a; b a,+a, [ (/3 oPs + f31PM )(I - ComD) r,+a, at' a;, l z-a,-a, (4.13) 
with the value of /Jp given by (4.3). In the period of free domestic markets, substituting 
the value of /Jp from equation ( 4.4) into ( 4.10), the value of the productivity factor 
coefficient AM is given by 
AM _ [a Z <) a,+a2 [ p (l - C m )a1+a2 a al a a2] z-a1-a2 - 0 M OM 1 2 (4.14) 
and for the period of the opening up of the international market (with the value of /Jp as 
determined in equation (4.5)), the value of the productivity factor coefficient is given as 
.... 
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Aw =[a;5a1+a2[ (f31PM +/32Pw)(l-Comw)a1+a2at1a;2]z-a1-a2. (4.15) 
The results in equations (4.12) through (4.15) allow us to derive expression for the 
growth rate of total factor productivity in each transitional period. 
As such, the growth rate of total factor productivity in the period of output 
contracts compared to that of the communal system is determined from equations (4.12) 
and ( 4.13), or 
[ 
•] D 
1 A = AD -c Ac = ( a1 + a2 J[(f3oPs + f31PM )(1- ComD) - Ps (1- moc)JZ-a1-a2 
A A z - a1 - a2 Ps (1- C0m0 ) 
( 4.16) 
The growth rate of total factor productivity in the free domestic market compared to that 
in the output contracts system, as given from equations (4.13) and (4.14), is 
]
M 
1 
[
A =AD-CAM=( a1 +a2 J[PM(l-Com)-(f3oPs +/3ipM)(l-ComD)JZ-a1-a2 
A A z - a1 - a2 f3oPs + f31PM 
(4.17) 
and the growth rate of total factor productivity in the period of the opening up of the 
international market, compared with that of a free domestic market, given equations 
(4.14) and (4.15), becomes 
W 
1 
[ A] = Aw -c AM = ( a 1 + a2 J[(f31PM + f32Pw )(1- Comw) - PM Jz-a1-a2 A A z - a 1 - a 2 PM (4.18) 
The results of equations ( 4.16) through to ( 4.18) indicate that the growth rate of 
total factor productivity relates positively to the average goods price (/3p) and negatively 
to the average weighted-cost share parameter (m). During process of trade 
A 
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liberalisation, the component (/Jp) increases over time but the movement of the average 
weighted-cost share parameter (m) is ambiguous, hence the precise conditions for a 
positive growth rate of total factor productivity during process of trade liberalisation 
needs to be considered further. 
(b) The condition for positive growth of total factor productivity during the 
process of trade liberalisation 
Relying on equations (4.11), and (4.16) to (4.18), we now examine changes in total 
factor productivity under the effects of trade liberalisation according to the various 
possibilities of the changes in the average weighted-cost share parameter (m) set out 
earlier. The cases are as follows: 
(1) m is constant. When m is constant the level of total factor productivity 
jumps to a higher level when agriculture moves from one stage of trade liberalisation to 
the next. More specifically, with the sign of the denominator positive (see equations 
( 4.2), ( 4.3) and ( 4.6)). the sign of the growth rate of total factor productivity from the 
period of the communal to the output-contract system depends on the sign of the 
numerator in equation ( 4.16), which is positive. Similarly, the growth rate of total factor 
productivity from the regime of output-contracts to the regime of the free domestic 
markets also has the same sign as the numerator in equation ( 4.17), which from ( 4.3), 
(4.4) and (4.6), is also positive. Relying on equations (4.18), and (4.4) to (4.6), the 
growth rate of total factor productivity from the period of free domestic market to the 
period of opening up of the international market is positive as well. 
.... 
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(2) m is decreasing. From the arguments above, it can be concluded that the 
growth rate of total factor productivity across different phases is positive. The total 
factor productivity jumps to an even higher level than in the previous case because m 
decreases. Liberalisation has a more positive effect than in the case where m is constant. 
(3) m is increasing. Here, there is no strong conclusion about whether the 
growth rate of total factor productivity is positive or negative because m increases at the 
same time that /Jp increases. Indeed, because the sign of the growth rate of total factor 
productivity has the same sign as that of the numerator in equation ( 4.11 ), the growth 
rate of total factor productivity is positive only if 
/Jp2 (I- Com2 )- /Jp1 (1- Com1) > 0 ( 4.19) 
or, after substituting the value of m into equation ( 4.19), 
[ ( /Jp) 2 - ( /Jp) 1 ] - C0 [ (W ( w i ) 
2 
- (W ( w i ) 1 ] > 0 (4.20) 
where W(wJ 1 and W(wJ1 are the average factor price in periods 1 and 2, respectively. 
In other words, the condition turns out to be that the difference in the average 
price of inputs must be smaller than the difference in the average price of outputs 
between two periods, all divided by the constant coefficient in the cost function Co, 
where Co is defined as in (3 .8), or 
.6..W < .6../Jp 
C . 
0 
(4.21) 
Alternatively, if the full value of the average factor price is written as in equation (3.9) 
the condition for an increase in total factor productivity is given as 
4 4 TI (w: )a; - TI (w,2)a' < ;',,.f]p 
l=l i=l C 0 
(4.22) 
~ 
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where w) and w;2 indicate the factor price of input i in periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
Assuming that there are relatively immature markets for land and labour in these 
transitional periods, and given that the explicit payments or expenditures mainly refer to 
current inputs ( e.g., fertiliser, insecticide, and seeds), condition ( 4.22), as argued in 
Appendix 4A below, is easily satisfied. 
If, instead, we assume that factor markets are sufficiently mature (i.e., with high 
demands and perfect mobility in the labour and land markets), so that explicit payments 
include those to labour and land as well, it is possible that the condition given by 
equation ( 4.22) may not hold. It all depends on the specific situation, of course. For 
example, if the farm is located next to a large city, the wage rate or the opportunity cost 
for using land will undoubtedly be relatively much higher than in other areas, so that the 
increase in total factor productivity for cultivation will thus be smaller. Nevertheless, in 
transitional periods, even if apparently the rare case of an increase m happens, it is still 
highly probable that there will be positive growth in total factor productivity under 
effects of trade liberalisation. In other words, it seems very unlikely that an increase in 
m will totally swamp the relevant price effects (see Appendix 4A). 
4.3 The individual's optimal choice of effort in the different stages of trade 
liberalisation 
Now consider the optimal choice of effort in different stages of trade liberalisation. 
Rewriting equations (3.18) and (3.19), with the value of B1, the individual's optimal 
choice of effort can be described in terms of three components of the output market 
share and the output price as 
~ 
,,I 
I 
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z-a1 a1 I 
£; =[ao(PoPs + P1PM + P2Pw)(l-Com)(l)a1(kt 3 )(k;4 )a 1_z_a2--;-)]z-a,-a1 (4.23) 
and 
a1. z-a 1 I 
£; = [ ao (PoPs + P1PM + P2Pw )(1- Com)(l)a1 (kt 3 )(k;4 )a1-; a~)] z-a1-a1. (4.24) 
The effects of trade liberalisation on the individual's optimal choice of work effort ( £1) 
and devotion to land management ( £2) in different stages can now be considered by 
analysing the effects of the changes in the value of ,8 and p within each trade 
liberalisation regime, given the change in m for different cases. 
• In the communal system: Substituting the value of ps and ,8 (given in ( 4.2), or 
/Joe= l;,81c = 0;,82c = 0) into (4.23) and (4.24), we obtain the value of the 
individual's optimal choice of effort ( &1 ), and the optimal choice of effort for 
exploiting the land ( &2), or 
z-a1 a1 1 
£Jc= [aops(l- Comc)(l)a1 (kt) )(k;4 )a1_z_a!)]z-a,-a1 (4.25) 
a 1 z-a 1 1 
£2c = [ ao Ps (l- Come )(l)a1 (kt3 )(k;4 )a I-; a~)] z-a,-a1 (4.26) 
so that a low planned ( or state) price for the agricultural good in the communal 
system leads both to low effort as well as inefficient exploitation of land. 
• In the period of output contracts with a tightly controlled domestic market: 
Substituting Ps and ,8 (given in ( 4.3), where 1 > ,8/ > 0; 1 > /Jt > O; f32D = 0 
f30D + AD = l with /Ji° very small), so relevant effort variables are 
z-a1 a1 l 
&1D = [ ao (/3{: Ps + /Ji° PM )(l - C0mD )(l)a1 (kt3 )(k;4 )a1_z_a() ]z-a1-a1 (4.27) 
...ii 
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a1 z-a1 1 c: = [a
0
(,B0D Ps + /31D PM )(l- C0mD)(l)a1 (kt3 )(k;4 )a( a;;-)] z-a,-a1. (4.28) 
• In the period off ull freedom in the domestic market: Substituting the value of p M 
and f3 (given in (4.5) where f30M = O;/JiM = l;j32M = 0) into (4.23) and (4.24) we 
obtain 
z-a1 a1 I 
&1M = [ aoPM (l- ComM )(l)a1 (kt3 )(k;4 )a1_z_a7" )] z-a,-a1 ( 4.29) 
a1 z-a 1 1 
c:1 = [ a
0 p M (l - C0mM )(l)a1 (kt 3 )(k;4 )a1-;- a;;-)] z-a,-a1. ( 4.30) 
• In the period of opening up the international market: From the value of /3 in ( 4.5) 
where f3 0w=O;l>/31w>O;l>/32w >O;f31w+/32w=l , then the value of efforts 
become 
z-a1 a1 I 
&;1 =[a
0
(/3 1w PM+ /3 2w Pw)(l-C0mw)(la)a1(kt 3 )(k;4 )a1_z_a / )] z-a, -a1 (4.31) 
a1 z-a 1 I 
&; = [ a 0 (/3 1w p M + /3 2w Pw )(l - C0mw )(la)a1 (kt3 )(k;4 )a 1-;- a;;-)] z-a1-a1. ( 4.32) 
Comparing equations (4.23) and (4.24) with (4.10), it can be seen that the 
growth of the individual ' s optimal choice of effort equal each other and that they also 
equal the growth rate of total factor productivity. Therefore, the whole analysis of the 
growth in the individual's optimal choice of effort is similar to that of the growth of 
total factor productivity. Thus, we obtain the conclusions about the positive effects of 
trade liberalisation on the growth rate of the individual's optimal choice of effort, solely 
in terms of the change in factor productivity. 
.... 
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4.4 The share parameters of factor inputs in the institutional production function 
Finally, note the share parameters of factor inputs in the institutional production 
function (r1 ,· r2,· y3 and y4) are different from those in the technical production function 
(a1, a2, a3 and a4). From equations (3.22) to (3.25) the values of r1 ,· r2,· y3 and y4 
depend on the value of the curvature of the utility function (z) and the shares of 
parameters of factor inputs in the technical production function. Nevertheless, they are 
independent of the value of /3 and p, and thus do not depend on the specific regulatory 
regime in place. 
Consider the factor share of labour in the institutional production function, r1. 
This must be smaller than a1 in the 'technical' production function, since 
za1 -a1 -a2 <a1. 
Y1 = z- a
1 
-a2 (4.33) 
Taking the derivative of the value of YI with respect to z gives 
o(r1) = (al +a2)(l-~1) >O, 
O(z) (z-a 1 -a2) 
(4.34) 
so that the higher the disutility of effort, the higher the share parameter of labour in 
production. 
Likewise, the factor share of land in the institutional production function will be 
greater than that in the ' technical' production function, or 
za2 
Y2 = > a2 z-a -a 1 2 
(4.35) 
and the derivative of y2 with respect to z is 
0(r2) = -a2 (al+ a2~ < Q 
O(z) (z- al - a2) 
(4.36) 
...ii 
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so that the higher the disutility of effort, the lower the share parameter of land in 
production. 
By symmetry it can also be proved that the factor share of current input 
expenditures in the institutional production function will be greater than that in the 
'technical' production function, or y3 > a3 with 
O(y 3 ) _ - a3 ( al + a2 ) < Q. 
0( Z) - (z - al - a2 ) ,, 
( 4.37) 
The factor share of physical capital in the institutional production function will be 
greater than that in the 'technical' production function, or y4 > a4 with 
o(y 4 ) - a 4 ( al + a2 ) 
--= 2 <O. 
O(z) (z - al - a2) 
( 4.38) 
Under the same conditions, the change of the disutility coefficient z leads to 
changes in the share parameter of all factors of production. For example, if the disutility 
of effort increases, then the share of the labour parameter increases and the share of the 
parameters for land, current input and capital, decrease. Note that r 2 + r 3 + r 4 = 1 - r 1, 
so the total of the decrease in the parameters shares for land, current input expenditures, 
and capital, is equivalent to the increased amount of the share of the labour parameter. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has presented a formal analysis of the comparative statics effects on 
agricultural production of enhanced incentives and the different prices and market 
regimes that correspond to liberalisation across various transitional periods. Since 
prices and the structure of the goods and factor markets differ from one stage of trade 
liberalisation to the other, total factor productivity (A) and the farmer's optimal choice 
.A 
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of effort ( &1, &2) also differ across various stages of reform. Indeed, for the most part 
this chapter strongly argues that total factor productivity and the farmer's optimal choice 
of effort have increased from the period of the communal system, to that of the output-
contracts system, and from the output-contracts system to the period of the opening up 
or freeing of domestic and international markets. Quantitative estimation of the size of 
there effects for the case of rice production in Vietnam will be undertaken in Chapter 7. 
_.....ii 
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Appendix 4A: THE CHANGE IN THE AVERAGE WEIGHTED cosT-sHARE 
PARAMETER (m) FROM ONE STAGE OF TRADE LIBERALISATION TO THE NEXT2 
Assume that from period 1 to period 2 the output price increased by a factor a ( a > I) and the 
input price increased by a factor x, so that 
W2 (wi) = (xwi)a 3 and (f3p) 2 = a(f3p) 1. 
The average weighted-cost share parameter can increase only in the case 
xa3 
m2 =--m1 >m1 
a 
Or X > a ll a3 
(4A.l) 
(4A.2) 
If a 3 = 0.1 as in the case of China (Tang (1980, p.28) or 22 LDC's (Hayami-Ruttan, 
1985, chap 6), the average weighted-cost share parameter only increases if x > a 10 . In general, 
it is not common for 4A.2 to occur. For example, if output price doubles (a =2), then m 
increases only if the price of fertiliser increases by 210 or about I 000 times. In the case of 
paddy production in Vietnam, a 3 =0.2 (Appendix 7 A) and since output price increases by a 
factor of 2.5 (Table DA. I 0, Data Appendix) m increases only if the price of fertiliser increases 
by a factor of 97. 7. In fact, the price of fertiliser has decreased during trade liberalisation so the 
average weighted-cost share parameter has decreased from 0.31 (1976-80) to 0.23 (1994) (see 
Table DA.12, Data Appendix). 
2(The case of explicit payment refers only to current input expenditures) 
i 
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Chapter 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL TRADE LIBERALISATION ON 
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
In Chapters 3 and 4 a static economic model was developed to show the positive effects 
on agricultural output of newly enhanced incentives in transitional economies. There, 
the analysis employed an institutional production function, which is derived from the 
underlying technical production function and captures the farmers ' response to the 
institutional and market arrangements within which they work. 
The specific form of the ' institutional production function' in a static model 
allows us to analyse how total factor productivity changes in response to liberalisation 
(see Chapter 4). However, the static model considers only the comparative static 
changes in total factor productivity and various output levels in the different stages of 
liberalisation thus abstracting from the potential dynamic effects associated with 
induced capital accumulation. In this chapter, we extend the static model to account for 
It 
/I 
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the long-run dynamic behaviour of agricultural output due to the effects of liberalisation, 
given the farmer's optimal intertemporal choice over his or her lifetime. The idea is to 
analyse the resulting optimal transitional paths and the new steady-state outcomes that 
are the result of the enhanced incentives to produce more, and more efficiently, in 
transitional economies. This will provide a model which is used in Chapter 8 to 
estimate the long-run effects of the different stages of liberalisation on the rice industry 
in Vietnam. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5. I sets up and solves a dynamic 
optimal control problem for the representative farmer; one that accounts for the specific 
incentive effects of using land and labour more efficiently over time. To illustrate the 
solution, Section 5.2 constructs the appropriate phase diagram in the control-state-space 
for consumption and physical capital. Section 5 .3 analyses how the relevant transitional 
dynamics change in different stages of trade liberalisation, while Section 5.4 
characterises the positive effects of trade liberalisation on agricultural growth by 
comparing the outcomes in the growth model both with and without incentive effects. 
The chapter concludes in Section 5.5 with some overall remarks, and three appendices 
provide additional mathematical detail and derivations. Appendix SA, in particular, 
derives the slope and the directions of motion around the stationary loci in the phase 
diagram in Section 5.2. As a specific basis for comparison, Appendices SB and SC 
construct a comparable and detailed growth model for the case where there are no 
incentive effects from trade liberalisation, and then compare the effects on the steady-
state levels of the capital stock in both regimes. 
... 
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5.1 A growth model for agriculture under the effects of internal and external trade 
liberalisation 
For our purposes modem neoclassical growth theory starts with Ramsey (1928), with 
later developments given by Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Arrow (1962), Cass (1965), 
Koopmans (1965), and Sheshinski (1967). A central feature of these models (whether 
optimal or descriptive) is the assumption of an exogenous rate of growth in the labour 
force. Thus, changes in savings behaviour do not affect the steady-state growth rate, but 
only the steady-state values (for example) of consumption, output per capita and the 
stock of capital. In contrast, in the "new" class of endogenous growth models such as 
those of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), not only is the growth rate determined within 
the structure of the model but growth may go on indefinitely because the returns to 
investment of a broad class of capital goods-( ones which may include human capital) do 
not necessarily diminish as the economy develops. Spill-overs of knowledge across 
producers and the external benefits generated from the accumulation of human capital 
are also often part of this process, and help avoid the tendency for diminishing returns to 
the accumulation of capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Because this study is concerned with agricultural markets in which the 
production process is typically characterised by constant returns to scale with no 
significant spillovers, it is appropriate to use the neoclassical paradigm here. The 
growth rate of labour is exogenous but the standard neoclassical growth model is fully 
extended to account for the existence of incentive effects and the resulting economic 
change due to liberalisation. Of course there may also be a role for human capital 
't 
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accumulation, 1 however this is omitted here because of data limitations. Nevertheless, 
the analysis manages to capture most of the relevant effects of liberalisation on dynamic 
paths and the steady-state levels of consumption, output, the capital stock, and worker 
effort and efficiency. 
For simplicity, assume that all farmers are identical and the farmer ' s utility is 
non-negative and a concave and increasing function of consumption, and that utility is 
negatively related to the optimal choice of effort involved in using labour and land more 
efficiently. At time t we assume the relationship between utility and the optimal choice 
of effort is given by 
U = c(t) I-a - &1 (t) z - &2 (t) z 
l-a z8 z8 
(5 .1) 
where c represents consumption for the representative farmer; a E (0, 1) u (1 ,oo) is the 
inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution; 8 > 0 and z > 1 are 
constants as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The representative farmer ' s problem is to maximise overall utility U over a 
lifetime by deciding how much should be consumed today ( at any time t) or invested in 
capital to provide for consumption in the future and, in addition, what the correct or 
optimal trade-off should be between the effort required for higher income versus less 
effort or more leisure. In standard form, the dynamic optimal control problem for a 
representative farmer is thus given as 
Max J(c(t) 1-a 
0 1- (j 
&1(t) z - &2(t) ZJe-ptdt 
z8 z8 
(5.2) 
1
The 'Solow residual' in the empirical work (see Section 7.2, Chapter 7), for example, may be due to the 
effects of human capital accumulation (among a great many other things). 
11 
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subject to 
• 
k2 (t) = l(t) - (µ + n)k2 (t) 
k2(0) = k~ 
c(t) = IT(t) - l(t) 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
where pis a constant subjective rate of time preference. The evolution of the stock of 
physical capital is given by equation (5.3) where a dot over a variable denotes (as usual) 
differentiation with respect to time. The value I represents investment and µ and n (both 
constants) represent the depreciation rate for physical capital and growth rate of the 
labour force respectively. The value of consumption c(t) for a representative farmer is 
defined as the difference between the profit and investment at each time t. 
Substituting the value of profit given by equation (3 .14) adds a constraint for the 
control problem, or 
c(t) = PP[ (1- C0 m)q(t) - d ]- l(t) (5.6) 
and substituting the value of q from equation (3.3) into (5.6), allows consumption c to 
be rewritten as 
c(t) = /Jp(l - Com)aola 2 kt 3 k; 4 E~ 1 (t)c; (t) - /Jpd - I(t) (5.7) 
or 
c(t) = B3 k;4 c;1 (t)E; (t)- f3pd - J(t) (5.8) 
where the value of B3 is given by 
B3 = ,Bp(I - C0 m)a 0 la 2 kt 3 • (5.9) 
Given the equality constraint, or equation (5.8), the current-value Hamiltonian 
for this problem is defined as 
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H=(c(t)l-a - &1(t)z - &2(t)zJ +l(t)[ (B3&1(t) z&2(t)zk;4 -/Jpd-J(t)-c(t)] 
1-a z8 z8 
+ <P(t)[ l(t) - (µ + n)k2 (t)] (5.10) 
8H 
The first-order necessary condition with respect to c(t), or a(t) = 0 gives the result 
c(t)-a = l(t) 
oH and the first order condition with respect to &1 (t) , or --= 0 implies that 0&1 (t) 
&1 (t)z-a1 = l(t)B38a1&2 (t)a2 k2 (t)a4. 
8H By symmetry, the first order condition with respect to &2(t), --= 0 gives 
0&2 (t) 
&2 (t)z-a2 = l(t)B38a1&1 (t)a1 k2 (t)a4 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
Taking the ratio of equations (5.13) to (5.12), and solving for the value of &2(t) as a 
function of &1 (t) we get 
( J 
1/z 
5 2 (t) = &1 (t) :: 
as in the static model (see Chapter 3). 
The first order condition with respect to l(t), 8H = 0 gives 
8J(t) 
l(t) = <P(tJ 
and the co-state and state variables satisfy the conditions 
or 
• 8H 
<P(t) = --- + P<P(t) 
ik2 (t) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
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• 
(jJ =- A(t)B3a4&1 (t)al E2 (t)a2 k2 a4-I + (fJ(t)(µ + n + p) (5.16) 
and 
· oH 
k2 (t) = - = J(t)- (µ + n)k2 (t) orp (5.17) 
with the initial condition given as in (5.4) and 
li~ rp(t)k2 (t)] = 0 t • ct:J (5.18) 
as the transversality condition. 
5.2 Phase diagram analysis 
The above application of the 'Maximum Principle' yields a set of first-order necessary 
conditions including a pair of differential equations in (fJ(t) and k2(t). It is difficult to 
solve the system directly or explicitly (although see Chapter 8 for a further, applied 
analysis), but the solution can be nicely characterised with a phase diagram in the space 
for c and k2. The various regions designate optimal motions of the variables over time 
and define a steady-state. We first find the appropriate differential equations for 
consumption and the physical capital stock. 
(a) The differential equation for consumption (c) in terms of c and k2 
Substituting equation (5.14) into (5.12) and solving for the value of &1(t) gives 
&1 (t) = [ /4(t)5B3 (al t,a, (a2) a: k2 ur· ]z-a,-a, 
and using the results in (5.14) and (5.19) we can obtain 
(5.19) 
[ 
'I: 
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a1 +a2 a1 +a2 a4 a1 +a2 a1 a2 --
(t) 
a1 ( )a2 "(t)z-a1-a2 s:z-a1-a2 B k ( )z-a1-a2 £1 £2 t = /1, u 3Z-a1-a2 al z-a1-a2 a2 z-a1-a2 2 t . (5.20) 
Substituting equation (5.20) into (5.16), gives a differential equation for the co-state ( or 
shadow) price of physical capital, so that 
z a1+a2 za 4 1 • z a 1 a 2 -
( ) "(t) z-a 1-a2 s:z-a 1-a2 B k (t) z-a1 -ai + (t)( + ) (j) ( =-/!, U 3Z-a1-a2aJz-a1-a2a2z-a1-a2a4 2 (j) µ n+p 
or 
z za4 • 
(f)(t) = -A(t)z-a1-a2 B4a4k2 (t)z-a1-a2 + (f)(t)(µ + n + p) (5.21) 
where 
a1+a2 
z a1 a 2 
B s: z-a1 -a2 B --4 = u 3 z-a1-a2 al z-a1-a2 a2 z-al -ai . (5.22) 
From the results in (5.11) and (5.15) it follows that 
(f)(t) = J(t) = c(t)-a (5.23) 
and differentiating (5.23) with respect to time yields 
• • 
(f)(t) = (-o-)c(t)-a-I c(t). (5.24) 
Finally, substituting equations (5.23) and (5.24) into (5.21) and solving gives 
1 
[ 
-o-(a1 +a2) za4 ] 1 • l --'-- 1 
c(t) = - c(t) z-a1-a2 B a k (t)z-a1-a2 - -c(t)(µ + n + p) (J 4 4 2 (J (5.25) 
or the desired differential equation in consumption (c) in terms of c and k2 only. 
Note that the differential equation in consumption (c) in this model is different 
from the more standard Ramsey model without incentive effects (see Appendix 5B). In 
this case, the marginal product of capital in the steady-state is not equal to just the sum 
of the rate of time preference, the rate of depreciation of capital and the growth rate of 
l 
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labour force. Instead, the marginal product of capital in the steady-state also depends on 
the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the disutility of effort, 
and consumption at that time. 
(b) The differential equation for physical capital (k2) in terms of c and k2 
Begin by substituting the value of J(t) given in equation (5.17) into equation (5.8) so that 
• 
c(t) = B3k;4 st1 (t)st (t) - /Jpd - k2 (t) - (µ + n)k2 (t) (5.26) 
or 
• 
k2 (t) = B3k;4 st1 (t)s; (t) - /Jpd - (µ + n)k2 (t) - c(t) (5.27) 
The value of s1(t) and s2(t) in equation (5.27) can be eliminated by substituting from 
(5.20), giving 
z ~+~ z~ • z a 1 a 2 --k (t) ')(t) z-a1 -a2 s: z-a1 -a2 B k (t) z-a1 -a2 2 = /I, U 3 z-al -a2 a 1 z-a1 -a2 a2 z-al -a2 a4 2 
-(µ + n )k2 (t) - c(t)- /Jpd (5.28) 
and by substituting (5.11) into (5.28), using the definition of B4 in (5.22), we can obtain 
the differential equation in physical capital involving c and k2 only, or 
• -o-(a1+a2) za4 
k2(t)=c(t) z-a1-a2 B4k2(t)z-a1-a2 -(µ+n)k2(t)-c(t)-/Jpd . (5.29) 
As in the case of consumption, and as will be discussed later, the differential equation in 
physical capital (k2) in the growth model with incentive effects (resulting from 
liberalisation) also differs with that in the model without incentive effects. 
( c) The phase diagram for the optimal control problem 
~I 
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The phase diagram is constructed from considering the differential equations in 
consumption (c) and capital (k2) simultaneously (or equations (5.25) and (5.29)), listed 
here again for convenience: 
I 
[ 
-a-(a1 +a2 ) za4 • --'----'--=---+ I --c( f) = _ c(t) z-a1-a2 B a k (t) z-a1-a2 a 4 4 2 
1] 1 - a c( t )(µ + n + p) (5.25) 
-a-(a1 +a2) za4 • 
k
2 
(t) = c(t) z-ai-ai B
4 
k
2 
(t) z-ai-ai - (µ + n )k
2 
(t) - c(t) - /Jpd . (5.29) 
• To complete the exercise it is first necessary to graph the two stationary loci for c =O 
• 
and k 2 =O. This is done in Figure 5.1 (see Appendix SA for the derivation of the 
relevant slopes and directions of motion). 
• • 
Given the curvature of c and k 2 , the two stationary loci may intersect each 
• • other at two points. However, in the case (if it exists), where k 2 intersects c from 
above, it can be shown that this must occur at very large value of k2.
2 Based on 
boundary conditions, we can ignore this equilibrium and focus on the first case, or the 
steady-state equilibrium designated by point E in Figure 5 .1. The phase-space is thus 
divided into four distinct regions (I through IV), and at point E the values of k;, and c * 
are stationary. At any other point, either k2 or c changes in the directions indicated by 
• • the sign of the derivatives of c and k2 , with respect to c and k2 respectively, at that 
point. The result is indicated in Figure 5 .1, with directions of motion ( and the resulting 
trajectories) in all regions as shown (see Appendix SA). 
• 2 From Appendix 5A, it can be shown that the locus of points for which c =O is very steep so that the 
second equilibrium (if it exists) is at very large value of k2. 
! 
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Figure 5.1: The phase diagram for a dynamic model of the effects of internal and 
external trade liberalisation 
C = 0 
C + ..; .. 
II 
C· 
• 
2 = 0 
Co21------ ----: 
I 
Co1 L-t_.:---r IV 
0 
k20 k2· k2 
The equilibrium Eis seen to be a saddlepoint. For any initial value of k(O) (say 
k0 ) less than k; there is only one initial value of cat time zero (say ci as in Figure 5.1) 
that gives an optimal equilibrium path that converges to point E. All other paths 
diverge. Along this path both the values of c and k increase to their steady-state values. 
5.3 The effects of different stages of internal and external trade liberalisation on 
steady-state equilibrium 
With enhanced incentive effects in mind, is now easy to analyse the effects of 
• • liberalisation on the steady-state values of c * and k; . When c k 2 = 0, from 
equation (5.25), we obtain 
[ 
o-(a1+a2) ] za4 
B4c(t) z-a1-a2 a 4 k 2 z-a1-a2
1 = (p + µ + n) . (5.30) 
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Substituting (5.30) into (5.29) and solving for consumption c as a function of k2 gives 
•[P + (1- a4 )(µ + n)] 
C * = k2 ------ - /Jpd. 
a4 
(5.31) 
For convenience and in order to simplify the solution, we ignore din equation (5.31) 
and set it equal to zero. Substituting (5.31) into (5.30) and solving for k2, and c gives 
the equilibrium steady-state value, or 
k* = 2 
a(a1+a2) I+---'---=;_ 
B a z-a1-a2 
4 4 
a(a1+a2) 
(µ + n + p)[ (l - a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a1-a2 
(1-y4)+ a(a1+a2) 
z-a1-a2 
(5.32) 
Given the form of the technical production function, a constant subjective rate of time 
preference (p), the depreciation rate for physical capital (µ), and the growth rate of 
labour force (n), the steady-state values of physical capital and consumption depend 
only on the value of B3 or /Jp(l - C0m). Under different stages of liberalisation this 
value will change. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, liberalisation provides direct effects in the 
goods and factor markets. The changes in the structure of goods and factor markets, the 
changes in the price of goods, and the relative price of inputs and outputs causes the 
value of /Jp(l - C0m) to vary in the different stages of liberalisation, so the steady-state 
values of physical capital and consumption also vary. 
(a) In the communal system 
Substituting the value of Ps, and /J(given by (4.2) where /Joe =l;/J1c =0;/J2c =0), the 
value of m (see Section 4.1, Chapter 4) and the value of B3 and B4 (given as in (5.9) and 
' 
l 
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(5.22) respectively) into (5.31) and (5.32), we get the steady-state values of physical 
capital ( ki ) and consumption ( c *), which are 
z a1 +a2 a1 a 1 er( a 1 +a2) - _.,;;_-----=- -- _.c..__ I+--=--::....;.. 
ki = (p (
l - Cm )a za2 ka3 )z-a,-a2 6 z-a1-a2 az-a1-a2 az-a,-a2 a z-a1-a2 s Oc O 1 1 2 4 
a(a1 +a2 ) 
(µ + n + p)[ (1- a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a1-a2 
and 
z a 1+a2 a 1 a 1 1 
a(a 1+a2) -- -----'- ---- ---- +----
c*= 
(p s (l - Comc)aoza2 kt3 )z-a,-a2 6 z-a,-a2 a;-a,-a2 a;-a,-a2 a
4 
z-a,-a2 
a(a 1 +a2) 
(µ + n + p)[(l- a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a,-a2 
\.. 
[p(l- a~~(µ+ n) ]- p,d. 
(l-y4)+ cr(a,+a2) 
z-a,-a2 
(5.33) 
(l-y4)+ cr(a,+a2) 
z-a1-a2 
(5.34) 
(b) In the period of output contracts with a tight domestic market 
The value of Ps and /3 are given by equation (4.3) where 
I> f3 0D > O;l > /31° > O;f32D = O;f3a° + /31° = l, with /Ji° being very small (see Section 
4.1, Chapter 4). By symmetry, from (5.31) and (5.32) we get of the steady-state value of 
physical capital ( k] ) and consumption ( c1 ) as 
k; = 
and 
Z a1+a2 a1 a1 a(a1+a2) 1+----
[ (/]OD Ps + AD PM )(l-ComD)aofa2 kt3 ]z-a,-a2 5z-a1-ai CX-rz-a,-a2 a;-a,-a2 a4 z-a,-a2 
a(a,+ai) 
(µ+n+ p)[ (l-a4 )(µ+n)+ p] z-a,-ai 
a(a1+a2) 
(l-r4 )+ z-ai-ai 
(5.35) 
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Cll = 
z a1+a2 a1 a1 1 a(a1+a2) Wo Ps + If p M )(1- G!nD)aof a2 kt3 ,-z--a-1--a-2 g-a, -a2 aral -a2 «i-al -a2 a4 z-al -a2 
a(a1+a2) 
(µ+n+ p)[(l-a4 )(µ+n)+ p] z-a,-a2 
(l-y4) a(a1+a2) 
"-a - 1-a2 
[
Al +a4 )(µ+n)]_r d> d> )d 
\fJoPs + 1-'1 PM · 
a4 
(5.36) 
( c) In the period of full freedom in the domestic market 
Substituting the value of PM and /3 (given by ( 4.4) where /30M = 0; fli.M = l; /32M = 0, as in 
Section 4.1, Chapter 4 ), by symmetry, we get the value of the steady state for physical 
capital ( kf 1 ) and consumption ( c11 ) as 
kll -
2 -
and 
Cll = 
'-
z a1+a2 a1 a1 a(a1+a2) -- _ ___:_-=._ ----"-- ----"-- l+--'_;;____;;:-.. 
(p ( l - cm )a za2 ka3 )z-a1-a2 6 z-a,-a2 az-a1-a2 az-a1-a2 a z-a,-a2 M OMO 1 1 2 4 
a(a1 +a2 ) 
(µ + n + p)[ (1- a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a,-a2 
z a1 +a2 a1 a1 1 a(a1 +a2) -- ------"-- ---- --- +---'---''--
(p (l - cm )a za2 ka3 )z-a1-a2 6 z-a1-a2 az-a1-a2 az-a1-a2 a z-a1-a2 s OMO 1 l 2 4 
a(a1+a2) 
(µ + n + p)[(l - a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a1-a2 
[ p(l - a~~(µ+ n) ]- p,d. 
( d) In the period of opening up the international market 
(l-y4)+ a(a1+a2) 
z-a, -a2 
(5.37) 
(l-y4)+ a(a1+a2) 
z-a,-a2 
(5.38) 
From the value of /3 given by (4.5) where /J0w = 0;1 > /3 1w > 0;1 > /3 2w > O;f31w + f3 2w = l 
(Section 4.1, Chapter 4), once again, by symmetry, the value of the steady state for 
physical capital ( k;11 ) and consumption (c111) are given by 
l,JJ 
and 
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k lll -2 -
• a 1 +a2 a 1 a 1 a(a1 +a2 ) I a(a +a ) (I{" p M + K Pw )(I - Co111w )aari k~3 ,_z--a-:--a-2 5z-a, -ai CXiz-a, -a2 a;_-al -a2 a:+ z-ai -ai (1-r 4 )+ z-~1 _:2 
a(a1 +a2 ) 
(µ + n + P )[ (1- a4 )(µ + n) + P] z-a, -a2 
a 1+a2 a 1 a 1 a(a1+a2) z --- -----'----'--I+--'-~ 
(5 .39) 
(I-y
4
)+ a(a1+a2) 
z-ai -a2 
Cll = 
[ ~PM+ /1'; Pw )(I - Co111w )aofa2 kt3. ]z-a1-a2 c5z-a1 -a2 a;-a1 -a2 ara1-a2 a4 z-ai -a2 
o-(a1 +a2) 
(µ+n+ p)[(l-a4 )(µ+n) + p]z-a1-a2 
[ p(I+a~:(µ+n)]-~pM+jf,'pw)d (5.40) 
In Chapter 4 (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2) it was argued that, in the majority of 
cases in transitional economies, goods markets develop earlier and faster than factor 
markets. In that case, the value /Jp(l - C0m) will increase since PP will increase 
regardless of whether m falls (if in fact it does) with trade liberalisation, and indeed the 
empirical work for Vietnam is clearly consistent with that assumption. On that basis 
and from equations (5.33) through (5.40), it can be seen that as /Jp(l - C0 m) increases, 
so do k2 * and c * (see Figure 5.2). 
In the phase diagram in Figure 5.2, an increase in j,p(l - C0m) causes the locus 
• • 
c =O to shift up and to the right, and the k 2 =O curve to also shift up. Different steady-
state equilibria are obtained for each different period of trade liberalisation. In Figure 
5 .2, the equilibria E1, E11 and E111 represent the equilibria in the period of output contracts 
with a tight domestic market, the period of full freedom in the domestic market and the 
period of the opening up of the international market respectively. With each new stage 
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of liberalisation, the economic system jumps up onto a new higher transitional path, thus 
following the path ABCF to the final steady state Em. 
Figure 5.2: The transitional and steady-state effects of the different stages of trade 
liberalisation 
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The broad conclusions of this analysis are straight forward. Based on analysis in 
this section, it is clear that liberalisation results in both enhanced path effects and larger 
steady-state values of consumption and physical capital. This will be explored further in 
the empirical analysis of Chapter 8. 
5.4 The role of incentive effects on agricultural growth 
The effects of trade liberalisation include not only changes in the structure of the market 
and changes in prevailing prices, but also induced changes in worker effort and 
efficiency. This section considers the role of such "incentive effects" of liberalisation 
'11 
1, 
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by comparing a growth model including incentive effects with one where such effects 
are absent. The two cases are compared in terms of the differences in their underlying 
transitional dynamics and their resulting steady-states. 
A quick comparison of the phase diagrams in Figure 5 .1 above and Figure 5 .3 
for the case without incentive effects3, gives a general overview of the differences in 
• both regimes. The locus of points for which c =O changes from a vertical line in Figure 
• 5 .3 to the hyperbola in Figure 5 .1, and the curve for k 2 =O moves to the right and 
becomes flatter in the case of growth with incentive effects. 
Figure 5.3: Phase diagram for an optimisation model of agriculture without 
incentive effects 
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For the details of this model (without incentive effects) and the construction of the phase diagram, see 
Appendix 5B. 
t 
I 
~ 
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Moreover, based on equations (5.31), (5.32), and equations (5B. l 7), (5B.24) (see 
Appendix 5B), we can also directly compare the steady-state levels of consumption and 
physical capital in both cases. It is clear that with trade liberalisation, in the presence of 
incentive effects, all other things equal, the steady-state for consumption and physical 
capital is greater, provided that a< a 4 ; i.e., for the case in which the constant 
intertemporal elasticity of consumption is less than the share parameter of the capital 
input in the production function (see Appendix SC). A priori there is no way to restrict 
the value of a other than the fact that it lies somewhere between zero and one. 
Nevertheless, a lower value of a implies that the representative farmer is more willing 
to postpone consumption in response to higher rates of return, and this seems a likely 
scenario for emerging or transitional economies first experiencing market liberalisation, 
with their accompanying higher returns and bursts of economic growth. 4 In any case, 
the correct value for a is an empirical matter and preliminary work in this regard 
suggests that the restriction a< a4 in fact is not even necessary; i.e., steady-state values 
of consumption and the capital stock are larger with market liberalisation regardless of 
the value of a.. 
Finally, with a< a 4 it can be shown that out-of-steady-state growth rates for the 
capital stock ( and thus for consumption and output as well) are also larger for the case 
with trade liberalisation and incentive effects. From equation (5.32) the growth rate for 
\ .: 
physical capital with incentive effects is given by 
4 
If CJ' > a 
4 it implies that trade liberalisation and enhanced incentive effects result in lower steady-state 
values of consumption and the capital stock in the model and, as we will see shortly in the paper, lower out-of-steady-state values for the growth rate of the capital stock, and this seems contrary to experience. For growth rates, a similar parameter restriction matters for standard Ramsey models without incentive effects (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, p.59-95, 1995). 
p 
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• 
k* 
2 ---- ~-
z 
• k2 z-a -a 1 2 
• 
1 (/Jp(l - C0 m) 
( 1 - r 4 ) + a-( a I + a2 ) /Jp(l - CO m) 
z-a -a 1 2 
(5.41) 
and from equation ( 5B. l 7) in Appendix 5B, the comparable growth rate for physical 
capital without incentive effects is 
• k: l [ /Jp(l - C0m) ] k: = l - a 4 [ /Jp(l - CO m) ] . (5.42) 
It can be seen by comparing (5.41) and (5.42) that with the same growth rate of 
/Jp(l - C
0 m), the growth rate of physical capital with incentive effects is greater than 
that without incentive effects. Subsequent empirical work (see Chapter 7) will estimate 
the size of these dynamic effects. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter extends the static model of Chapters 3 and 4 by developing a dynamic 
optimal control model to show the effects on agricultural output and the steady-state 
capital-labour ratio that result from changes in prices, market arrangements, and the 
enhanced incentives due to the process of liberalisation. In a given trade regime, the 
farmer's problem is to maximise utility over a given time horizon by deciding, on the 
one hand, how much should be consumed today ( at any time t) or invested for 
tomorrow, and, on the other, by determining what the correct or optimal trade off should 
be between the effort required for higher income versus less effort or more leisure. 
Based on the analysis of this chapter, most importantly, it is clearly seen that 
liberalisation results in enhanced path and steady-state effects. Indeed, a direct 
r-
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comparison between a growth model with incentive effects, and one without, in terms of 
the differences in their underlying transitional dynamics and their resulting steady-states, 
shows that with the presence of incentive effects the steady-state values for consumption 
and physical capital are greater, and certainly so in the case for which the constant 
intertemporal elasticity of consumption is less than the share parameter of the capital 
input in the production function. 
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• Appendix, SA: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE Locus OF POINTS WHERE e=O 
• 
AND k 2 =0, WITH INCENTIVE EFFECTS 
• (a) The slope of the curve of points where e=O: Dividing (5.25) by c (assuming that c is 
• greater than zero), implies that locus of points where e =O is given by the graph of the equation 
B4a4e(t) z-a1-a2 k2(t)z-a1-a2 i -(µ+n+p)=O . [ 
-o-(a1 +a2 ) za4 ] 
(5A.l) 
Because equation ( 5 .14) satisfies the condition for the static model at any different time t, it is 
za 
possible to substitute y 4 = 4 into ( 5 A. I), where y4 is the share parameter of physical z-a -a l 2 
capital in the institutional production function. Totally differentiating equation (5A.l) with 
respect to c and k2, gives 
de 
dk2 lc;O 
e (y 4 - 1 )( Z - a 1 - a 2 ) 
k2 a(a1 + a2 ) 
(5A.2) 
+ 
de In the space (c, k2), the value of --1 has a negative sign, and the second derivative dk · 2 c=O 
d 2e • 
k 2 • d 2 lc=O 
is positive, so that the locus e =O has a convex shape. It also is noted that 
lim k I = lim cl· = 0 2 • C=O c• co c=O k2 • co (5A.3) 
The result is shown in Figure 5 .1. 
• (b) The slope of the curve of points where k 2 =O: Equation (5.29) implies that 
-a( a1 +a2 ) za4 
e(t) z-a1-a2 B4k2(t)z-a1-a2 -(µ+n)k2(t)-e(t)-/Jpd = 0. (5A.4) 
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za Once again, substituting y 4 = 4 , and totally differentiating (5A.4) with respect to k2 . z-a -a I 2 
gives 
o-(a1 +a2) 
B z-a1-a1 k y4-l - (µ + n) de I r4 4e 2 
o-(a1+a1) 
1 dk2 I· 0 o-(al + a2) B - z-a1-a1 k Y4 + 1 k1= _____
4
e 2 
(5A.5) 
z- a 1 - a 2 
Because the sign of the denominator is positive, the sign of (5A.5) depends on the sign of the 
numerator. Rewriting the numerator of (5A.5), given the definitions of B3 and B4 in equations 
(5.9) and (5.22), yields 
z a1+a1 o-(a1+a2) 
a2 a 3 z-a -a z-a1 -a2 --- --- z-a1 -a1 r 4 -1 [ ] 
a1 a2 
/Jp(I-Com)aol kl I 28 a1z-a1-a2a2z-a1-a2Y4C k2 -(µ+n). 
(5A.6) 
Substituting the value of total factor productivity and the factor share for land and current 
inputs in the static 'institutional production function' at time t into (5A.5), implies that 
de 
dk2 lk2=0 
o-(a1 +a2) o( S) 
/Jp(I - Com)e z-a1-a2 : - (µ + n) 
2 
o-(a1+a2)_1 o-(al + a2) B - z-a1-a2 k Y4 + 1 
4 e 2 z- a 1 - a2 
(5A.7) 
where qs is the institutional production function. It can be shown that if the production function 
is neoclassical, then the institutional production function is also exhibits: (i) a positive and 
diminishing marginal product with respect to physical capital; (ii) constant returns to scale (as 
proved in Chapter 3); and (iii) satisfies all Inada conditions (Inada, 1963). In particular, 
CXJ o2q 
(5A.8) ->0 2 < 0 a,2 a,2 
and 
r &J. lim &J. = 0. (5A.9) 1m-=oo k2 • 0 a,2 k2 • a:) a,2 
.,j 
t 
L 
11' 
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/1 
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de 
With this in mind, the sign of dk 1. can be determined from conditions (SA.8) and (5A.9). 
2 k2=0 
de 
The value dk 1. is positive and decreases from a large value when k2 rises from an 
2 k2 =0 
de 
extremely low level to some higher level; dk 
2 
equals zero when k2 increases to a specific . 
k2 =0 
&J. de value large enough to make /Jp(l - C0m)- equal to (µ+n); and dk 1. turns negative and 
ck,2 2 k
2 
=0 
• decreases when k2 continues to increase even further. Therefore, the shape of the k 2 =O locus 
is concave as indicated in Figure 5 .1 . 
• • • c) The motion of the curves e=O and k2 =O: The variation of e with respect to c in 
equation (5.25) is given by 
O~ = ..!_[(- a(a1 + a2 )J B
4
e(t) 
& a z-a1 - a 2 
• 
o-(a1 +a2) 
za4 
z-ai -a2 a k z-a1 -a2 
4 2 
oe . 
I -(p+ µ+n)] (SA.IO) 
and implies that & < 0, whereas the variation of k 2 with respect to kin equation (5A.1) is 
given by 
• o-(a1 +a2) 
0 k2 (t) z-a1-a2 r B ky4-l - (µ + n). --=e 4 4 2 
&2 (5A.1 l) 
• 
I · d h h I f 
O
k 2 · h · · h f de I · · t 1s note t at t e va ue o 1s t e same sign as 1s t e numerator o dk . 1n equation 
a,2 2 k
2
=0 
(5A.5). 
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Appendix SB: A GROWTH MODEL FOR AGRICULTURE WITHOUT THE 
INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
As a comparison to the model presented in Chapter 5 above, consider a comparable system 
without the incentive effects of trade liberalisation; i.e., a system that resembles a more 
standard Ramsey model. All definitions and notation are as in the paper. Assume that the 
agricultural production function exhibits constant returns to scale, so production at time t is 
given by 
Q = ao (N)a' (L)a2 (KI )a1 (K2 )a4. 
The quantity produced by a representative farmer q is thus 
q = a O (!) a2 ( k I ) a3 ( k 2 ) a4 • 
By symmetry with the derivation given in the static model, the profit function is given as 
Il=Pp[ q(l-C0m)-d ]. 
Assume that each farmer wishes to maximise overall utility U, given by 
U f(c?l';}-P'dt 
0 
subject to 
• 
k2 (t) = l(t) - (µ + n)k2 (t) 
k2(0) = k(O) 
and 
c(t) = TI (t) - l(t) 
(SB.l) 
(SB.2) 
(SB.3) 
(SB.4) 
(SB.5) 
(5B.6) 
(5B.7) 
where c represents the consumption for a representative farmer, pis a constant subjective rate 
of time preference. 
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Substitute (5B.2) and (5B.3) into (5B.7), so that the relevant constraint for the control 
problem can be expressed as 
c(t) = B 3 k; 4 (t) - /Jpd - l(t) (5B.8) 
for 
B 3 = /Jp [ 1 - C O m) ]a O I a 2 k t 3 • (5B.9) 
Maximising (5B.8) subject to (5B.5) and (5B.6), with the equality constraint (SB.7), 
gives the following first order conditions 
c(t)-u = J(t) 
J(t) = (fJ(t) 
The state and costate variable ( or (fJ(t)) satisfies the conditions 
• 
rp =- 2(t)B3a4k2 a4 -I + rp(t)(µ + n + p) 
• tJH 
k 2 (t) = orp = l(t)- (µ + n)k 2 (t) 
(SB.IO) 
B.11) 
(SB.12) 
(SB.13) 
along with the initial condition as given in (5B.6) and the appropriate transversality condition. 
The phase diagram in ( c, k2) space is constructed from the simultaneous differential 
equations for c and k2, which are derived from the results above. Combining (5B.10) and 
(SB. I I), and differentiating with respect to time gives the differential equation for 
consumption, or 
· I I 
C (t) = -[ B 3 a 4 C ( f ) k 2 ( f) a 4 - I ] - - C (t) ( µ + n + P) • CY CY 
(SB.14) 
The differential equation for physical capital (ki) can be derived by substituting the value of 
J(t), which is given in equation (SB.13) into equation (5B.8), so that 
• 
k 2 (t) = B 3 k;
4 
- /Jpd - (µ + n)k2 (t) - c(t) . (SB.15) 
• • Next, derive the two demarcation curves or loci of points where c=O and k2 =O. 
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• • 
For c =0: From (SB.13), the locus of points where c=O is graph of the equation 
[B3a4k2 (t)a4-I ]- (µ + n + p) = 0 (SB.16) 
so that 
I 
N _ [ B3a4 ]~ k 2 -
p+µ+n 
(SB.17) 
gives the steady-state value of k: (see Figure 5.3). 
• 
For k 2 =0: From equation (SB.15) we have 
B 3 k 2 (t)a
4 -(µ + n)k2 (t)- c(t)- /Jpd = 0. (SB.18) 
Totally differentiating (SB.17) with respect to c and k2, gives 
de 
dk2 1;
2
=0 
= a4B3k2 a4-I - (µ + n) (SB.19) 
and substituting B3, as defined in (SB.9), into (SB.18) gives 
de ,,_ - ~ - -- oq dk = /3 p (1 - Com ) -- - ( µ + n) . 
i k2=0 ok2 
(SB.20) 
With Inada conditions, and as argued in the paper, ~ 
dk I· 
is positive and decreases when k2 
1 k i = 0 
de 
increases; d k 
2 
oq . equals zero when k2 increases to a value that makes /Jp ( I - Com) ok 
2 k 2 = 0 
de equal to (µ+n); and the value dk is negative and decreases when k2 increases further. 
2 
. 
k 2 = 0 
• Therefore, the shape of the k 
2 
= 0 curve is concave as indicated in the Figure 5 .3 . 
• 
The variation of c respect to c in equation ( SB .14) is given by 
0 ~ = _I_[B3a 4k1a,-I - (p + µ + n)] oe (J' 
and equations (SB.16) and (SB.22) imply that 
(SB.21) 
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. . 
0 c "fk k E d O c "f k k E - > O I 2, < 2 an - < O I 2, > 2 . oc oc (SB.22) 
• 
The variation of k 2 respect to k2 from equation (SB.17) is given by 
. 
cJ k 2 
ok =a4B3k;·-l-(µ+n)" 
2 
(SB.23) 
• 
It is noted that the sign of variation of k 2 is the same sign as ~ in the equation ( SB.20). 
dk · 
2 kz =0 
All motions and trajectories are as depicted in Figure 5.3. The steady-state is a saddlepoint. 
• • 
When c = k 2 =O, then the value physical capital k2N, is as indicated in (SB.17). 
Substituting that value into equation (SB.18), the equilibrium value for consumption is given as 
l 
N ( B3a4 )1-a,[p+(I-a4)(µ+n)] C = ---- -------- - f]pd . p+µ+n a 4 
(5B.24) 
Appendix SC: THE coMPARisoN oF STEADY STATE FOR PHYSICAL CAPITAL 
WITH AND WITHOUT THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Consider the value of the steady-state for physical capital in the growth model under trade 
liberalisation as given as equation (5.32) 
k. = 
2 
It follows that 
cr(a 1 +a 2 ) I + -'--'----=-~ B a =-a , -ai 
4 4 
> I 
~~~ 
:-a 1 -a 2 
(µ + n + p)[(l- a 4 )(µ + n) + p]o-<a 1+a)2 
(1-r 4 )+ er ( a , +a2) 
:-a1 -ai 
(SC.I) 
( 
I 
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k; > 
a(a 1+a 2 ) I+-'--'-_.:...:.. 
B a =-a1 -ai 
4 4 
> I ------=-a1 -ai 
{l-y4)+a(a1+a2) 
z-a1 -ai 
(µ + n + p)(µ + n + p)a (a1+a)2 
'----v-~ 
k; > 
( 0 , I) 
o- (a 1+a 2 ) 1+----'---"---
B4a4 z-a,-a2 
(µ+n+p) 
\ v----' 
<l 
(I-y
4
)+ o-(a 1 +a 2 ) 
z-a, -a2 
It can be shown that 
1 1 
1-y +o-(a1+a2) >I-a >1 4 4 
z - a - a I 2 
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(5C.2) 
(5C.3) 
(5C.4) 
By substituting the value of y4 given in the 'institutional production function', we can rewrite 
(5C.4) as 
z - a - a 
I 2 >---1 (5C.5) z - a 1 - a 2 - za 4 + a-(a1 + a 2 ) 1 - a 4 
The inequality (5C.5) is equivalent to 
z-a1 -a2 -za4 +o-(a 1 +a2)<(1-a4)(z-a1 -a2) (5C.6) 
or 
a-(a1 + a2) < a4 (a1 + a2) (5C.7) 
and 
a<a4 . (5C.8) 
Therefore, as discussed in the paper, the inequality (5C.4) is satisfied if the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption in the future is less than ( or, as 
discussed in the paper, equal to) the share parameter for the capital input in the technical 
production function. 
l 
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Although not strictly necessary for the result, with (5C.8) satisfied, the inequality 
(5C.3) can be rewritten as 
k; > 
I 
c; ( a 1 +a 2 ) I 1-a, !+----~ 
B
4
a
4 
z-a1-a2 
(µ + n + p) 
'-----......- __,/ 
(5C.9) 
and since the value of B4 in equation (5.22) of the paper is greater than the value of B3 in 
equation (5.9), the inequality (5C.9) can be given as 
J - a 4 
k; > B4a4 
(µ+n+p) 
'-- --v- __,/ 
kf 
(5C.l 0) 
The right hand side of the inequality is the steady-state value for physical capital in the growth 
model without the effects of trade liberalisation (see (SB.17)). Therefore, the inequality in 
(5B. l 0) means that under trade liberalisation, or with the presence of incentive effects, other 
things being equal, the value of the steady state for physical capital is greater. 
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Chapter 
RICE PRODUCTION IN VIETNAM 
As a preliminary step for the empirical research that follows in Chapters 7 and 8, this 
chapter contains a general overview of the rice industry and an econometric analysis of 
the functional form for Vietnamese rice production. Section 6.1 describes the 
geography and climate of Vietnam, highlighting the major rice producing areas. It also 
includes some relevant data regarding rice production and the performance of the rice 
industry. Section 6.2, most importantly, estimates, with a view toward designating the 
relative importance of each input, the share parameters of labour, land, current inputs 
and capital in the rice production function. Section 6.3 concludes. 
6.1 An overview of the rice production and theoretical application 
Rice is the most significant industry in Vietnamese agriculture. In fact, it absolutely 
dominates agricultural and foodstuff production, and that role has become even more 
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important during the process of economic reform. With reform, the proportion of rice in 
foodstuff production has increased from 80.8 per cent (in 1980) to 97.6 per cent (in 
1996), and from 79 .4 per cent (in 1980) to 85 per cent (in 1996) in terms of output 
(unhusked rice equivalent) and sown area respectively (GSO, various years). Rice 
production also absorbs the greatest percentage of the labour force in rural areas, where 
about 70 per cent of workers in the Vietnamese economy live and, on average, 
contributes 67 per cent of household income (World Bank, 1995). 
In addition, rice production is a crucial source of nutrition for the population. In 
Vietnam, starch-products make up 90 per cent of daily nourishment and, of that, rice 
supplies 83.1 per cent of calorie intake in the rural regions and 77.6 per cent in the urban 
areas (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry, MAFI, 1987 quoted by 
SDP, 1995a). 1 Moreover, rice exports are an important source of export revenue, 
accounting for (approximately) 30 per cent of total export revenue (GSO, 1996; and 
Ministry of Trade (MIT), 1992 and 1995). 
(a) Geography and climate 
Vietnam is naturally suited for rice production, especially for so-called wet rice 
production. Located in a tropical area with high humidity, the weather is especially 
amenable and the land is fertile. With this, Vietnam is also blessed with an 
advantageous water system, with an extensive network of rivers, favourable topography 
and rain fall patterns (World Bank, 1996a). The two deltas, the Cuu Long River Delta 
(CRD) and the Red River Delta (RRD), which are the main areas for rice production, 
1 Although, it is argued that in Asia, rice is becoming an inferior good (Ito, Peterson and Grant, 1989). 
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contain most of the population and are situated over one-thousand kilometres apart. 
Besides these two main deltas, the Trung Bo delta, although small and narrow, is also 
very productive and located in the centre of the country. 
Although humid and tropical weather is predominant overall, there are still some 
differences between north and south. The monsoon influences the north with four 
different seasons, Spring (March to April), Summer (May to August), Autumn 
(September to October) and Winter (November to February), and the rainy season 
dominates the weather in the south with two seasons, the wet (June to November) and 
the dry season (December to May). The instability caused by flood and drought are the 
main problems and as such provide riskiness for agriculture producers in general and 
cultivation in particular. For example, for the Summer-Autumn crop of 1991 in the Red 
River Delta, the output of rice decreased by 1.4 million tons. In contrast, in the 
Summer-Autumn rice crop of 1993 in the Cuu Long River Delta output decreased by 1 
million tons (Nguyen S Cuc, 1995a) both because of drought and the resulting problems 
with insects. In addition, storms and flooding resulted in 1 million tons less of rice 
output in both deltas in 1994, but, nevertheless, the total output of rice still reached 23 .5 
million tons (Nguyen S Cuc, 1995b and GS0,1996). In general, with the variable 
climate, flooding and insect problems are the main causes for up to 6-7 per cent of the 
reduction in rice output. However, the increasing use of irrigation systems partially 
offsets problems with weather and especially so for wet rice production. In Vietnam, 
the irrigation system maintains the water supply and guards against flooding for about 
54 per cent of the cultivated area (Ministry of Water Resource, MWR, 1994 and World 
Bank, 1996), although, it must be remarked, this percentage is still much lower than in 
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the other rice export economies such as Thailand (80 per cent, SDP, 1995a). 
The Cuu Long River Delta with an area of 3.9 million hectares provides 2.8 
million hectares for rice production, with a population of 12, 8 million (GSO, 1995a). 
This rice area was formed by the alluvial soil raised by the Cuu Long and Bassac rivers. 
In these areas, the high concentration of alluvial soil accounts for 1.164 million ( very 
fertile) hectares of total land. In the wet season, flooding often threatens around 25 per 
cent of the sown area and induces poor crops (SDP, 1995a), but generally, favourable 
conditions in the Cuu Long River Delta allow for a triple crop of rice during the year; 
the Winter-Spring crop between March and May, the Summer-Autumn crop between 
August and September and the Winter crop from December to the following January. 
The area of the Red River Delta is 1. 7 million hectares, with a population of 11.5 
million (GSO, 1995a). The population density is highest in Thai Binh province with 
about 1,100 persons/ km2 (GSO, 1996). The area of rice cultivation is about 600,000 
hectares (GSO, 1996). Flooding often negatively influences about 800,000 hectares but, 
having said this, the irrigation system is much better than that in the CRD and 
consequently it maintains a stable water supply for about 85 per cent of the total area.2 
Occasional drought and insects, nevertheless, still badly affect the size of the crop. 
Overall, the conditions of the alluvial soil and the weather are less favourable than that 
in the Cuu Long River Delta, since about 88 per cent of the total rice area cultivated can 
only provide for double (not triple) harvests: the Winter-Spring crop between May and 
June, and the Winter crop between-November and December (SDP,1995a). 
2 Report by the MWR, 1994: The 'Da River' electronic hydraulics project provides a positive extemality to 
the general hydraulic conditions in the Red River Delta. The dam from this project induces a lower level 
of maximum flooding in Hanoi from 14.6 m to 13 m, and the velocity of flooding in the high area of the 
Red River, from 38,000 m/minute to 23,000 m/minute. 
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Besides two main deltas, the Trung Bo delta, with an area for cultivation of only 
(approximately) 497,000 hectares (GSO), satisfies only the demand for rice within its 
own local area. Generally, conditions of the soil and the weather are much less 
favourable than in the CRD and the RRD as well. 
(b) Rice production and the performance of the rice industry 
Although, rice production has experienced fluctuations from year to year (see Table 
6.1 ), it is possible to designate three significant periods in rice output: 1976-80, 1981-87 
and 1988-1994. As the discussed earlier, in terms of Figure 2.2 (Chapter 2), the general 
trend of the growth of food grain and rice has shown a decrease in 1976-80, a marked 
increase in 1981-87, and an extreme boom in yields since 1988 until the present. 
In the period 1976-80, the decrease in the output of rice production occurred 
simultaneously with the campaign of collectivisation in the north and south, as well as 
throughout the whole of Vietnam. The output of unhusked rice never reached more than 
12 million tons per annum and that was much less than the ambitious target of 21 
million tons of food grain per annum set by the Fourth Party Congress (Congress of 
Communist Party IV, CCP, 1976). At that time, and although Vietnam is (to say the 
least) an agricultural economy, the agricultural sector could not provide enough output 
to feed its own population. The serious shortage of foodstuffs and severe fall in the 
standard of living caused Vietnam to be a heavy importer of foodstuffs from other 
supporting socialist countries or the CMEA (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
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Table 6.1 Output, cultivated area and yield of rice production of Vietnam (1976-94) 
VIETNAM NORTH SOUTH Unhusked Rice Yield Unhusked Rice Yield Unhusked Rice Yield nee cultivated of rice nee cultivated of rice nee cultivated of rice output area output area output area (thous tons) (thous hectare) (tons/hectare) (thous tons) (thous hectare) (tons/hectare) (thous tons) (thous hectare) (tons/heel are) 1976 11821.7 5297.3 2.2 5457.7 2383.6 2.3 6364.0 2909.6 2.2 1977 10533.3 5468.7 1.9 4645.9 2326.9 2.0 5887.4 3034.3 1.9 1978 9764.4 5462.5 1.8 4749.6 2425.9 2.0 5014.8 3010.2 1.7 1979 11310.6 5485 .2 2.1 4878.7 2439.7 2.0 6431.9 3011.4 2.1 1980 11578.9 5600.2 2.1 4371.4 2306.5 1.9 7207.5 3236.2 2.2 1981 12415.2 5651.9 2.2 5401.1 2480.7 2.2 7014.1 3171.2 2.2 1982 14390.1 57 l l .4 2.5 6170.5 2495.2 2.5 8219.6 3216.2 2.6 1983 14743.3 5611.0 2.6 6174.1 2476.5 2.5 8569.2 3134.5 2.7 1984 15505.6 5675.0 2.7 6200.0 2470.6 2.5 9305.6 3204.4 2.9 1985 15874.3 5703.9 2.8 6292.0 2501.5 2.5 9582.3 3202.4 3.0 1986 16002.9 5688.6 2.8 6262.8 2441.9 2.6 9740.1 3246.7 3.0 1987 15102.6 5588.5 2.7 6075.2 2450.4 2.5 9027.4 3138.1 2.9 1988 17000.0 5726.4 3.0 6708.7 2464.8 2.7 10291.3 3261.6 3.2 1989 18996.3 5895.8 3.2 7275.4 2481.2 2.9 11720.9 3414.6 3.4 1990 19225.1 6027.7 3.2 6962.4 2483.5 2.8 12262.7 3544.2 3.5 1991 19621.9 6032.7 3.3 6257.5 2509.5 2.5 13364.4 3793.2 3.5 1992 21590.3 6475.4 3.3 7885.1 2522.1 3.1 13705.2 3953.3 3.5 1993 22836.6 6386.8 3.6 8973.3 2502.8 3.6 13863.3 3884 3.6 1994 23528.3 6559.4 3.6 9100.0 2519.4 3.6 14428.3 4040 3.6 
Sources: The Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (SDAFF)- General Statistics Office (GSO) 
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In the period of de-collectivisation and a tightly controlled markets (1980-1987), 
the output and yield increased slowly until 1987, or from about 11 million tons and 2.1 
tons per hectare (1980) to about 15 million tons and 2.7 tons per hectare (1987) 
respectively (Table 6.1 ). Vietnam overcame its food shortage crisis and had more 
balance in terms of its importation of foodstuffs (Table 6.2). However, the prospect of 
exporting rice was clearly not available yet. 
Table 6.2 Import and export foodstuff in Vietnam (1976-94) (thousand tons) 
Year IMPORT RICE NET 
Rice Wheat Flour Other EXPORT EXPORT 
1976 147.60 249.00 247.70 88.90 -733.20 
1977 196.50 463.00 507.40 95.90 -1262.80 
1978 34.45 738.3.0 50.10 104.80 -927.65 
1979 117.41 633.00 634.10 20.70 -1405.21 
1980 201.37 343.30 442.70 4.83 -992.20 
1981 56.17 223.50 300.30 -579.97 
1982 184.79 63.70 86.67 -335.16 
1983 46.30 42.55 -88.85 
1984 322.0 15.38 21.60 -358.98 
1985 336.08 83.47 27.68 -447.23 
1986 482.50 27.60 35.20 3.00 -548.30 
1987 332.60 56.00 107.00 -495.60 
1988 199.50 0.00 250.70 6.77 -456.97 
1989 55.10 25.00 106.50 6.00 1372.60 -1180.00 
1990 27.50 141.20 2.00 1624.40 1453.70 
1991 6.00 56.00 197.00 1273.00 1014.00 
1992 29.78 252.24 2191.00 1909.00 
1993 14.52 250.87 1908.00 1642.60 
1994 49.00 250.00 2360.00 2061 .00 
Source: The General Statistics Office, the Rice Trader and the State Department of 
Price (1995b). 
As mentioned, the boom in rice output and yield happened in the period 
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characterised by the strongest push for liberalisation or from 1988-89 until the present. 
In 1989, for the first time, Vietnam reached the threshold of 21 million tons of food 
grain (in terms of rice equivalent) and about 19 million tons of rice output (GSO, 1990 
and Table 6.1 ). It was also the first time in fifty years that Vietnam became a rice 
exporter. Indeed, the export volume of rice from Vietnam increased rapidly over time 
and Vietnam soon became the third largest exporter of rice in the world (see Table 6.2). 
Despite the constant problem of low and inconsistent rice quality, high quality 
rice exports (the proportion of broken rice being 5-10 per cent) in the total volume of 
exports have increased from 40 per cent in 1991 to 64.44 per cent in 1993 (according to 
the Ministry of Trade, MIT)3. However, the low and inconsistent quality of exported 
rice is still the most serious problem for Vietnam in terms of participation in world 
markets (Luu V Dat, 1993 and Vo T Xuan, 1995a). 
Corresponding to the high rates of growth of rice output, supporting inputs have 
also improved and have grown rapidly. In fact, while rice area sown has decreased 
(Nguyen T Khiem, 1995) under the pressure of urbanisation and diversified crops in 
agriculture, the total amount of cultivated rice has increased rapidly over time (see Table 
6.1) due to the more intensive exploitation of land and the use of high-yield rice crops. 
In addition, a decrease in the large amount of the wasteland (with its impoverished soil) 
3 Participation in the foreign rice trade industry includes three kinds of partners: central government 
companies, local government companies and private organisations. At the central state level, there are 
three corporations for trading rice: Vinafood I in the north, Vinafood II in the south and Foodstuff 
Corporation III in the centre. Foodstuff State Corporation's branch in every province manages the 
network of foodstuff shops and has the rights for foreign trade. As such private companies do not have 
the rights to trade rice, but illegal private activities on the China-Vietnam border possibly amount to of 0.4 
to 0.6 million tons of trade (Rice Trader, 1995). Because of the low quality requirement, the higher price, 
and the lower of transportation costs and flexible terms of trade, the amount of rice export going to China-
legally (or illegally) has increased strongly. The amount of exports to China has increased from 24 per 
cent of total export volume (2.36 million ton) in 1994 to 53 percent of total export volume (1.78 million 
ton) in the first six months of 1995 (Rice Trader, 1995). 
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has improved the rice fields generally. Rice output has also been enhanced by crop 
rotation, new technology, irrigational systems, higher quality and new kinds of seeds, 
and the more intensive use of labour and current inputs. Irrigated area, for example, has 
risen from 1.2 million hectares in 1976 to 1.88 million hectares in 1994 (MRW, 1994) 
and the amount of fertiliser use in terms of nitrogen, phosphates and potassium (NPK) 
in 1994 was 3.5 times that of 1976 (GSO).4 
6.2 The econometric estimation of the share parameters of inputs in the rice 
production function 
This section applies the form of institutional production function (see Chapter 3 above) 
to estimate the share parameter of inputs in the rice production function. 5 Following the 
static institutional production function from Chapter 3, it is argued that trade 
liberalisation in Vietnam can affect the level of rice production. In what follows the 
share parameters of inputs (YI, y2 , y3 and y4) are assumed to be constant during the 
process of trade liberalisation 6, with estimated share parameters in one given year being 
used for all years in the process of liberalisation. 
Here, the estimation is carried out for the year 1993 because the National 
4Evidently, the high growth in supporting factors of production has contributed to the rapid development 
in rice production. However, all of this is qualitative in its account. The empirical research regarding the 
effects of internal and external trade liberalisation requires a precise quantitative evaluation. As 
mentioned, Section 6.2 provides an estimation of the share parameters of inputs for labour, land, current 
input and capital in the rice production function. 
5The original assumption (in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3 above) about the form of 'technical ' 
production function as Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale is also relevant for rice production in 
Vietnam. because the technology level for Vietnamese agriculture is the similar to that in other agrarian 
and Less Developed Countries (LDC's). In other words, the production function for agriculture or rice 
production in Vietnam is Cobb-Douglas and with constant returns to scale just as in the other LDC's 
(according to empirical research for 22 LDC's by Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and for China by Tang, 
(1980, p.28). 
6 see Section 4.4, Chapter 4. 
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Investigation of Rural Regions, NIRR (by SDAFF, GSO,1995b) provides the best data 
for regression in that year. Further, in 1993, the full process of liberalisation had already 
taken place, so that the estimated results strongly reflect this feature in the form of the 
institutional production function for rice. 
The economic specification in equation (3 .20) and all assumptions and 
specifications contained in Chapter 3 above are applied to the empirical work here. The 
econometric specification is generated by taking the logarithm of equation (3 .20) so that 
lq= la+ +YJ Zn+ r2 llan + y3 lk1 + y4 lk2 (6.1) 
where lq,, la, Zn, llan, lk1 and lk2 are the log-forms of output, total factor productivity, 
labour, sown area, current inputs and the capital input respectively. 
The estimation for rice production is carried out using cross-sectional data from 
53 provinces and cities in 1993 (see Table 6.3). The Data Appendix below (see Section 
DA. I in particular) provides detailed explanations of all the economic terms used, such 
as current input, physical capital, and so on, the formulas for determining them, as well 
as data sources and adjustment for the data set presented in Table 6.3. 
The estimated results for share parameter of inputs (see Table 6.4) are quite 
significant for the constant term, land, current input and capital. Only the result for 
labour is not significant. The F-test for all regressions indicates high significance, so in 
general the outcome of the regression is acceptable. The sum of all coefficients for 
share parameters of inputs is about 1.1. However, the Wald-test for the restriction of 
constant returns to scale indicates that we could not in fact reject the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale for the rice production function (at 5 per cent significance). 
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Table 6.3 The cross-sectional data set used for econometric estimation 
Province Output Labour Land Current Capital 
input (ten thous 
(thous tons) (thous pers) (thous ha) (thous tons) horsepower) 
1 Ha Giang 134.20 158.60 24.38 15.40 4.84 
2 Tuyen Quang 166.10 172.69 26.28 24.72 4.67 
3 Cao Bang 156.80 187.92 27.30 21.88 8.0 
4 Lang Son 160.90 185.40 35.24 31.34 7.98 
5 Lai Chau 151.40 141.71 44.85 23.61 4.20 
6 Lao Cai 128.60 146.98 24.61 18.53 3.55 
7 Yen Bai 155.80 114.52 23.83 22.76 3.29 
8 Bae Thai 269.00 276.08 56.63 47.41 7.30 
9 Son La 171.20 215.07 50.08 29.63 5.99 
10 Hoa Binh 163.50 182.39 41.62 25.64 4.56 
11 Quang Ninh 152.10 99.30 29.51 19.52 3.30 
12 Vinh Phu 506.00 641.40 96.07 99.53 8.57 
13 Ha Bae 640.10 782.70 118.55 118.54 9.03 
14 HaNoi 206.30 245.85 37.17 39.00 4.45 
15 Hai Phong 440.00 316.41 50.65 63.48 1.54 
16 Ha Tay 682.40 691.62 95.44 108.48 4.90 
17 Hai Hung 1079.60 783.81 131.06 138.74 4.18 
18 Thai Binh 968.90 573.46 88.99 94.03 3.46 
19 Nam ha 792.60 677.25 128.72 138.87 2.55 
20 Ninh Binh 269.10 168.46 46.25 42.28 3.21 
21 Thanh Hoa 924.80 756.44 148.62 147.74 14.26 
22 Nghe An 644.50 677.22 110.20 108.10 15.82 
23 HaTinh 349.80 309.33 68.12 59.93 8.57 
24 Quang Binh 148.50 188.89 33.21 30.04 4.67 
25 Quang Tri 105.30 100.26 24.06 21.39 4.17 
26 Thua Thien Hue 135.00 161.84 21.57 29.23 2.85 
27 Quang Nam -DN 463.80 390.72 64.49 71.01 9.07 
28 Quang Ngai 303.10 298.89 41.40 54.21 7.67 
·l: ;; 
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Table 6.3 The cross-sectional data set used for econometric estimation 
( continues) 
No Province Output Labour Land Current 
input 
(thous tons) (thous pers) (thous ha) (thous tons) 
29 Binh Dinh 444.30 286.83 53.28 63.56 
30 Phu Yen 279.70 166.26 33.44 33.61 
31 KhanhHoa 180.60 130.07 23.54 21.74 
32 Ninh Thuan 127.90 82.98 15.66 17.76 
33 Binh Thuan 234.90 105.38 53.85 29.06 
34 Gia Lai 166.10 93.43 65.16 26.98 
35 Kon Tum 73.90 42.47 19.29 9.71 
36 Dae Lac 286.10 118.15 65.08 32.56 
37 Lam Dong 138.30 110.63 22.35 16.10 
38 Hochiminh City 248.30 188.40 57.11 42.02 
39 Song Be 132.10 122.06 32.57 23.04 
40 Tay Ninh 390.50 147.42 107.36 44.02 
41 Dong Nai 439.40 180.21 56.90 27.79 
42 Baria-Yung Tau 117.40 63.05 16.63 8.03 
43 Long An 1003.00 442.33 178.89 101.00 
44 Dong Thap 1591.00 539.54 183.35 115.69 
45 An Giang 1898.80 609.90 215.52 134.02 
46 Tien Giang 1190.90 467.23 99.98 93.54 
47 Ben Tre 333.60 327.01 59.52 55.49 
48 Vinh Long 819.30 340.57 74.13 59.96 
49 Tra Vinh 651.90 287.18 96.62 60.52 
50 Can Tho 1481.50 519.81 150.36 110.75 
51 Soc Trang 1002.30 356.18 182.98 98.02 
52 Kien Giang 1223.90 448.11 221.99 109.60 
53 Minh Hai 1093.10 502.84 264.21 131.03 
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8.58 
6.52 
5.33 
6.97 
11.60 
10.54 
2.23 
6.74 
10.34 
6.45 
18.67 
16.02 
8.69 
9.74 
25.44 
35.83 
39.38 
13.97 
7.6 
12.83 
7.79 
25.88 
18.59 
22.25 
15.86 
Source: From Tables DA. I through DA. 3, see Section DA. I (Data Appendix) for data 
sources and adjustments 
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The other diagnostic tests also show that there are no important problems such as 
heteroscedasticity,7 nor is there a problem in the form of the function,8 by both F test 
and CU SUM test9. The R Bar squared is high in this case compared with the normal 
cross-section estimation (89 per cent). 
Table 6.4 The share parameters of inputs in the rice production function 
(53 observations in 1993) 
The dependent variable is the log of the output of rice (thousand tons) 
Factor input Coefficients p value 
Constant term a= 0.5 0.02 
Labour n= 0.2 0.29 
Land Ian= 0.4 0.00 
Current inputs k1= 0.4 0.09 
Capital k2= 0.1 0.02 
R Bar Squared= 0.89 F( 4,48): 116.9 (0.000) 
The estimated results indicate the very important role of sown land and current 
inputs in the rice production function (the coefficient is 0.4), while the share of labour is 
only 0.2 (but p for that coefficient is high at 0.29). The fixed amount of land limits the 
growth of output, so the only alternative for any increase in the capacity of land to 
increase output and yield comes (at least for Vietnam for the moment) from capital 
improvements, and particularly so in the irrigation system. According to the World 
Bank (1995b ), irrigation in Vietnam can add substantially to land value: the difference 
between zero and 100 per cent irrigation amounts to 645 kg/ha in rice. Indeed, this 
7 By testing square residuals on squares fitted value. 
8 Ramsey Reset test by using squares of fitted value. 
9 The CUSUM test at 5 per cent significance shows that only one small part of the tested line is slightly 
out of the critical area. 
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result regarding the importance of the role of current inputs is fully consistent with the 
conclusions drawn in the research on the rice production conducted by the United 
Nations Development Program, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
F AO (1989). There, chemical fertiliser also weighs as the most important factor in 
current inputs and in fact the expenditure on fertiliser is the major cost component faced 
by rice farmers, at about 65 per cent of total variable cost (Nguyen T Khiem, 1995). 10 
As mentioned above, the estimated results reflect the share parameter of inputs 
in the institutional production function (r1, r2 , y3 and y4), but the share parameters of 
inputs in the 'technical' production function ( or a1, a2 , a3 and a4) are still unknown. 
However, we can derive a1, a2 , a3 and a4 from these estimated results and the 
coefficient z, according to equations (3 .22) through (3 .25). An alternative approach to 
determine z and the 'technical' share parameter of inputs (a1, a2 , a3 and a4) is 
presented in Appendix 7 A (Chapter 7). This appendix shows that the technical share 
parameter of inputs for Vietnam are 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 for labour, land, current input 
and capital respectively. The 'technical' share parameters of inputs in the rice 
production function for the Vietnamese case shows constant returns to scale which again 
is appropriate to the assumptions used in Chapter 3. Note, that the 'technical' share 
parameters of inputs in the rice production function for Vietnam do not differ much 
from those for other LDCs where the 'technical' share parameters of inputs are 0.5 , 
0.25, 0.1 and 0.15 in China (Tang, 1980, p.28) and 0.53, 0.1, 0.21 and 0.16 in twenty-
two LDCs (Hayami-Ruttan, 1985, Chapter 6) for labour, land, current inputs and capital 
1
°Needless to say, there will be diminishing marginal returns to chemical fertiliser use on rice output 
(UNDP-FAO, 1989). Besides, techniques for minimising chemical fertiliser and pesticides, while 
stabilising grain yield, are also needed to reduce the farmer's production costs and environment pollution 
(Vo T Xuan, 1995b). Improvement, instead, in technology and capital investment (e.g., irrigation) is a 
crucial requirement for further increases in output in the long run. 
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respectively. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
Since 1989, Vietnam has grown to be the third largest rice exporter in the world. This 
chapter provides the first step in the quantitative analysis of the rice production function 
by estimating the share parameters of inputs in the rice production function using cross-
sectional data in 1993 for 53 provinces and cities. The estimated results indicate that 
the share parameters of labour, land, current inputs and capital for rice production are 
0.2, 0.4, 0.4 and 0.1 respectively. On this basis, the following two chapters provide an 
empirical examination of how trade liberalisation affects rice output, first, as a static 
exercise (Chapter 7), then in terms of the dynamics of the growth in rice output (Chapter 
8). 
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Chapter 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF 
TRADE LIBERALISATION ON RICE PRODUCTION IN 
VIETNAM FROM 1976 TO 1994 
Following the theoretical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, and based on the estimated 
results for the share parameters in the rice production function in Section 6.2, this 
chapter directly and empirically examines the comparative effects of the different stages 
of liberalisation as an explanation for the rapid growth of the rice industry in Vietnam. 
The institutional production function derived in the previous chapter is used to separate 
the growth in rice output into a component due to the growth of factor inputs or supplies 
and another component due to the growth of total factor productivity. 
This chapter is organised around two sections. Section 7.1 subtracts the growth 
of factor inputs from the total growth of rice output to obtain an estimate of the growth 
of total factor productivity. Section 7.2 computes directly that part of the growth of total 
factor productivity which can be attributed to liberalisation, allowing us to decompose 
f I 
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total factor productivity growth into two components: one that results from the effects of 
trade liberalisation only, and one that is due to a host of other items or 'unexplained 
residuals'. Section 7.3 concludes and Appendix 7 A provides the technical details 
regarding the calculation of the effort-disutility coefficient (z) and 'technical ' share 
parameters for inputs. Detailed data sources and adjustments for this chapter are 
documented in Data Appendix below. 
7.1 The growth of total factor productivity in the transitional periods of trade 
liberalisation 
Based on the static model of Chapter 3, the estimated results in Section 6.2 (Chapter 6), 
and the actual growth rate of factor inputs, this section computes an index for the growth 
rate (g) of total factor productivity (A) in the process of trade liberalisation in Vietnam 
from 1980 to 1994. 1 To do so, begin with equation (3 .20), or the institutional 
production function, so that the growth rate of total productivity is determined as 
• • • • • • 
A Q N L Kl K2 
A= Q - Y1 N - Y2 L - Y3 K - Y4 K 
1 2 
(7.1) 
1in this regard it is useful to consider not only the whole of Vietnam but also the north and the south 
separately, due to the significant differences between the two areas. The differences in natural 
endowments between the north (represented by the Red River Delta) and the south (represented by the 
Cuu Long River Delta) were discussed in Section 6.1 (Chapter 6). The differences in economic structure 
and the processes of liberalisation between the two regions also were described in Section 2 .2, Chapter 2 
above. In brief, they are: (a) a peasant middle class in the south forms a strong presence in rural society 
and they are very experienced at operating within a market economy, and as such they are very reluctant 
to follow unreasonable commands from the State; (b) the south had more advanced technology and more 
developed markets for agricultural commodities, both of which had been established before unification; 
(c) the collective regime regulated more strongly in the north than in the south, i.e. , the ' low advanced' 
and ' advanced cooperative' were dominant in the north, the ' production collective ' was popular in the 
south; and ( d) it is likely that the economic reforms in the south happened earlier and with more vigour 
than in the north. 
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and define the cumulative rate of growth of output and factor inputs at any time t 
relative to their levels at some specified initial time by 
• 
X X, -X0 --
x X 0 
(7.2) 
where Xi and X 0 respectively define output and factor inputs at time t and at some initial 
(base) time period. The constructed index for the growth rate in this case is not the 
usual one based on a year-to-year or annual comparison. This enables us to focus on the 
overall changes between the various stages of trade liberalisation; e.g., the change in rice 
output in the period of output-contracts and the opening up of markets compared to rice 
output in the (base period) communal system. 2 The resulting index is thus constructed 
as a cumulative measure of all the relevant growth rates relative to a single base period 
and slows clearly the effects of movements from one period of trade liberalisation to 
another. Nevertheless, as a means of comparison, the average annual growth rates for 
output and various inputs across different transitional periods are also calculated. Here 
we use the fitted values of exponential growth rates as a basis for the measurement. 
Given our discussion of the process of economic liberalisation in Vietnam (see 
Section 2.2, Chapter 2), let the initial situation ( or the starting point) in the agricultural 
industry be defined by the communal system (1976-80). The process of trade 
liberalisation in Vietnam has then experienced two periods: the period of de-
collectivisation with controlled markets (from 1981-87); and the period of the opening 
2 Indeed, this is exactly the type of index occasionally used in official Vietnamese statistics (e.g., GSO). 
With the limited number of observations, and the resulting inability to accurately fit a proper exponential 
(trend) function, a year-to-year comparison can in fact be misleading. Given dramatic changes from one 
year to the next (say as a result of a bad weather shock in one year), the calculated annual growth rate in 
the following year may read as an extremely high positive value even though the clear trend within the 
period (across all years in the given trade regime) is negative. Comparisons to a base period and the 
construction (as we will see) of a cumulative index help avoid this problem. 
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up or freeing of markets (1988-until now). Following equations (7.1) and (7.2), it is 
possible to compute an index of the cumulative growth rates of total factor productivity 
for the whole country, the north and the south in every year from 1980 to 1994. 
The relevant time series data for rice output, labour, land, current inputs and 
capital for Vietnam, the north and the south in 1976-94 are presented in the Tables DA.4 
through DA.9 (Data Appendix) and summarised in Table 7.1. The sources, adjustments 
and derivations of these data are documented in Data Appendix (Sections DA.2 and 
DA.3). With the initial situation immediately prior to the process of liberalisation being 
the period of the communal system, we can assume that the arithmetic average for the 
years 1976-80 constitutes the initial value (Xo) for each of output, labour, land, current 
input and capital. The cumulative growth of output and factor inputs for Vietnam, the 
north and the south, can be obtained (see Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4) from equation (7.2) 
and the figures contained in Table 7 .1 . Substituting the values of the growth of output 
and factor inputs, and the estimated results of share parameters of inputs ( see Section 
6.2), into (7 .1 ), we then get the cumulative growth of total factor productivity 1n 
Vietnam, the north and the south (see Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 respectively). 
Quite clearly, total factor productivity has increased in direct correspondence to 
the process and progress of trade liberalisation and its growth is the most important 
component of the growth of rice output in the years 1980 to 1994 (see Tables 7.2 to 7.4 
and Figure 7 .1 ). Moreover, the growth rate of total factor productivity in the south is 
greater than that in the north and makes up the largest part of the growth of total factor 
productivity for the whole of the country. 
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Table 7.1 Output and inputs for rice production for Vietnam as a whole, the north and the south separately, 1976-94 
VIETNAM THE NORTH THESOUTH 
Year Rice Labour Land Current Capital Rice Labour Land Current Capital Rice Labour Land Current Capital 
output input output input output input 
(thous (thous (thous ha) (thous (ten thous (thous (thous (thous ha) (thous (ten thous (thous (thous (thous ha) (thous (ten thous 
tons) man day tons) horsepower) tons) man day tons) horsepower) tons) man day tons) horsepower 
1976 11827.2 764.1 4710.0 2137.6 236.7 5457.7 584.9 1672.0 1141.3 144.6 6364.0 179.2 3038.0 996.4 92.1 
1977 10597.1 764.2 4709.8 2129.6 243.8 4645.9 571.0 1671.8 1098.5 146.0 5887.4 193.2 3038.0 1031.1 97.9 
1978 9789.9 782.1 4664.0 2186.7 237.9 4749.6 595.3 1666.5 1104.9 143.3 5014.8 186.8 2997.5 1081.8 94.6 
1979 11362.9 786.0 4618.1 2127.7 245.2 4878.7 598.7 1661.1 1065.4 144.9 6431.9 187.3 2957.0 1062.3 100.4 
1980 11647.4 768.6 4572.3 2026.4 263.7 4371.4 566.0 1655.8 980.4 153.2 7207.5 202.6 2916.4 1046.0 110.5 
1981 12415.2 803.8 4526.4 2126.3 281.2 5401.1 608.8 1650.6 1035.2 148.6 7014.1 195.0 2875.8 1091.2 132.5 
1982 14390.2 810.1 4480.5 2203.5 274.7 6170.5 612.3 1645.3 1080.4 146.9 8219.6 197.8 2835.2 1123.1 127.8 
1983 14743.3 800.5 4434.6 2336.0 273.2 6174.1 607.7 1640.0 1148.1 148.2 8569.2 192.8 2794.6 1187.9 124.9 
1984 15505.6 803.4 4388.8 2365.8 280.8 6200.0 606.3 1634.8 1162.9 151.3 9305.6 197.1 2753.9 1202.9 129.6 
1985 15874.8 810.8 4296.5 2425.4 287.7 6292.0 613.9 1629.6 1192.9 153.8 9582.3 196.9 2666.9 1232.5 133.8 
1986 16002.9 798.9 4250.0 2556.9 314.2 6262.8 599.2 1651.3 1242.3 166.2 9740.1 199.7 2598.7 1314.6 148.0 
1987 15102.6 794.3 4242.6 2517.2 292.1 6075.2 601.3 1638.6 1230.7 159.3 9027.4 193.0 2604.0 1286.5 132.8 
1988 17000.0 805.5 4108.9 2693.2 298.6 6708.7 604.9 1633.4 1286.7 164.6 10291.3 200.6 2490.9 1406.5 134.0 
1989 18996.3 818.9 4108.0 2766.3 299.1 7275.4 608.9 1628.1 1330.3 157.1 11720.9 210.0 2490.0 1436.0 142.0 
1990 19225.2 827.4 4108.0 2844.4 296.5 6962.4 609.5 1618.0 1382.1 158.4 12262.7 218.0 2490.0 1462.3 138.1 
1991 19621.9 832.5 4101.0 2962.6 350.7 6257.5 615.8 1618.0 1391.6 173.9 13364.4 216.7 2531.0 1571.0 176.8 
1992 21590.3 862.1 4100.0 3254.3 418.1 7885.1 618.9 1570.0 1551.6 198.2 13705.2 243.1 2517.0 1702.7 219.9 
1993 22836.6 853.1 4038.6 3404.4 514.8 8973.3 614.2 1583.0 1609.3 227.6 13863.3 238.9 2455.6 1795.1 287.2 
1994 23528.3 866.7 4038.6 3790.4 562.2 9100.0 618.3 1583.0 1877.3 248.6 14428.3 248.5 2455.6 1913.1 313.6 
Annual growth rate(%) 4.7 0.6 -1.0 3.1 3.8 3.3 0.3 -0.3 2.7 2.3 5.6 1.4 -1.3 3.5 5.5 
Source: See Section DA. 2 (Data Appendix) for data sources and adjustments 
Note: Average annual growth rate is measured as the fitted value of the exponential growth rate 
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Table 7.2 The growth for total factor productivity in the transitional periods of 
trade liberalisation in Vietnam, 1976-94 (per cent) 
The cumulative growth of the factor: (the figure at 1976-80 as JOO) Percentage of 
Year Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor contribution 
input productivity of (gA) in 
growth rate 
of output 
(go) (gN) (gJ (gK(IJ) (gK(2J) (g,J (g,JI (go) 
1976-80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1981 12.4 4.0 -2.8 0.2 14.5 11.2 90.0 
1982 30.3 4.8 -3.7 3.9 11.9 28.1 92.8 
1983 33.5 3.6 -4.7 10.1 11.3 29.5 88.1 
1984 40.4 3.9 -5.7 11.5 14.4 35.8 88.8 
1985 43.7 4.9 -7.7 14.3 17.2 38.4 87.8 
1986 44.9 3.4 -8.7 20.5 28.0 36.7 81.7 
1987 36.7 2.8 -8.9 18.6 19.0 30.4 82.7 
1988 53.9 4.2 -11.7 26.9 21.6 44.8 83.1 
1989 72.0 5.9 -11.7 30.4 21.8 61.2 85.0 
1990 74.1 7.0 -11.7 34.1 20.8 61.7 83.2 
1991 77.7 7.7 -11.9 39.6 42.9 60.7 78.2 
1992 95.5 11.5 -11.9 53.4 70.3 69.6 72.8 
1993 106.8 10.4 -13.2 60.5 109.7 74.8 70.1 
1994 113.0 12.1 -13.2 78.7 129.0 71.5 63.3 
Annual growth rate (per cent) 
Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor 
input productivity 
1981-87 4.6 0.2 -1.3 2.9 2.3 3.8 
1988-94 6.1 1.3 -0.5 5.6 10.6 3.6 
Note: Annual growth rate is measured as the fitted value of the exponential growth rate 
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Table 7.3 The growth for total factor productivity in the transitional periods of 
trade liberalisation in the north, 1976-94 (per cent) 
The cumulative growth of the factor: (the figure at 1976-80 as JOO) Percentage of 
Year Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor contribution 
input productivity of (g,4) in 
growth rate 
of output 
(go) (gN) (gJ (gK(l;) (gK(2;) (g,4) (g,4)/ (go) 
1976-80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1981 12.0 4.4 -0.9 -4.0 1.5 12.0 100.0 
1982 28.0 5.0 -1.2 0.2 0.3 27.4 97.7 
1983 28.1 4.2 -1.5 6.5 1.2 25.1 89.5 
1984 28.6 4.0 -1.8 7.9 3.3 25.1 87.6 
1985 30.5 5.3 -2.1 10.6 5.1 25.6 83.8 
1986 29.9 2.7 -0.8 15.2 13.5 22.3 74.4 
1987 26.0 3.1 -1.6 14.2 8.8 19.5 74.9 
1988 39.2 3.7 -1.9 19.3 12.4 30.2 77.1 
1989 50.9 4.4 -2.2 23.4 7.3 40.8 80.2 
1990 44.4 4.5 -2.8 28.2 8.2 32.6 73.3 
1991 29.8 5.6 -2.8 29.1 18.8 16.3 54.7 
1992 63.6 6.1 -5.7 43.9 35.4 43.5 68.5 
1993 86.1 5.3 -4.9 49.3 55.5 61.8 71.7 
1994 88.8 6.0 -4.9 74.1 69.8 52.9 59.6 
Annual growth rate (per cent) 
Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor 
input productivity 
1981-87 2.9 0.2 -0.2 2.6 1.6 2.0 
1988-94 5.4 0.4 -0.6 5.6 6.8 3.3 
Note: Annual growth rate is measured as the fitted value of the exponential growth rate 
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Table 7.4 The growth for total factor productivity in the transitional periods of 
trade liberalisation in the south, 1976-94 (per cent) 
The cumulative growth of the factor: (the figure at 1976-80 as JOO) Percentage of 
Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor contribution 
Year input productivity of (gA) in 
growth rate 
of output 
(go) (gN) (gJ (gK(I)) (gK(2)) (gA) (gA)I (go) 
1976-80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1981 13.5 2.7 -3.8 4.6 33.7 9.2 68.6 
1982 33.0 4.2 -5.2 7.6 29.0 28.3 85.7 
1983 38.6 1.6 -6.5 13.8 26.0 32.8 84.9 
1984 50.5 3.8 -7.9 15.3 30.8 43.7 86.5 
1985 55.0 3.7 -10.8 18.1 35.0 47.8 87.0 
1986 57.6 5.2 -13 .1 26.0 49.3 46.4 80.6 
1987 46.0 1.7 -12.9 23.3 34.0 38.2 82.9 
1988 66.5 5.7 -16.7 34.8 35.2 54.6 82.1 
1989 89.6 10.6 -16.7 37.6 43.3 74.8 83.5 
1990 98.4 14.9 -16.7 40.1 39.4 82.1 83.5 
1991 116.2 14.2 -15.3 50.6 78.4 91.5 78.7 
1992 121.7 28.1 -15.8 63.2 121.9 85.0 69.8 
1993 124.3 25.9 -17.9 72.0 189.8 78.5 63.1 
1994 133.4 30.9 -17.9 83.3 216.4 79.4 59.5 
Annual growth rate (per cent) 
Output Labour Land Current Capital Total factor 
input productivity 
1981-87 5.9 0.3 -2.0 3.3 3.4 5.2 
1988-94 6.5 3.7 -0.5 5.6 14.5 3.3 
Note: Annual growth rate is measured as the fitted value of the exponential growth rate 
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Figure 7.1: The cumulative growth of output and total factor productivity for the 
rice industry in Vietnam 
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The positive growth rate of total factor productivity across periods of trade 
liberalisation (see Tables 7.2 to 7.4) can be explained by the enhanced incentive effects 
that accompany economic reform. Since there is no significant change in technology, it 
follows that without liberalisation, all other things equal, the growth rate of total factor 
productivity must be equal to zero or, in other words, the growth of output is due solely 
to the growth of inputs. However, under the effects of partial-liberalisation in the period 
1981-87, total factor productivity grew at the annual rate 3.8, 2.0 and 5.2 per cent for 
Vietnam, the north and the south respectively. In the period of the freeing up of 
domestic and international markets (1988-94), rice output and total factor productivity 
rose comparatively much more. In this period, the annual growth rate of total factor 
productivity (instead of a zero growth rate if there is no further liberalisation), was 3 .6, 
3.3 and 3.3 per cent for Vietnam, the north and south respectively. 
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Besides the growth of total factor productivity, the growth of factor inputs, 
especially current inputs and capital, also contributed markedly to the remarkable 
growth of rice output. Compared with the period of the communal system, all factor 
inputs increased at a positive rate, except for land (see Tables 7.2 through 7.4), and 
while the sown area of land has in fact decreased, the more efficient exploitation of land 
has increased over time due (by our argument) to the incentives that trade liberalisation 
offers. Indeed, the increased efficiency of land use is indicated in two aspects: (a) the 
higher degree of crop rotation and with it a larger cultivated area; and (b) the higher 
yield of rice (see Table 6.1 ). In other words, in our approach, the incentives to exploit 
land and labour more efficiently are not explicit measurements, but are implicitly 
revealed through a large increase in growth of total factor productivity and the more 
efficient use of agricultural resources. 
Obviously, the analysis of the growth of total factor productivity in the process 
of trade liberalisation above relies on the estimated results performed in Section 6.2. 
However, as a sensitivity check, an alternative measure of this growth rate can be 
obtained by using a different measure for the share parameters for inputs. Let the 
alternative measure be the estimated results obtained by Tang (1980) for China and 
Hayami and Ruttan (1985) for 22 other LDCs. In this case, the technical share 
parameters for labour, land, current input and capital are 0.5, 0.25 , 0.1 and 0.15 for 
China (Tang, 1980, p.28), and 0.53 , 0.1, 0.21 and 0.16 for 22 other LDCs (Hayami-
Ruttan 1985, chap. 6). Accordingly, the institutional share parameters of inputs for 
China and 22 other LDCs can be computed according to the equations (3 .22) through 
(3.25). Taking the value of the effort-disutility coefficient (z) to be 3, (see Appendix 
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f 
l 
,11 
II• 
I 
~\ 
I' nl 
' 
An empirical analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation on rice production. .. (Ch. 7) 126 
7 A), the institutional share parameters of inputs are computed to be 0.32; 0.34; 0.14 and 
0.2 for China, and 0.4, 0.13, 0.27 and 0.21 for 22 other LDCs for labour, land, current 
input and capital respectively. Following an approach similar to that above, the 
alternative measure of the growth of total factor productivity for rice production is 
obtained and shown in Table 7.5. A comparison across all of these measures shows 
(clearly) that there is little difference in the results (see Table 7.5 and Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2: Comparison of the cumulative growth of total factor productivity by 
alternative measures of the share parameters of inputs 
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In a nut shell, regardless of the approach taken, total factor productivity has been 
increasing simultaneously with the process and the extent of trade liberalisation, and the 
inspection of Tables 7 .2 through 7 .5 leaves little doubt that the growth in total factor 
productivity is the important explanation for the extremely high rates of growth of rice 
output in Vietnam from 1980 until the present. 
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Table 7.5 Comparison of the cumulative growth of total factor productivity by alternative measures of the share parameters of inputs 
(per cent) 
(Takes 1976-80 as the basis period for calculating) 
VIETNAM THE NORTH THESOUTH 
Year Estimated results Derived results Derived results Estimated results Derived results Derived results Estimated results Derived results Derived results 
in Section 6.2 from Tang study from Hayami- in Section 6.2 from Tang study from Hayami- in Section 6.2 from Tang study from Hayami-
Ruttan study Ruttan study Ruttan study 
1976-80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 11.17 9.13 8.06 12.00 11.19 11.16 9.25 6.51 4.56 
1982 28.09 27.11 25.32 27.37 26.72 26.03 28.25 26.52 23.82 
1983 29.50 30.28 27.58 25.12 26.09 24.58 32.79 33 .20 29.65 
1984 35.84 36.58 33.43 25.07 26.20 24.44 43.74 43 .70 39.45 
1985 38.38 39.34 35.30 25.56 27.07 24.76 47.85 47.96 42.69 
1986 36.69 38.30 33.26 22.26 24.49 21.98 46.44 46.85 39.81 
1987 30.37 32.46 27.77 19.50 21.83 19.32 38.15 39.83 33.62 
1988 44.83 48.46 41.94 30.21 33.43 30.09 54.59 58.43 49.60 
1989 61.16 65.46 58.35 40.85 45.53 41.60 74.80 77.98 68.29 
1990 61.65 66.88 59.22 32.56 38.36 33.66 82.11 85 .83 75.52 
1991 60.73 65.12 56.42 16.32 21.16 16.14 91.45 94.13 82.42 
1992 69.55 74.31 63.24 43 .53 50.33 42.57 84.97 84.89 69.89 
1993 74.83 77.54 64.98 61.80 68.13 59.71 78.46 74.03 56.95 
1994 71.53 76.83 61.57 52.91 64.19 52.33 79.40 74.64 55.42 
Fitted annual 
growth rate 
1981-87 3.8 4.2 3.7 2.0 2.4 2.0 5.2 5.5 4.9 
1988-94 3.6 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.6 1.6 
'I 
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7.2 Decomposition of total factor productivity growth into two components 
Now consider the decomposition of total factor productivity growth into two 
components, one due to the effects of trade liberalisation alone, called (A1 ), and one 
which includes a number of 'unexplained' causes, termed the so-called Solow residual 
(A 0). The computed value of A 1 thus indicates the extent to which trade liberalisation 
contributes to the growth of rice output through the growth of total factor productivity. 
Following the analysis for the growth of factor productivity (A1) in Chapter 4 
above, the growth of A1 is given as in equation ( 4.11 ), listed here again for convenience 
. J . . l ~=( a 1 +a2 /Jp + (l-C0 m) 1. 
A1 z - a 1 - a 2 /Jp (1 - C0 m) j (7.3) 
( 
a +a J For the case of rice production in Vietnam, we compute the value of 1 2 ~ 
z - a 1 - a2 
0.3, where z=3, a1=0.4, a2=0.3; a3=0.2 and a4=0.I (see Appendix 7A). Substituting 
the values of a1, a2, a3 and a4 into equation (3.8), the value of Co is approximately 1.4. 
The data source and the discussion of adjustment for the time series of the average rice 
price (/Jp), the average weighted cost share parameter (m) and (l-C0m) are documented 
in the Data Appendix, Section DA.3. Substituting the results of time series for the 
average rice price (/Jp) and (l-C0m) (see Tables DA.10 and DA.12, Data Appendix) into 
(7.2), gives the time-series data on the growth of /Jp and (1-C0m) (see Table 7.6). 
Following (7.3), the value of A 1 is computed from the growth of /Jp and (l-C0m). 
The obtained value of A 1 (see Table 7.6) shows quantitatively the separate effects of 
liberalisation on the growth of total factor productivity in rice production. 
....... 
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Table 7.6 The cumulative growth of A1 and the Solow residual (per cent) 
Cumulative growth of A Cumulative Cumulative growth of /Jp Cumulative growth of A 1 Solow residual A 1 percentage share of total 
factor productivity growth 
VN North South growth of VN North South VN North South VN North South VN North South 
(]-Com) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 11 12 13 14 9/2 10/3 11/4 
1976-80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 11.17 12.00 9.25 0.0 13.85 3.39 23.94 4.16 1.02 7.18 7.01 10.98 2.07 37.24 8.50 77.62 
1982 28.09 27.37 28.25 0.0 18.33 8.52 27.86 5.50 2.55 8.36 22.59 24.82 19.89 19.58 9.32 29.59 
1983 29.50 25.12 32.79 ... o.o 22.04 17.34 27.27 6.61 5.20 8.18 22.89 19.92 24.61 22.41 20.70 24.95 
1984 35.84 25.07 43.74 0.0 25.55 17.76 33.58 7.66 5.33 10.07 28.18 19.74 33.67 21.37 21 .26 23 .02 
1985 38.38 25.56 47.85 15.7 21.35 20.57 23.94 11.12 10.89 11.90 27.26 14.67 35.95 28.97 42.6 24.87 
1986 36.69 22.26 46.44 15.7 27.42 33 .26 25.24 12.94 14.69 12.29 23 .75 7.57 34.15 35.27 65.99 26.47 
1987 30.37 19.50 38.15 18.1 30.72 31.29 32.2 14.66 14.83 15.10 15.71 4.67 23.05 48.27 76.04 39.58 
1988 44.83 30.21 54.59 18.1 58.55 78.73 45.75 23.00 29.06 19.16 21.83 1.15 35.43 51.31 96.21 35.10 
1989 61.16 40.85 74.80 23.0 77.33 77.86 80.46 30.09 30.24 31.02 31.07 10.61 43.78 49.20 74.03 41.47 
1990 61.65 32.56 82.11 24.2 94.29 93 .39 99.71 35.53 35.27 37.16 26.12 0.00 44.95 57.63 100.00 45.26 
1991 60.73 16.32 91.45 32.0 132.72 112.69 151.72 49.41 43.41 55.12 11.32 0.00 36.33 81.35 100.00 60.27 
1992 69.55 43.53 84.97 33.8 112.1 103.89 122.77 43.77 41.31 46.97 25.78 2.22 38.00 62.93 94.90 55.28 
1993 74.83 61.80 78.46 32.0 113.1 90.38 134.05 43.53 36.71 49.82 31.30 25.09 28.64 58.17 59.40 63.50 
1994 71.53 52.91 79.40 30.2 153.79 153.65 158.66 55.19 55.15 56.66 16.34 0.00 22.74 77.15 100.00 71.36 
Fitted annual 
growth rate 
1981-87 3.8 2.0 5.2 2.8 3.1 4.2 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.6 2.3 ~o.o 4.0 
1988-94 3.6 3.3 3.3 1.9 8.5 6.7 9.9 4.0 3.3 4.6 0.2 0.6 ::::0.0 
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As compared with the period of the communal system, in the period 1980-87 
total factor productivity increased at the annual rates of 1.8, 2.2 and 1.6 per cent for 
Vietnam, the north and the south respectively. Under the effects of full trade 
liberalisation (the period 1988-94), total factor productivity increased at annual rates of 
4.0, 3.3 and 4.6 per cent for Vietnam, the north and south respectively. Clearly, the 
stronger the process of trade liberalisation the higher the growth of total factor 
productivity. Total factor productivity jumped to a higher level when agriculture moved 
from the communal system to the output contracts system (1981-87), and jumped again 
dramatically after the full liberalisation of domestic and international markets (1988-94). 
The strong relation among the growth of output, total factor productivity (A) and the part 
of total factor productivity resulting from effects of liberalisation (A 1) in 197 6-94 also 
can be seen graphically in Figure 7.3 below. 
Figure 7.3: The cumulative growth of output, total factor productivity (A) and the 
part of total factor productivity due to liberalisation (A 1) in Vietnam 
120 per cent 
100 
80 
60 
40 
~~ 
0 ~ N M ~ ~ <O ~ ro m O ~ N ro ro ro ro ro ro ro ro ro ro m m m ,Am mm mm mm mm mm m 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
m 
~ 
th e cumulative gro wth of outp ut 
the cum ulative gro wth of A 
th e cumulative gro wth of A 1 
M ~ m m 
m m 
~ ~ 
p 
An empirical analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation on rice production. .. (Ch. 7) 131 
A regional comparison also shows that total factor productivity increased more 
in the south than in the north, where the push for trade liberalisation was effectively 
more determined and vigorous. Indeed, the ratio of the cumulative growth of A 1 to that 
of A also broadly reflects the extent of trade liberalisation; for the whole of the country it 
has increased from 37.2 per cent in 1981 to 77.5 per cent in 1994 (see Table 7.6). 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided a quantitative analysis of the effects of liberalisation on the 
growth of rice production as a result of the growth of total factor productivity. Whether 
one uses the estimated results constructed in Section 6.2 or the alternatives measures 
from other empirical studies, the conclusion is still the same. Total factor productivity 
has been increased directly in line with the pace and progress of trade liberalisation and 
the growth in factor productivity is the most important reason for the remarkable growth 
of rice output in the years 1980 to 1994. Indeed, the growth in total factor productivity 
more than dominates the effect of increases in factor supplies. 
fl 
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Appendix 7A: THE CALCULATION OF THE EFFORT-DISUTILITY COEFFICIENT 
(Z) AND THE 'TECHNICAL' SHARE PARAMETERS FOR INPUTS 
The value of z can be derived directly from equation (3 .21) or ( 4.10) with a knowledge of the 
components of /Jp. However, some parameters (such as A, ai and c5) in these equations are 
unknown. To simplify, we calculate z from the growth rate of A and /Jp in two contiguous years 
within the same period of liberalisation so that the value of ( l -C0m) does not vary much. Thus, 
from (3 .21) it can be seen that 
• 
a1 +a2 
z-(a 1 +a2) 
(A I A) 
• 
(/Jp I /Jp) 
(7A.l) 
Take the years 1979 and 1978 from the period of the output-contracts so that, by assumption, 
the average weighted cost share parameters and the market share coefficient in these years are 
the same. 3 From equation (7 A. I), we obtain 
A = z - a1 - a2 [/3p1919 (1- Com) - /3p191s (1- Com)] 
A a1 + a2 /3p191s (1- Com) . (7A.2) 
The value of the growth rate of total factor productivity between 1978 and 1979 is 
0.078. The growth of the price of rice is 0.25 ( calculated from Table S.4, Sub Appendix, Data 
Appendix). Thus, from (7 A.2) 
a1 + a2 ==: 0.3. 
z-(a1 + a2) -
(7A.3) 
Substituting the value of equation (7A.3) into equations (3.22) to (3.25), and solving 
the simultaneously, with the constraint z > I as in Chapter 3 above, gives: z ""2.8; a1 = 0.4; a2 ~ 
3The output in 1978 is adjusted by adding the amount of output which was destroyed by bad weather in 
that year (DAFF, GSO, 1996). 
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0.3; a3 ~ 0.2 and a4 ~ 0.1. Alternatively, choosing, the years 1982 and 1983 gives a growth 
rate of total factor productivity of 0.07 and the growth rate of the price of rice price at 0.183, so 
that 
a1 + a2 :::: 0.38. 
z- (a1 + a2) -
(7A.4) 
As above, the calculated results are: z --3.3; a 1 ~ 0.4; a2 ~ 0.3; a3 ~ 0.2 and a4 ~ 0.1. From the 
two attempts it can safely be assumed that the value of z is about 3 and a1 ~ 0.4; a2 ~ 0.3; a3 ~ 
0.2 and a4 ~ 0.1. From equation (3 .8), the value of C0 is computed to be 1 .4. 
f 
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Chapter 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITIONAL 
PATH AND THE LONG-RUN STEADY STATE VALUE OF 
RICE PRODUCTION 
This chapter uses the dynamic model of internal and external trade liberalisation 
developed in Chapter 5 as the basis for an empirical analysis of the transitional dynamic 
path and long-run level of capital and output for the rice industry in Vietnam. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. Section 8.1 discusses a graphical comparison of 
the actual transitional path with the path predicted by the theory for rice production. 
This suggests an underlying consistency between the theory and the empirical evidence. 
Based on the theoretical analysis in Chapter 5 and given parameter values relevant to 
Vietnam, Section 8 .2 computes the various steady-state values of capital in the periods 
of trade liberalisation. Section 8.3 provides an empirical estimate of the speed of 
convergence in the dynamic model and the timescale required for the rice industry to 
reach the neighbourhood of a steady-state. Section 8.4 estimates the long-run level of 
I 
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output and the capital stock in the rice industry in the different stages of trade 
liberalisation, and Section 8.5 provides some concluding remarks. Appendix 8A 
collects all of the technical details, showing clearly the derivation of the appropriate 
linear approximation of the underlying dynamic model. 
8.1 The transitional paths for the capital stock and output in rice production 
Both the theoretical and empirical transitional paths for the capital stock and the output 
of rice production will be represented graphically in this section. While the dynamic 
model of Chapter 5 is clearly helpful in predicting the behaviour of capital and rice 
output along a transitional path under the various effects of trade liberalisation, the 
specific case of Vietnam allows us to see what actually happened under the 
liberalisation process and compare it with the predictions of the theory. 
(a) The transitional dynamic path for physical capital 
As outlined in Section 2.2, Chapter 2 above, the process of liberalisation in Vietnam 
started from the period of a communal system (1980) and continued through the period 
of de-collectivisation in rural areas with tightly controlled markets (1981-87), to the 
period of the total freeing up of markets, or market liberalisation (1988- to the present). 
Applying the phase diagram analysis of Figure 5.2, from Chapter 5, to rice production in 
Vietnam, the theoretical trend of physical capital is indicated in Figure 8.1. As such, 
Kl 980 Kl 988 d Kl 994 h 1 f h . 1 . I -C'. h . . d . , , an represent t e va ues o p ys1ca capita 1or t e nee 1n ustry 1n 
years in which the important stages of liberalisation occurred. 1 The years 1980 and 
1 Chapter 5 referred to the capital-labour ratio rather than the capital stock. In order to eliminate the effect 
of growth in labour force on capital stock, for the precise comparison, it is assumed that total labour in the 
sector does not change so that the analysis for the capital-labour ratio can be applied for the capital stock. 
,, 
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1987 are the first year for the period of output contracts and the commencing year of the 
period of the opening up of markets respectively and 1994 is the last year for data source 
used in this dissertation. The length of time from 1981 to the year t(I) is the timescale 
required for the rice industry to attain the vicinity of the steady state in the period of 
output contracts, and t(II) is the year in which the steady state is nearly attained for the 
period of the opening up of markets. 2 
Figure 8.1: The theoretical path of physical capital for the rice industry in the 
different stages of trade liberalisation 
K 2, (Y) 
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1994 t (I) t ( 11) Time 
According to Figure 8.1 , in a given period of trade liberalisation, capital is 
increasing monotonically and converging to its steady-state value. At the beginning of 
each transition or the next stage of trade liberalisation, the rate of change of capital 
jumps up to a higher level. As a result, each new stage of liberalisation results in a new, 
higher steady-state level for physical capital. 
2In principle, an infinite timescale is required for the system to converge to the steady state. 
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Returning to the actual facts of the rice industry in Vietnam, we would like to 
know whether the actual trend of capital is consistent with the theoretical analysis as 
illustrated in the graph above. The time series data for physical capital is available 
(Tables 7.1), and thus it is possible to graph (see Figure 8.2) the trends of growth of 
physical capital during the liberalisation process (taking the value of physical capital in 
the period of the communal system (1976-1980) as a basic index). As seen, the value of 
physical capital for rice production in Vietnam increased moderately in the period of 
output contracts (1981-87), and has increased remarkably since the opening up of 
markets, or 1988 to the present. 
Figure 8.2: The actual cumulative growth of physical capital for Vietnam, the 
north, and the south in the different stages of trade liberalisation 
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Sources: Constructed data from the Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing (SDAFF)-General Statistics Office (GSO) (see Section DA. 2, Data Appendix) 
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The comparison of the theoretical trends of physical capital in Figure 8.1 and the 
actual data in Figure 8.2 suggests that the theoretical analysis is broadly consistent with 
the empirical evidence in the rice industry for the whole of Vietnam as well as for the 
north and south separately. 
(b) The transitional path for rice output 
Since the output of rice can be derived from the institutional production function in 
equation (3 .20), it is easy to show that the theoretical trend of rice output must follow a 
similar path to that illustrated for physical capital in Figure 8.1. On this basis, the 
transitional path for rice output follows the characteristics that: (i) in one given period of 
trade liberalisation the trend for rice output is increasing monotonically and converging 
to a steady state; (ii) rice output jumps to a higher level and its rate of change is also 
altered at the beginning of each new stage of trade liberalisation and (iii) each new stage 
of liberalisation causes a new, higher steady-state value for rice output. 
For a comparison of the theoretical and actual trend of rice output along the 
transitional dynamic path, we also graph the actual trend of growth of rice output in the 
whole of Vietnam, the north, and south (see Figure 8.3) by taking the numerical mean-
value from the years 1976-80 as a base year. As predicted by the theoretical model, in 
the period of output contracts ( 1981-87), rice output had increased significantly and then 
it jumps remarkably in the period of market liberalisation or the opening up of markets 
(1988 to the present). Each new stage of liberalisation causes a new, higher level of the 
trend value for rice output for Vietnam as well as for the north and south taken 
separately. 
l 
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Figure 8.3: The actual cumulative growth of rice output for Vietnam, the north 
and the south in the different stages of trade liberalisation 
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Sources: The Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (SDAFF)-
General Statistics Office (GSO). 
To reiterate, the comparison between Figures 8.1 and 8.3 shows (at least 
casually) a clear consistency between the prediction of the theoretical analysis and the 
actual time path of rice output in Vietnam. The general consistency between the 
predicted and observed transitional paths over the process of trade liberalisation 
provides some reassurance about the usefulness of the model of Chapter 5 as a predictor 
of the steady-state level of rice output and capital stock in Vietnam. In the remainder of 
this chapter, the model will be used as a basis for empirical estimation of the long-run 
growth path in transition to the respective steady states. 
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8.2 The steady-state values of physical capital in the different stages of trade 
liberalisation 
This section uses the dynamic model of Chapter 5 to estimate the effects of trade 
liberalisation on the steady-state level of capital for rice production in the different 
stages of liberalisation. At any given stage of liberalisation, a general expression for the 
steady-state value of capital is given by equation (5.32) while the particular steady-state 
values of capital are given by equations (5.33), (5.35), (5.37) and (5.39) respectively for 
the period of the communal system, the period of output contracts and the period of the 
opening up of markets3. These equations are listed here again and renumbered for 
convenience. 
k1 = 
In the communal system, the steady-state physical capital ( k1) is given by 
z a 1 +a2 a 1 a 1 o-(a1 +a2) -- _ __:_______::_ ---- ---- 1+----
(p (1 - C m ) a l a2 k a3 ) z-al -a2 8 z-al -a2 a z-al -a2 a z-al -a2 a z-al -a2 s Oc O I I 2 4 
o-(a1 +a2) 
(µ + n + p)[ (l - a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a1-a2 
(1-r 4 )+ o-( a1 +a2) 
z-a1-a2 
(8.1) 
In the period of output contracts with tightly controlled domestic markets, the 
steady-state physical capital (kt) is 
kt = 
z a 1 +a2 a 1 a 1 rr(a1 +a2) !+---[ C/JoD p s + f31 D p M )(l - Com D )aol a2 k t3 ] z-al -ai 8 z-a1 -ai a t-al -ai a ;-a1 -ai a4 z-al -ai 
rr(a1 +a2) 
(µ + n + p)[(l- a 4 )(µ + n) + p] z-a1-a2 
(l-y4)+ rr(a1+a2) 
z-a1 -ai 
(8.2) 
3 Section 2 .2 discusses the period of the opening up of the domestic market as well as the period of the 
opening up of the international market in Vietnam, both of which happened nearly simultaneously in the 
period from 1988-1989. 
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and in the period of the opening up of markets, the steady-state physical capital ( k;1 ) is 
k if -2 -
I+--'--'=- I + t 2 
z a1 +a2 a 1 a 1 a(a1 +a2 ) I a(a +a ) [ (/1: p M + JJ: Pw )(1- Comw )aof a2 kt3 F gz - a, - a2 CXiz-a1 - a2 a.;_-a, - a2 a4 z-a, - a2 ( -r 4) z-a, - a2 
a(a1 +a2 ) 
(µ+n + p)[(l- a4 )(µ+n) + p]z- a, - a2 
(8.3) 
It is possible to use these expressions to estimate the steady-state level of capital 
at each stage of liberalisation, assuming the values of the parameters as determined in 
Chapters 6 and 7, with the exception of 8 and p.4 However, there is a simple method of 
computing these steady-state values using a historically pre-determined value of K~. 
Since Vietnam had already experienced a collective regime for a long period of time, 
especially in the north where collectivism was firmly in place for at least twenty five 
years, assume that for the period from 1976 to 1980, agriculture had already attained a 
steady-state equilibrium for the period of the communal system. If so, we can take the 
arithmetic mean of physical capital during 197 6-80 as representing the steady-state 
value of capital at this time and in this system. According to Table 7 .1, the steady-state 
physical capital in the period of the communal system is 245.5, 146.4 and 99.1 ten 
thousands horsepower for Vietnam, the north and south respectively. 
From equations (8.1) and (8.2), the steady-state value of physical capital in the 
period of output contracts with tightly controlled markets then can be derived as 
K~ = ~[(/Ji Ps + /3~ PM )(l -C0mD)](l-r 4)+ o-(a1 +a2) 
PsO-Cofnc) 
(8.4) 
4 
As mentioned in footnote (3), in this chapter, although equations (8.1) to (8.3) are expressed in terms of 
capital-labour ratio, here we eliminate the effect of growth in the labour force on the capital stock by 
assuming that the total labour input does not change so that the analysis for the capital-labour ratio can be 
replicated in terms of the capital stock. 
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Here, y4 ~ 0. l (see Sectio
n 6.2, Chapter 6), z ~ 3, a1 ~ 0.4, a2 ~
 0.3, a3 ~ 0.2 and 
a4 ~ O. l (see Appen
dix 7 A). Following the discussion in
 Section 5.4 (Chapter 5) about 
the value of the constant intertempora
l elasticity of consumption CY in relati
on to a4 , we 
assume that in this case the value of
 CY is equal to the value of a4, or 0.1.
 Substituting 
these values into equation (8.4), we g
et 
1 
(1- r 4) + a(a, + a2) 
z-a 1 - a 2 
1 
(1 - 0.1) + 0.1(0.3 + 0.4) 
3 - 0.3 _ 0.4 
~ 1.1 (8.5) 
Now assume that the structure and p
rice level in the goods and factor m
arkets 
are constant from 1987 to the year o
f the steady state, so that we can use
 the values of 
the average rice price (/J/ Ps + Pt p M) and the composite 
measure (1- C0mD) in 1987 
to represent steady-state values. Fr
om Table DA.10 (see Data Append
ix), the ratio 
between the average rice price in the 
period of output contracts and that in
 the period of 
the communal system (,Bt P, ;:,D PM J is derived to be approximately 1.31
5 and the 
ratio (
l-C0mDJ 
1- C0 mc 
between the period of output con
tracts and the period of the 
communal system is approximately 1
. 09. 6
 
Substituting the value of K~ (245.5, 
146.4 and 99.1 ten thousands horsep
ower 
for Vietnam, the north and south resp
ectively ( derived from Table 7.1) and
 the values of 
coefficients and the ratios above into
 equation (8.4), we get the steady-st
ate values of 
5 Data sources and adjustments are docu
mented in Data Appendix (Section DA
.3 and Table DA. I 0). For 
simplification, we assume that ratio for
 the whole of Vietnam is the same for t
he north and south. 
6 Data sources and adjustments are do
cumented in Data Appendix (Section
 DA.3 and Table DA. IO. 
Again, for simplification, we assume th
at ratio for Vietnam is the same for the
 north and south. 
i
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physical capital in the period of output contracts to be 363.2, 216.7 and 146.7 ten 
thousands horsepower for Vietnam, the north and south respectively (see Table 8.1 ). 
Table 8.1 The steady-state value of capital in the different stages of trade 
liberalisation (Ten thousands horsepower) 
The stage of trade liberalisation VIETNAM The north The south 
(0) The period of the communal system 245.5 146.6 99.1 
(I) The period of output contracts with a 363.2 216.7 146.7 
tightly controlled market 
( 11) The period of the opening up of the 844.0 503.6 340.9 
domestic and international markets 
Following a similar approach to that above, the steady-state value of physical 
capital in the period of the opening up of markets also can be derived. From equations 
(8.1) and (8.2), the steady-state physical capital in this period is found to be 
Kil = JC[(Ji{ Ps + /J:. PM )(l-Colnw) l(l-y4)+ a (a1+a2) 
2 2 (l C z- a 1-a2 • 
Ps - olnc) 
(8.6) 
Here, the superscript in (8.6) is given as in (8.5) and is approximately 1. 1. 
Again, it is assumed that the structure and price level in the goods and factor 
markets are constant in the period from 1994 to the year of the steady state. As above, 
we use the value of average rice price (f3t Ps + /Ji° PM) and (1- C0mD) in 1994 for 
those values in the year of the steady state. Based on Table DA. IO (Data Appendix), the 
ratio between the average rice price in the period of the opening up markets and that in 
~1: 
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• 0 Ps l PM • • (/JD + /JD J the penod of the communal system ------ 1s computed to be approximately 
Ps 
7 (l-C0mDJ 2.54 and the ratio ---- between the period of output contracts and the period of 1- C0 mc 
the communal system is approximately 1.21.8 
Substituting the derived values of Ki and the relevant coefficients and the ratios 
above into equation (8.6), we get the steady-state values of physical capital in the period 
of output contracts as 844.0, 503.6 and 340.9 ten thousands horsepower for Vietnam, 
the north and south respectively (see Table 8.1 ). 
8.3 The speed of convergence and the timescale required for the system to reach 
the vicinity of the steady state 
It is quite clear that the value of capital and rice output change considerably over time 
along a transitional path, but how quickly those variables change or how soon the rice 
industry will reach a neighbourhood of the steady state in a given stage of trade 
liberalisation is an important question we should now explore. Accordingly, this section 
is devoted to estimation of the speed of convergence of a transitional dynamic path and 
the timescale required for the rice industry to be within a vicinity of the steady state. In 
addition, the timescale of our model is also needed to derive the steady-state level for 
rice output in the different stages of trade liberalisation and to get some idea of the 
average annual growth rates predicted for the respective transitional periods. 
7 Data sources and adjustments for this calculation are documented in Section DA.3 and Table DA. I 0 
(Data Appendix). 
8 Data sources and adjustments for this calculation are documented in Section DA.3 and Table DA. I 0 
(Data Appendix). 
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Here the standard approach of a log-linear approximation around steady-state 
values is used to generate numerical solutions of the approximate nonlinear system (see, 
for example, Barro and Sala-i- Martin (1995, p.59-92).9 
The relevant system of simultaneous differential equations in consumption (c) 
and capital (k2) is given by equations (5.25) and (5.29), renumbered here for 
convenience 
-er( a1 +a2) za4 • 
k2 (t) = f (c(t), k2 (t) = c(t) z-a1-a2 B4k2 (t) z-a1-a2 -(µ + n)k2 (t)-c(t)- /Jpd 
(8.7) 
• l[ -cr(a 1+a 2 )+I za4 1 ] l 
c(t)=g(c(t),k2(t))= O" c(t) z-a1-a2 B4a 4k2(t) z-a1-a2 - O"c(t)(µ+n+p) 
(8.8) 
where B4 is given as in equation (5.22), or 
a1+a2 
z a 1 a2 
B s: z-a1-a2 B --4 = u 3 z-al -a2 al z-al -a2 a2 z-al -a2 (8.9) 
Taking a linear approximation around a steady-state point ( c*, k; ), gives, in 
matrix notation 
• 
k2 (t) 
• 
c(t) 
[
f k2 (t) f c(t) ]I k2 (t) - k; (t) 
g k2 (t) g c(t) I c(t) - c* (t) 
(8.10) 
where fk
2 
(t), f c(t), gki (t) and gc(t) are partial derivatives evaluated at the steady state. 
The details of solution of the system (8.10) are presented in Appendix 8A. The 
resulting solution for the time path of the physical capital-labour ratio is found to be 
9 For simplification we use the derived result for the whole of Vietnam as applying to both the north and 
the south, i.e., we assume that it takes the same timescale for Vietnam, the north and south to reach the 
vicinity of the steady state. 
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-
k t() k c k -0.251 k* 2 t = 2 + 2 = a1e + 0.97 2 
where k; represents the solution for the homogenous form of (8.10) and k2 1s a 
particular solution of (8.10). As argued above, by assuming a constant labour input, it is 
possible to recast the foregoing equation to represent the time path of the absolute 
physical capital stock ( or non-per-capita) which is then given by 
-
K t ( ) K c K -0.251 0 9 K* 2 t = 2 + 2 = a1e + · 7 2 • (8.11) 
Thus the speed of convergence of capital is calculated as -0.25 for any stage of 
trade liberalisation. It is easy to show that the speed of convergence of output is the 
same as it is for capital (from the institutional production function), so the speed of 
convergence of rice output must also be -0 .25. 
As such, equation (8.11) only provides the general form of the time path for 
physical capital, in this ( again) the speeds of convergence of capital and output are fixed 
* at -0.25. But, obviously, the values of K2 or (K2 ) and a1 in (8.11) also depend on the 
relevant parameters, which vary in the different stages of liberalisation. In other words, 
for every period of liberalisation, we need to calculate the new and different time path of 
physical capital and the different length of time required for the rice industry to attain 
the vicinity of the steady state. These calculations are performed below for each of the 
two liberalisation stages. 
(a) In the period of output contracts with tightly controlled markets 
The value of a1 can be computed by setting t=O in equation (8.11) above. That value is 
. 
given as 
j'I 
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a1 = K 2 (0) - K 2 = -106.8 (8.12) 
-
where K2 is computed as being 352.3 ten thousands horsepower
10 and K 2 (0) equals 
245.5 ten thousands horsepower (Table 8.1). 
Substituting the values of a1 and K2 into (8.11), the time path for physical 
capital in this period is 
K~ (t) = (-106.8)e-0·251 + 352.3. (8.13). 
Now consider this approximate solution of the system at time t, when the system is in 
the neighbourhood of the steady state. Let ~ denote the proportion of the total 
adjustment (from time zero to the steady state) of K~ (t) still to be effected at time t; 
i.e., ~ is given by 
K 2 (t) - K~ = <;. 
K 2 (0) - K 2 
(8.14). 
Assume that we are interested in finding out the time taken for K~ (t) to complete 90 
per cent of the adjustment to the steady state, then ~ is 0.1. Substituting the value of 
K2 (0), K;, and (8.13) into (8.14), the value oft can be found to be 
t = _l_ln( 106.8 ) 
0.25 0.1 * 11 7. 7 _ 10_9 ~ 20 years . (8.15). 
Since the overall convergence time T may be approximated by t divided by (1-~), we 
obtain 22 years as the timescale required for the system to attain the vicinity of the 
steady state in this transitional period. 
10
This value equals 0.97 K; as given in (8.11), where K; =363.2 ten thousand horsepower (see Table 
8.1). 
1t 
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(b) In the period of the opening up of markets 
Using the above approach, the value of a 1 in this case is 
a 1 = K2 (0) - K2 = -818.7 (8.16) 
where in this period K2 is computed as being 818. 7 ten thousands horsepower 11 and 
K2 (0) (in the year 1987) equals 292.1 ten thousands horsepower (see Table 7.1). 
Substituting the values of a1 and K2 into (8.11), the time path for physical 
capital in this stage is given by 
K~ (t) = (-818.7)e-0·25' + 818.7. (8.17). 
By symmetry to the argument above regarding the relationship between the values of 
capital and the length of time required for the system to attain those values, we can use 
the relationship in equation (8.14) to determine the timescale in this period. Assume 
that~ is 0.1 and substituting the value of K2 (0), K;, and equation (8.17) into (8.14), 
the value oft can be derived as 
1 ( 818.7 J t = - ln ------ ~ 13 years 
0.25 0.1 * 551.9 - 25.32 
(8.18) 
Again, approximating T by t divided by (1-~), the timescale required for the system to 
reach the vicinity of the steady state in this period is computed to be about 15 years. 
8.4 The long-run level of rice output in the different stages of trade liberalisation 
Now consider the steady-state value of rice output. As an important final good, the 
value of rice output, as it varies across different transitional periods, illustrates nicely the 
11 k* . k* Equals 0.95 2 (as m (8.11), where 2 =844.0 ten thousand horsepower (see Table 8.1). 
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distinct effects of market liberalisation and as such is a useful measure of particular 
interest to policy-makers in Vietnam. 
In the steady state, if inputs are known, rice output can be computed by the 
institutional production function given in equation (3 .20), or 
Qs = A(Ns)ri (Ls)r2 (K/)YJ (K
2 
s )r4 (8.19) 
where ~, Ls, K1s and K2s are the steady-state values of labour, land, current input and 
physical capital respectively. Here YJ =0.2, r2 =0.4, y3 =0.4 and y4 =0.1 (see Table 6.4). 
The total productivity factor coefficient A is still determined by the equation 
(3.21) or 
_z - a1+a2 a1 ~ 
A=(ao) z-a1-a2 [ of]p(l-Com) ]z-a1-a2 (a
1
) z-a1-a2 (a
2
) z-a1-a2 (8.20). 
Thus, total factor productivity depends on the component 8/Jp(l - C0m) , which as 
discussed reflects the changes in market structure and the prices of goods and factors in 
the different stages of liberalisation. 
We are now in a position to use equations (8.19) and (8.20) to estimate the 
steady-state level of rice output in the different periods of liberalisation. 
(a) The steady-state level of rice output in the period of output contracts with 
tightly controlled markets 
As we have seen, the timescale for long-run growth in this period is about 22 years. 
Thus if the system started in 1980, it will converge 'near ' the steady state in the year 
2002, and recall that the actual last year of the period of output contracts (1987) is the 
seventh year in that path. 
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The steady-state value of the parameters in equation (8.19) can thus be derived 
from their actual value at the seventh year of the process ( or 1987) and applying the 
annual growth rate of those parameters for the 15 years from 1987 to 2002 (the year of 
the 'near' steady state). Equation (8.19) for steady-state rice output then can be 
rewritten as 
Q = A 1987 (10~;/ A) 15 (N 1981 t [ ( I O~~t ) 15 r (L im ) r' [ ( IO~;t ) 15 r (K /"' )'' 
l00+gKl (K 1987 ) y4 K 2 
[ ( ) 
1 s ] r] ( s J r 4 
100 2 K ~9s1 
(8.21) 
where gA, gN, and gL are the respective annual growth rates of total factor productivity, 
labour, land, current input and physical capital from 1987 to 2002. 
Based on the institutional production function in equation (8 .19) for the year 
1987, equation (8 .21) can be rewritten as 
Q=t9~(1~;gAr[(1~;gNJ'J[(1~;&J'T[(1~~K,J'T[J~ r (8.22). 
where the annual growth rates for labour and current input are estimated to be 
approximately 0.6 and 3.1 per cent respectively in 1976-94 (see Table 7.1 for the whole 
of Vietnam), since, ceteris paribus, it is simply assumed that those growth rates are also 
the same in the period 1988-2002. 
For simplification, also assume that gL is equal to zero given that there is not 
much change in the actual land area for rice production. In other words, suppose the 
regulation of Vietnamese government banning conversion of rice land to other purposes 
ll 
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is enforced efficiently, then the rate of change in the area of land used for rice 
production can be ignored. 
Finally, we consider the growth rate of total factor productivity (gA). This is 
complicated because it depends directly on the growth effects of trade liberalisation (see 
equation (8.19)). Suppose the market structure and price level in the goods and factor 
markets, as represented by 8/Jp(l - C0 m) , changes significantly (as suggested by the 
available data for the period of 1981 to 1987) in the earliest years of a period of trade 
liberalisation and then became constant after five or seven years of this particular trade 
regime. Obviously we can not simply assume that the growth rate of total factor 
productivity is the same for 1981-87 and 1988-2002, but it is reasonable to assume that 
in the period from 1988 to 2002, A1, (see equation (8.11)) the most important 
component for growth of total factor productivity, will no longer change because the 
value 8/Jp(l - C0m) in A1, will not be likely to change, having incurred all its change in 
earlier years, starting in 1981. On this supposition, the growth rate of 8/Jp(l - C0m) may 
be assumed to equal zero for 1988-2002, and the growth rate of A1 is zero too. If the 
annual growth rate of A in 1981-87 is about 3.8 per cent (see Table 7.2 for the whole of 
Vietnam), then the annual growth rate of total factor productivity must be less than that 
given the constancy of 8/Jp(l - C0m) over this time. To deal with this problem, we 
consider the following alternative possibilities (reflecting varying degrees of optimism) 
for gA. 
• In the first and most pessimistic scenario, as a minimum benchmark ( and one that 
still, as we shall see, shows the positive effects of trade liberalisation), assume that 
gA equals zero per cent for the period from 1988-2002. Suppose too, as mentioned, 
A 
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that market structures and price levels do not change from 1987-2002 (i.e. , that the 
component 8/Jp(l - C0m) in equation (8.11) is constant since 1987), so that the 
component of the growth rate of total factor productivity directly due to 
liberalisation (A 1) is constant since 1987. Assume also that there are not significant 
changes in the other factors ( apart from effects of trade) since 1987 so that the 
growth rate of the Solow residual is zero as well. Under both of these assumptions, 
overall total factor productivity does not change from 1987 .12 
• In the second case, as an optimistic possibility, assume that the annual growth rate of 
total factor productivity maintains the annual growth of rate 3.8 per cent (as 
experienced in 1981-87) until the steady state (see Table 7.6, for the whole of 
Vietnam). In other words, let gA equal 3.8 per cent per year for the period 1988-
2002. 
• In the third case, as a compromise possibility, let gA be equal to the arithmetic mean 
of the values in the first two cases above, or 1.9 per cent for 1988-2002. 
Substituting into equation (8.13) the initial values of rice output in 1987 as 
15102.6, 6075.2 and 9027.4 million tons of rice for Vietnam, the north and south 
respectively (Table 7.1), and the values g N = 0.6, gi = 0 and gK1 =3.1 (Table 7.1 for the 
whole of Vietnam), 13 with the three different cases for the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (gA, = 0 per cent ; gA, = 3 .8 per cent and gA, = 1.9 per cent), the various 
alternative values for the long-run level of rice output in Vietnam, in the north, and in 
12The main reservation about this approach is that it may be not be realistic to assume a zero growth rate 
of the Solow residual. In other words, the actual figure for the Solow residual in 1981-87 (Table 7.6) may 
not allow us simply to ignore the growth rate of this component in the growth of total factor productivity. 13 
It can be see that using the alternative measures of the annual growth rates for labour and current inputs 
in Tables 7.2 to 7.4 gives even higher steady state values for output and predicted annual growth rates for 
the period 1988-94. Using the measures in Table 7.1 (the relatively more pessimistic case) still gives 
strong conclusions regarding these effects. 
A 
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the south (at the point of fifty years after 1980) are obtained and are summarised in 
Table 8.2. 
According to Table 8.2, and under all three cases for gA, trade liberalisation in 
this period of output contracts still provides positive effects on the steady-state level of 
rice output. The difference in the value of steady-state rice output between this period 
and the period of the communal system is 4.53, 19.25 and 11.0 million tons of rice for 
the first, second and third case of gA respectively, for the whole of Vietnam. That 
difference is 1.82, 7.75 and 4.43 million tons of rice for the north and 2.70, 11.50 and 
6.58 million tons of rice for the south. As such, these results provide a confirmation of 
the theoretical analysis: trade liberalisation results in increases in the steady-state level 
of agricultural (rice) output. 
These results also allow us to compute the predicted annual growth rate of rice 
output in this period. Since we know the initial value of rice output ( as the arithmetic 
average of rice output for the years 197 6-80), the steady-state value of rice output, and 
the time-scale for the system to reach the vicinity of the steady state ( all are collected in 
Table 8.3), the predicted annual growth rate of rice output is easily calculated and shown 
for various cases of gA, for Vietnam, the north and the south (see Table 8.3). 
(b) The steady-state value of rice output in the period of the opening up of 
markets 
According to the result in Section 8.2, recall the timescale for long-run growth in this 
period is about fifteen years. Thus if the system starts in 1988-89, it will converge to a 
'near' steady-state value in 2004, and the year 1994 is the fifth year in that process. 
,.. 
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Following a similar approach to that employed in part (a) above, the parameters 
in equation (8 .11) can be derived from actual values at year five of the process ( or 1994) 
and the growth rate of the parameters from this year until the fifteenth year. Thus, the 
steady-state value for rice output is given by 
Q=tm(l~;gA)l(1~;gN)
1°J[(1~;&)1J[(1~JK1)1J(~r (8.23) 
where the annual growth rates for labour and current input are approximately 0.6 and 3 .1 
per cent respectively (see Table 7.1). 
Following the same assumptions and arguments from above, we consider three 
possible values of the growth rate of total factor productivity from 1995 to 2004. The 
first case is that of a zero growth rate of total factor productivity. In the second case the 
annual growth rate of total factor productivity of 3 .6 per cent in 1988-94 (see Table 7.6 
for the whole of the country) is assumed to continue for 1995-2004. In the third or 
intermediate case, the growth rate of total factor productivity is 1.8 per cent. It is also 
assumed throughout that gL is equal to zero. 
The initial values of rice output in 1994 are 23528.3, 9100.0 and 14428.3 million 
tons of rice for the whole of Vietnam, the north, and south respectively (Table 7.1). 
Substituting those values and gN= 0.6, gL = 0 and gK1 = 3.1 per cent into equation (8.23), 
for the three possible values of gA, we obtain three alternative values for the steady-state 
level of rice output for Vietnam, the north and south. These are summarised in Table 
8.2. All three possibilities for the growth rate of total factor productivity confirm the 
positive and (here) dramatic effects of trade liberalisation on long-run rice output. Even 
in the most pessimistic case of a zero rate of growth of total factor productivity (gA = 0), 
... 
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the difference in the long-run rice output between the period of the opening up of 
markets and the communal system is about 13.13, 4.84 and 8.29 million tons of rice and 
between the period of the opening up of markets and the period of output contracts is 
8.60, 3.02 and 5.58 million tons of rice for Vietnam, the north, and the south 
respectively (see Table 8.2). 
Again, following a similar approach to that above, we can compute the predicted 
annual growth rate of rice output for the different cases of gA, for Vietnam, the north and 
the south (see Table 8.3). Obviously, and relative to a given case of the growth of gA, 
the growth rate of rice output in this period is much higher than that in the period of 
output contracts with tightly controlled markets, and further trade liberalisation implies 
even stronger effects on the growth rate of rice output. For example even in the most 
pessimistic case with gA equal to zero per cent, the annual growth rate of rice output in 
the period of opening up of markets is 4.3 , 4.0 and 4.5 compared with 1.8, 1.2 and 1.2 
per cent in the period of output contracts for Vietnam, the north and the south 
respectively. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter shows that the predictions of the theoretical model of Chapter 5 regarding 
the transitional paths and steady-state values for capital and rice production are fully 
consistent with the actual data and the empirical analysis. Each new stage of 
liberalisation results in a new and higher steady-state level of physical capital and rice 
output. Indeed, based upon a construction of the timescale for the system to reach the 
vicinity of the steady state, our results show that even with an assumed zero rate of 
.... 
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growth in the 'Solow residual' component of total factor productivity that trade and 
market liberalisation alone may increase the production of rice output by an order of two 
times its initial value. It is also clear that the second stage of liberalisation has higher 
growth effects on the rice output than in the first stage implying that incentive effects 
and more open markets matter greatly. 
... 
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Table 8.2 The long-run level for rice output in the different stages of trade liberalisation (thousand tons) 
The steady-state rice output VIETNAM The north The south 
in the different stages of trade Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
liberalisation for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth 
ofgA Of gA Of gA ofgA ofgA Of gA Of gA Of gA Of gA 
(0) The communal system 15102.6 15102.6 15102.6 6075.2 6075.2 6075.2 9027.4 9027.4 9027.4 
(I) Output contracts 19633.4 34358.5 26112.4 7897.8 13821.2 10504.1 11735.6 20537.3 15608.3 
(II) The opening up of 28234.0 40092.3 33880.8 10920.0 15506.4 13104.0 17314.0 24585.9 20776.8 
markets 
The difference of the steady-
state rice output 
Between the period (I) and (0) 4530.8 19255.9 11009.8 1822.6 7746 4428.9 2708.2 11509.9 6580.9 
Between the period (II) and (I) 8600.6 5733 .8 7768.4 3022.2 1685.2 2599.9 5578.4 4048.6 5168.5 
Between the period (II) and (0) 13131.4 24989.7 18778.2 4844.8 9431.2 7028.8 8286.6 15558.5 11749.4 
Note: The period (0), (I) and (II) represent for the period of the communal system, output contracts with tightly controlled markets and the 
opening up markets respectively . 
... 
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Table 8.3 The predicted annual growth rate of rice output in the different stages of trade liberalisation (per cent) 
Period of liberalisation VIETNAM The north The south 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth for growth 
of gA ofgA ofgA ofgA ofgA ofgA Of gA ofgA Of gA 
The output contracts 
-Initial level of rice output 15102.6 15102.6 15102.6 6075.2 6075.2 6075.2 9027.4 9027.4 9027.4 
(thous tons) 
-The long-run level of rice 19633.4 34358.5 26112.4 7897.8 13821.2 10504.1 11735.6 20537.3 15608.3 
out put (thous tons) 
-Time scale for reaching the 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
vicinity to steady state (year) 
-Predicted annual growth rate 1.8 3.7 2.5 1.2 3.8 2.5 1.2 3.7 2.5 
of rice output (per cent) 
The opening up of markets 
-Initial level of rice output 15102.6 15102.6 15102.6 6075.2 6075.2 6075.2 9027.4 9027.4 9027.4 
(thous tons) 
-The long-run level of rice 28234.0 40092.3 33880.8 10920.0 15506.4 13104.0 17314.0 24585.9 20776.8 
out put (thous tons) 
-Time scale for reaching the 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
vicinity to steady state (year) 
-Predicted annual growth rate 4.3 7.0 5.6 4.0 6.5 5.3 4.5 6.9 5.7 
of rice output (per cent) 
~ 
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Appendix 8A: LINEAR APPROXIMATION oF THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
The system of simultaneous differential equations in consumption (c) and capital (k2) that 
characterise the dynamic model is given by equations (5.25) and (5.29) 
. -e1(a1 +a2) ~ 
k 2 (t) = f (c(t), k 2 (t) = c(t) z-a1-a2 B 4k 2 (t) z-a1-a 2 - (µ + n)k 2 (t)- c(t)- f3pd (8A.l) 
• 1 +I --
[ 
-cr(a 1 +a 2 ) za 4 
c(t) = g(c(t), k2 (t)) = CY c(t) z-a,-a2 B4a 4k2 (t) z-a,-a2 I] } - a-c(t)(µ+n+p) (8A.2) 
where B4 is given as in equation (5.22) or 
a, +a 2 z a, a 2 
B s: z-a, -a? B --4 = U - 3 z-a, -a2 a I z-a, -a2 a 2 z-a, -a2 (8A.3) 
* Linearise around the steady-state value ( c*, k 2 ) to obtain 
[
~•, (1)] = [fk 2 (t) fc(t) ][k 2 (t)- :; (t)] 
c(t) gk 2 (1) gc (1) c(t)-c (t) 
(8A.4) 
where 
za4 c f = a k2 (t) z - a I - 2 
-a(a 1+a 2) ~ 
=-a1-a2 B4k2(f) z-a1-a2 - (µ + n) (8A.5) 
( ) za, -a a 1 +a 2 1 __ _ 
O' (a I + a 2) (t) z-a,-a2 B k (t) z-a 1-a2 - I f - - C 4 2 c ( t ) - z - a I - a 2 (8A.6) 
I ( z a 4 
g k, (1) = -;- z - a 
1 
- a 2 ) 
-a ( a 1+a, ) +I za, 
2 - I c(t) =-a 1 -a, B4a4k2(t)z-a 1 -a, (8A.7) 
and 
I 
[ 
( ) 
] 
-a(a 1 +a 2) za, l a a + a 1 gc(t) = - - I 2 + I c(t) z-a,-a2 B4a4k 2(t)z-a1-a2 - -(µ + n + p). a z-a 1 -a 2 a 
(8A.8). 
The values of f kz (l), f c(l), g k i (l) and g c(r) are evaluated at the steady state, where 
-a (a1 +a: ) za, 
c(t) z-a 1-a, B 4k2(t)z-a ,-a, = (µ + n)k 2(t) + c(t) (8A.9) 
.... 
,11 
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and 
c(t) z-a1-a 2 B4a4 k i (t) z-a 1-a 2 -1 = (µ + n + p) 
[ 
-O' ( a 1+a 2 ) za, ] 
(8A.10). 
Substituting (8A.9) into (8A.5) and (8A.6), implies that fk
2 
(r) and fc(I ) are given as 
[ 
c*(t)] za 4 fk i U l = (µ + n) + • ----'--- - (µ + n) 
k 1 (t) z - a 1 - a 1 
(8A.11) 
and 
_ a(a 1 +a 2 )[ k;(t) ] fc(r) - - ---'-----=-- (µ + n) ~-+ 1 - I· z-a 1 -a 2 c*(t) 
(8A.12). 
Substituting (8A.10) into (8A.7) and (8A.8), gives gk
2
(,) and gc(r ) as 
1( za 4 J · c*(t) gk ,< 1) = - ------ I (µ + n + p) • 
a- z-a1-a2 k 1 (t) 
(8A.13) 
and 
a 1 +a2 (µ+n+p)· g c ( t ) = - z - a I - a 2 
(8A.14). 
To compute the values of fk
2
(t)' fc ci) ' gk
2
(1) and gc(t) for the rice industry in 
Vietnam, use the parameters as determined earlier ( see Chapters 5, 6 and 7), where z ~3 and 
a1~0.4; a2~0.3; a3~0.2 and a4~0.l (see Appendix 7A); for the annual growth rate of labour 
force ~o.006 (see Table 7.1). Assume the value of the inverse of the constant intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution a is 0.1 (as in Section 8.1 ); the depreciation rate for physical capitalµ 
is 0.015 14, and the value of a constant subjective rate of time preference pis 0.01. The ratio 
* :_ is determined approximately from equations (5.42) and (5.43), where k* 
2 
c * P + ( 1 - a 4 ) ( µ + n ) ::::J O .2 8 -::::! 
k • a 2 4 
(8A.15). 
14This value is slightly smaller than usual (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p.81), due to the nature of 
the fertility rate of buffaloes and cattle, both an important source of the capital stock. 
.... 
9 11, 
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Substituting the given value of parameters above into equations (8A.1 l) through (8A.14), the 
value of the elements in the matrix [/ k 2 <r) fc<r) ] in (8A.4) is given as 
g k 2 (r) g c(t) 
[
f k 2 (r) f c(t) ] = [0.02 
g k
2 
(t) g c(r) -0.07 
-1.03] 
- 0.01 
(8A.16). 
Substituting (8A.16) into (8A.4 ), the system of differential equations for physical capital (k2(t)) 
and consumption c(t) 
[
~ 2 (t) ] = [0.02 
c(t) -0.07 
-l.03][k 2 (t)- k;] 
-0.01 c(t)-c* 
(8A.17) 
Continuing to substitute the value c* as the value 0.28 of k; (see (8A. l 5) into (8A.17)), we can 
rewrite (8A.1 7) in standard form 
[
I OJ[k.2 (t)l + [-0.02 
0 I ~(t) 0.07 
1.03 ][k 2 (t)] = [0.27 k;] 
0.01 c(t) 0.07k; 
(8A.18) 
where the steady-state values for capital in the stage of output contracts and the opening up of 
markets ( k;) are taken from Table 8.1. 
To obtain the general solution, we adopt trial solutions of the form 
k { (t) = a e rt and cc ( t) = be rt • 
Substituting (8A.19) in the underlying homogenous system for (8A.18), yields 
[
I O][a]rerr + [-0.02 
0 I b 0.07 1/;1 ][: }" = 0 ·
This implies 
[I O]r + [-0.02 0 I O .07 
1.03 ] [r - 0.02 1.03 ] = 0 or det = 0 · 0.01 0.07 r+0.01 
The resulting characteristic equation in r is 
r 2 - O.Olr - 0.07 = 0 
with roots r1 =-0.25 and r2 =0.25. 
(8A.19) 
(8A.20) 
(8A.21) 
(8A.22) 
..till 
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Thus the general solution for capital takes the form 
k i ( t) = a i e -o.2s1 + a 2 e o.2s1 • (8A.23) 
Following Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, p.88), a2 must equal zero for the appropriate 
transversality condition to hold, leaving only the stable root. Thus, the general solution for 
capital is found to be 
k 2c (t) = a i e -o .2s1 (8A.24) 
According to (8A.24), the speed of convergence of capital is found to be -0.25 for any stage of 
trade liberalisation. 
or 
For the particular solution, to (8A. l 8), we have 
[
-0.02 
0.07 
[kl= [-0.02 - 0 .07 C 
1.03 J[k-2 ] = [0.2 7 k;] 
0.01 ; 0.07k; 
1. O 3 ] _, [ O .2 7 k ~ ] = [ 0. 9 7 k ~ ] . 
0.01 0.07k 2 0.28k 2 
(8A.25) 
(8A.26) 
Thus, the time path of physical capital in a given stage of trade liberalisation is obtained from 
(8A.24) and (8A.26), or 
-
k 1 (t)- k c + k - a e-0 -251 +097k. 2 - 2 2- I • 2 (8A.27). 
-
The values of k 2 or ( k; ) and a I in ( 8A.2 7) clearly depend on the values of the parameters in 
the different stages of trade liberalisation. 
Alli 
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Chapter 
CONCLUSION 
In the last two decades significant economic reforms have taken place in what were once 
purely socialist economies. Most importantly, these economies have undergone a 
sweeping process of internal and external trade liberalisation by gradually moving 
towards a system of fully-functioning competitive markets. Along with this, there have 
been profound changes in institutional arrangements and, in particular, changes in 
property rights that allow for some form (in varying degrees) of private ownership and 
control. The results have been astounding. In Vietnam, rice production has increased 
dramatically and indeed, as we have shown, directly in line with the pace and progress 
of economic reform. 
This dissertation has focused directly on the effects of this trade liberalisation. It 
provides a theoretical and empirical analysis which explains the increases in both rice 
output and its growth in terms of the incentive effects that result from changes in 
property rights and market structures. Private ownership and control of property and 
"' 
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competitive pricing and market structures induce individuals to work harder and use 
land more efficiently. 
To capture these effects of changes in both market structure and incentives we 
began first with a static model of the effects of trade liberalisation on agricultural 
output. There, effective labour and land are measured in terms of efficiency units which 
include the optimal choice of effort in both work and the exploitation of land, thus 
incorporating incentive effects, whereas changes in the definition of the profit function 
measure the relevant changes in policy and institutional structures across the various 
transitional periods that go with the gradual 'freeing up' of domestic and international 
markets. The form of the institutional production function and the resulting 
comparative statics effects clearly show that total factor productivity, the optimal choice 
of effort, and rice output increase directly with the extent of trade liberalisation. 
Next, the static model is extended to allow for intertemporal effects. A dynamic 
optimal control problem for the representative farmer is developed in a way that 
accounts for changes in market structures and the specific effects of using land and 
labour more efficiently over time. Here, trade . liberalisation results in both enhanced 
path and steady-state effects. The long-run values of output per capita and the capital-
labour ratio, in particular, increase with each stage of economic reform, from the 
communal system, to output-contracts, to the period of the total 'freeing up' of domestic 
and international markets. 
Finally, based on the theoretical models, an extensive empirical analysis of the 
various stages of trade liberalisation for the case of Vietnam is undertaken. Given 
estimated results for the share parameters of labour, land, current inputs, and capital in 
~ 
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the rice production function we show that the growth in factor productivity that results 
from changes in market structure and incentive effects is the most important explanatory 
factor for the increase in rice production, and that each new stage of trade liberalisation 
results in new and higher steady-state values for rice output. The positive effects of 
trade liberalisation are also seen through an analysis of the predicted growth rates of rice 
output in the different stages of trade liberalisation, where that growth rate in the period 
of full-trade liberalisation is shown to be much higher than that in the period of partial-
trade liberalisation. The miracle of Vietnam moving from the position of a large 
importer of rice and other foodstuffs (barely able to feed its own population), to the third 
largest exporter of rice in the world, all in the short space of just over a decade, is due 
not to any 'great leap forward' in technology or factor supplies but purely to economic 
reform. Competition, changes in market structures and property rights, along with the 
enhanced incentive effects that go with it, matter most. 
I 
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Data Appendix 
DATA SOURCES AND ADJUSTMENTS 
This Data Appendix documents the various and extensive data sources used in this 
dissertation. It also briefly describes the specific adjustments that were made to the data 
for use in the empirical analysis in this work. It is divided into three sections, as 
follows. 
Section DA.1 documents data sources and adjustments for the set of cross-
sectional data in fifty-three provinces and cities of Vietnam. This data set, which 
includes output and inputs for rice production, is principally used for the regression of 
the share parameters of inputs in the rice production function in Chapter 6. The 
concepts and the derivations of the specific economic terms and data categories which 
are used in this dissertation are also presented in this section. Section DA.2 provides 
three time-series data sets (from 1976 to 1994) of output and inputs in rice production 
for the whole country, and the north and south of Vietnam separately. These data sets 
are used for the analysis of the effects of internal and external trade liberalisation 
(Chapter 7) and the dynamic transitional path and long-run growth of rice production 
(Chapter 8). Finally, Section DA.3 collects data sources and the derives the time-series 
data of the composite price between output and input, or /Jp(l -Com) as defined in 
Chapter 4 above. This time-series data (again) is also used for the analysis of the effects 
.., ,., 
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of internal and external trade liberalisation ( Chapter 7) and the dynamic transitional path 
and long-run growth for rice production (Chapter 8). To obtain the time-series data for 
f]p(J-C0m), this section computes separately the changes in the average output price (/Jp) 
and the average weighted cost share parameter (m) during the period 1976 to 1994.1 
In a nutshell, the original data sources come mainly from the General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam (GSO) and related project investigations, studies and reports by 
Vietnamese organisations, such as the State Planning Committee (SPC); the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Processing Industry (MAFI); the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MWR); the State Department of Price (SDP), and international organisations such as 
the World Bank (WB) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Some other 
sources of data are based on the individual investigations, books, and research papers 
constructed and assembled by specialists on Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, due to the often inadequate and conflicting data sources, as well as 
the lack of sufficient studies on rice production in Vietnam, many adjustments and 
constructions of the data are required. For data adjustments, the various assumptions 
and the technical coefficients from empirical studies in other developing countries are 
used. Since errors and shortcomings are unavoidable, various comments on data 
construction are also made and discussed in this Data Appendix. 
DA.I The cross-sectional data set of output and inputs for rice production in fifty-
three provinces in Vietnam (1993) 
Data sources for Vietnam are barely sufficient to construct a cross-sectional data set for 
1 At the end of this Data Appendix, the Sub-Appendix describes and collect more details on the data which 
are used for all of the work and the calculations in the previous three sections. 
t 1: 
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nee production for fifty-three provinces and cities. Until now, the 'National 
Investigation of Rural Region (NIRR) in Vietnam' conducted in July 1994 by the 
Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (SDAFF)-General 
StatisticsOffice (GSO), (1995b) is the most accurate and detailed investigation about the 
rice industry for the all regions in Vietnam. Based on the NIRR, this section constructs 
the cross-sectional data set of the rice industry for 53 provinces and cities in 1993. 
(a) Index of rice output 
The data is referenced from the Statistical Yearbook (GSO, 1994) for the entire grain 
industry in terms of an index of the quantity of 'rice equivalent'. A rice equivalent 
output is chosen rather than rice output alone, because in the same rice fields farmers 
usually overlap production with other short term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes 
and maize. Since there is clear (nutritional) substitution between rice and these grains 
(SDP, 1995a), the State's target usually emphasises output in terms of a rice equivalent 
rather than rice only, converting (for example) so many ton of sweet potatoes into a 
comparable measure of rice output. There are two main problems with this data: First, 
differences of rice quality are ignored and second, the data source does not adjust 
regionally for the influence of bad weather on rice output at a specific time. 
(b) The labour force 
Data for the labour force are available for agriculture as a whole but not for the rice or 
food grain industry separately. With the overlapping of crops in a given field in the 
food grain industry, farmers use their time for multiple activities, so, by necessity, the 
I 
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labour force for the food grain industry is assumed to simply represent the labour force 
for the rice industry. Based on the data of labour for agriculture as a whole, we can 
derive approximately the labour force for rice or food grain production. The rice labour 
force is indicated in Table DA.1, where it is obtained by multiplying the total labour 
force for agriculture (SDAFF, GSO, 1994) with a weighted ratio between the cultivated 
area of grain to the total area cultivated for agriculture as a whole (see Table DA.1 ). 
Further, we suppose that the process of trade liberalisation affects the structure of rural 
labour along a time path rather than cross sectionally at the one time (Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, MPI, National Economics University, NEU, 1995).2 
( c) The sown area of rice 
The data for rice as sown area is from the National Investigation of Rural Regions 
(NIRR) in Vietnam by the GSO in 1994 (see Table DA.1 ). Table DA.1 also collects 
some main data on land, such as total area, agricultural land, cultivated land, land for 
food grains and land for rice production for every province and city separately. The 
problem with this data is that ( of course) it does not clearly reflect the quality of land, 
which is distinguished mainly by two standards: the quality of the soil and the amount of 
land area that is irrigated ( Che T Nhu, 1996b). 
In fact, the Vietnamese government divides the soil quality of land into seven 
levels and levies land tax depending on quality (UNDP-F AO, 1989). An investigation 
by the World Bank (WB, 1994b) distinguished the quality of soil into five levels in 
terms of cultivated area. Irrigation is more advanced in the Red River Delta than in the 
2 While over time the economic liberalisation has clearly impacted on the structure of labour (MPI, NEU, 
1995), cross-sectionally agriculture remains the primary occupation of 84 per cent of all rural workers 
(WB, 1995). 
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Cuu Long River Delta (MWR, 1994 and WB, 1995). According to the World Bank 
(1995), the difference in output between no and 100 percent irrigation on a farm 
amounts to 645 kg/hectare of rice, everything else equal.3 
(e) Total current input 
Following Tang (1980, p.61) and Sicular (1985), total current input is obtained by a 
measure of the nutrition content of all fertiliser ( organic and chemical), insecticide, and 
seeds that are used for rice production. The equation to determine total current input 
from fertiliser, insecticide and seeds with the weighted assigned ratios is given by 
TC!= 0.764TF + 0.178SE + 0.0521N (DA.I) 
where TC], TF, SE, IN are total current input, total nutrition content of all fertiliser, 
seeds, and insecticide respectively. This equation is adjusted, following Sicular (1985), 
so that the data for feed for animal husbandry is ignored. 
The total nutrition content of all fertiliser in equation (DA. I) is determined from 
the nutritional content of organic and chemical fertiliser separately. Here, the amount of 
organic fertiliser for the rice industry is derived from the total amount of organic 
fertiliser used for agriculture. Following Tang (1980, p.61), the organic fertiliser for 
agriculture is assumed to be supplied from two main sources: night soil and large animal 
manure (buffaloes, cattle and pigs), which is given by 
NCOF = 0.1 INS+ 0.0087 LA (DA.2) 
3The adjusted data of land based on its quality may be constructed according to quality levels in every 
province (WB, 1994, Annex 1, p.3). As mentioned, the Vietnamese government bases the average yield 
per hectare for seven levels of land in order to levy an amount of tax on each different quality of land. In 
particular, the amount of tax per hectare is 700 kg, 560 kg, 420 kg, 350 kg and 280 kg of unhusked rice 
for classes 1, through 5 respectively (UNDP-F AO, 1989). However, there is no conversion ratio between 
the classes 2 to 4 and 5 to 1, so we skip this means of adjustment. 
L 
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where NCOF, NS and LA is the nutrition content of organic fertiliser, the population 
adjusted night-soil and the standard number of large animals respectively. 
The population-adjusted night-soil equals the rural population (GSO, 1995) 
multiplied by a rural utilisation rate (0.9). The standard number of large animals equals 
the sum of buffaloes, cattle and pigs (GSO, 1994), for which the weighted ratios are 1, 1 
and 0.33 respectively. The large animal manure is defined as in Tang's formula (1980, 
p.62) 
LA=(0.7)(7.7)NLA (DA.3) 
where NLA is the number of the large animals, and here, the rural utilisation rate is O. 7 
rather than 0.9 as in Tang's formula because this type of free range buffalo and cattle is 
very common in Vietnam. 
The organic fertiliser for rice production is obtained by multiplying the amount 
of organic fertiliser for agriculture with the weighted ratio between food grain area sown 
to the total sown area for cultivation. The chemical fertiliser data used for rice 
production is derived directly from the multiplication of the average amounts of 
chemical fertiliser used (1992) in the north 165.4 kg/ha and the south 193 kg/ha (the 
Survey of Rice Farmers, SRF, Table S.1, Sub-Appendix) and the rice area in every 
province (see Table DA. I). The data are also adjusted from the data on chemical 
fertiliser obtained from the SDAFF-GSO (1996). 
The series data for insecticides are constructed by multiplying the average use of 
insecticide per hectare in the year 1992, or 5.8 kg and 7.6 kg in the north and south, 
respectively, (SRF, 1993, Table S.2, Sub-Appendix) and the total rice area (Table 
DA. I). The derived data are all quite consistent with the study done by the World Bank 
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(1994). The data for seeds are calculated from the average use of seeds per hectare in 
1992, or 140 kg/ha and 240 kg/ha in the north and south respectively, (SRF,1995) 
multiplied by the total rice area (GSO,1995). The main data sources and the constructed 
data of total current inputs for rice production are presented in Table DA.2. 
(e) Total capital inputs 
Following a similar approach to that used by McMillan, Whalley and Zhu, (1989), we 
assume that the physical capital input can be represented by capacity of tractors. It is 
very popular in LDC' s for capacity of tractors to be supplemented by draught animals, 
so that the total capital input for cultivation is generated by adding together the number 
of draft animals ( GSO, 1994) and the total horsepower of machinery as according to the 
NIRR (GSO, 1995). It can be assumed that the tractor capacity used for annual 
cultivation is also applicable for the rice industry because tractor capacity can vary in the 
rural areas at the rush time for rice production, just as it is does for other crops. 
The conversion from the number of draught animals to capacity of tractors is 
based on observations in Pakistan (Blomqvist, 1986, p.142) that a bullock-day (a pair of 
bullock working 8 hours) is approximately the same as a tractor-hour, with a typical 
tractor being between 15 and 25 horsepower. Here, in the Vietnamese case, I assume 
that one cattle or buffalo-day is equivalent to about 0.6 bullock-days4 (or about 14 hours 
of work by one pair of cattle or buffalo is about 8 hours of work by one bullock), with a 
typical tractor being around 15 horsepower. 
4 For simplification, I assume that the draft capacity of one head of cattle is equivalent to that of one 
buffalo. That is why the converted ratio which I used for Vietnamese case is quite low. 
.. 
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The data sources for the capacity of tractors are available by the NIRR (1994 ). 
However, there is some adjustment of the data. First, I adjusted downward the capacity 
of tractors for the mining provinces or coffee areas (where little rice is grown) such as 
Lao cai, Tuyen Quang and Dae Lac provinces. That adjustment is based on the data on 
mechanical devices used for food grain plantations in the regions of Vietnam (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry, MAFI, 1993). Second, data from the 
NIRR also shows that the capacity of tractors is not fully representative of the capital 
investment in ( total and) other plants and machines such as rice mills, threshing 
machines, generators, pumps, lorries, transport ships, etc., all of which are very popular 
in the south but much less so in the north. In fact, in general, farmers in the south use 
more machines for rice production than in the north (Nguy en T Khiem, 1995 and MAFI, 
1993). In this case, I adjusted the capacity of tractors in the south by adding the capacity 
of all other machines.5 
Data sources and results for the total capacity of tractors for every province and 
city are shown in Table DA.3. Although the data are constructed from inadequate 
sources, using approximate determinations, assumptions and adjustments, and no 
account is taken of State and private investment such as investment in irrigation and 
infrastructure (not available), the constructed data for capital are again quite consistent 
with other assessments by the GSO, (1995a), the MAFI (1994) and Nguyen V Bich and 
Chu T Quang (1994). 
5 
It is more popular in the north for farmers to use buffalo, cattle or human work instead of machines as 
they are poorer than farmers in the south. Besides, the size of land in the north for households is smaller 
than that in the south and the labour in the north is cheaper and more is available. 
.. 
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Table DA.1 Main data for labour force and land use for the rice industry (1993) 
Total of Land for Sown area Sown area for the Sown area for the Labour for Labour for the food 
No Province or city land area agriculture for cultivation food grain industry rice industry agriculture grain industry 
(thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous pers) (thous pers) 
1 Ha Giang 783.10 130.40 95.20 74.60 24.38 202.40 158.60 
2 Tuyen Quang 580.10 71.00 77.40 60.40 26.28 221.30 172.69 
3 Cao Bang 844.50 72.90 89.60 74.80 27.3 225.10 187.92 
4 Lang Son 818.70 84.30 77.20 62.50 35.24 229.00 185.40 
5 Lai Chau 1713.30 110.00 97.20 87.40 44.85 157.60 141.71 
6 Lao Cai 805.00 80.80 72.70 60.30 24.61 177.20 146.98 
7 Yen Bai 680.80 78.10 72.90 56.60 23.83 147.50 114.52 
8 Bae Thai 650.30 74.80 126.80 102.60 56.63 341.20 276.08 
9 Son La 1421.00 174.40 106.00 83.60 50.08 272.70 215.07 
10 Hoa Binh 461.20 72.10 100.90 75.70 41.62 243.10 182.39 
1 1 Quang Ninh 593.90 57.40 78.60 64.40 29.51 121.20 99.30 
12 Vinh Phu 482.70 140.20 243.10 202.00 96.07 771.90 641.40 
13 HaBac 461.50 146.70 284.00 241.30 118.55 921.20 782.70 
14 HaNoi 92.10 44.20 90.30 76.50 37.17 290.20 245.85 
15 Hai Phong 150.40 68.10 114.20 101.50 50.65 356.00 316.41 
16 Ha Tay 214.80 124.20 250.30 216.20 95.44 800.70 691.62 
17 Hai Hung 255.00 158.70 325.70 286.10 131.06 892.30 783.81 
18 Thai Binh 151.00 104.00 227.80 198.20 88.99 659.10 573.46 
19 Nam Ha 249.20 158.20 297.80 264.40 128.72 762.80 677.25 
20 Ninh Binh 138.70 63.90 106.20 90.40 46.25 197.90 168.46 
21 Thanh Hoa 1116.80 243.10 393.90 332.40 148.62 896.40 756.44 
22 Nghe An 1637.10 179.00 333.00 260.80 110.20 864.70 677.22 
23 Ha Tinh 605.40 105.10 170.20 136.50 68.12 385.70 309.33 
24 Quang Binh 798.40 59.20 79.50 64.20 33.21 233 .90 188.89 
25 Quang Tri 458.80 59.50 67.70 54.00 24.06 125.70 100.26 
26 Thua Thien Hue 500.90 47.10 73.20 64.00 21.57 185 .10 161.84 
.. 
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Table DA.1 Main data for labour force and land use for the rice industry (1993) (continued) 
Total of Land for Sown area Sown area for the Sown area for the Labour for Labour for the food 
No Province or city land area agriculture for cultivation food grain industry rice industry agriculture grain industry 
(thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous ha) (thous pers) (thous pers) 
27 Quang Nam -DN 1198.50 113.30 195.60 165.60 64.49 461.50 390.72 
28 Quang Ngai 517.70 86.00 143.30 114.40 41.40 374.40 298.89 
29 Binh Dinh 607.60 97.90 178.00 138.70 53.28 368.10 286.83 
30 Phu Yen 527.80 59.90 91.60 66.30 33.44 229.70 166.26 
31 Khanh Hoa 525.10 52.50 77.00 53.30 23.54 187.90 130.07 
32 Ninh Thuan 342.70 35.10 48.10 38.60 15.66 103.40 82.98 
33 Binh Thuan 799.20 88.50 133.40 82.40 53.85 170.60 105.38 
34 Gia Lai 1621.20 181.90 142.70 87.60 65.16 152.20 93.43 
35 Kon Tum 993.40 107.70 37.60 29.30 19.29 54.50 42.47 
36 Dae Lac 1980.00 180.10 230.30 104.90 65.08 259.40 118.15 
37 Lam Dong 1017.30 103.00 113.40 54.10 22.35 231.90 110.63 
38 Ho Chi Minh City 209.00 92.10 120.60 82.50 57.11 275.40 188.40 
39 Song Be 951.90 287.50 187.60 77.20 32.57 296.60 122.06 
40 Tay Ninh 403.10 208.00 200.40 117.00 107.36 252.50 147.42 
41 Dong Nai 586.40 258.80 296.30 112.20 56.90 475.90 180.21 
42 Baria-Yung Tau 196.50 90.90 95.30 41.70 16.63 144.10 63.05 
43 Long An 433.80 237.10 352.80 319.00 178.89 489.20 442.33 
44 Dong Thap 327.60 212.40 367.50 335.90 183 .35 590.30 539.54 
45 An Giang 342.40 241.80 420.90 375.30 215 .52 684.00 609.90 
46 Tien Giang 233.90 169.00 330.60 270.00 99.98 572.10 467.23 
47 Ben Tre 224.70 152.60 173.40 105.30 59.52 538.50 327.01 
48 Vinh Long 148.70 117.40 224.50 189.30 74.13 403 .90 340.57 
49 Tra Vinh 236.90 159.40 211.20 172.90 96.62 350.80 287.18 
50 Can Tho 296.40 244.50 413.60 356.30 150.36 603.40 519 .81 
51 Soc Trang 319.10 241.10 282.70 247.40 182.98 407.00 356.18 
52 Kien Giang 624.30 286.60 373.10 347.30 221.99 481.40 448.11 
53 Minh Hai 769.00 535.90 385.40 320.80 264.21 604.10 502.84 
.. 
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Table DA.2 The data set for constructing total current inputs for the rice industry (1993) 
No Province or city Population Night soil Buffaloes Cattle Pigs No of lar- Large Content Organic Chemical Content Insecticide Seed Total 
of ge animal animal organic fertiliser for fertiliser all current 
agriculture equivalent manure fertiliser rice industry fertiliser inputs 
(thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous tons) (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous 
pers) tons) head) head) head) head) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) 
1 Ha Giang 453.20 362.56 102.90 34.60 177.70 190.81 1028.47 48.83 15.49 4.03 19.52 0.14 2.68 15.40 
2 Tuyen Quang 508.70 406.96 115.80 13.30 203.40 190.12 1024.75 53.68 27.33 4.35 31.67 0.15 2.89 24.72 
3 Cao Bang 525.30 420.24 140.60 99.70 272.90 322.17 1736.50 61.33 23.41 4.52 27.93 0.16 3.00 21.88 
4 Lang Son 516. I 0 4 I 2.88 190.90 32.70 I 97.60 282.88 1524.72 58.68 34.28 5.83 40.11 0.20 3.88 31.34 
5 Lai Chau 420.80 336 .64 96.90 14.10 164.40 160.32 864.12 44.55 22.32 7.42 29.74 0.26 4.93 23.61 
6 Lao Cai 4 I 9.00 335.20 85.40 7.60 177.10 146.13 787.64 43.72 19.55 4.07 23.62 0.14 2.71 18.53 
7 Yen Bai 462.30 369.84 68.00 23.10 208.60 153.68 828.34 47.89 25.23 3.94 29.17 0.14 2.62 22.76 
8 Bae Thai 806.90 645.52 I 78.90 18.50 344.50 300.75 1621.04 85.11 51.21 9.37 60.58 0.33 6.23 47.41 
9 Son La 632.80 506.24 96.30 83.90 286.80 266.24 1435.03 68.17 29.20 8.28 37.48 0.29 5.51 29.63 
10 Hoa Binh 566.50 453.20 92.20 30.00 220.90 188.47 1015.85 58.69 25.59 6.88 32.48 0.24 4.58 25.64 
11 Quang Ninh 316.20 252.96 57.60 9.20 227.50 135.05 727.92 34.16 19.90 4.88 24.79 0.17 3.25 19.52 
12 Vinh Phu 1897.90 1518.32 116.70 156.70 606.00 455.20 2453.53 188.36 111.89 15.89 127.78 0.56 10.57 99.53 
13 Ha Bae 2028.50 1622.80 176.90 82.70 715.40 474.22 2556.05 200.75 132.46 19.61 152.07 0.69 13.04 118.54 
14 HaNoi 734.80 587.84 25.40 38.80 261.80 142.74 769.37 71.36 43.94 6.15 50.08 0.22 4.09 39.00 
15 Hai Phong 942.50 754.00 30.80 4.00 339.90 136.77 737.19 89.35 73.39 8.38 81 .77 0.29 5.57 63.48 
16 Ha Tay 1944.00 1555.20 58.40 87.80 573.60 318.28 1715.53 186.00 123.73 15.79 139.51 0.55 10.50 108.48 
17 Hai Hung 2246.20 1796.96 64.40 52.60 682.60 321.78 1734.39 212.75 156.51 21.68 178.19 0.76 14.42 138.74 
18 Thai Binh 1521.70 1217.36 26.50 36.70 460.70 201.41 1085.60 143.35 106.04 14.72 120.76 0.52 9.79 94.03 
19 Nam Ha 2139.30 1711.44 34.00 37.40 667.80 271.74 1464.68 201.00 157.13 21.29 178.42 0.75 14.16 138.87 
20 Ninh Binh 671.60 537.28 28.40 24.00 199.90 112.37 605.67 64.37 46.49 7.65 54.14 0.27 5.09 42.28 
21 Thanh Hoa 2676.70 2141.36 217.10 175.80 780.40 627.02 3379.64 264.95 164.93 24.58 189.51 0.86 16.35 147.74 
22 Nghe An 2088.80 1671.04 232.30 220.70 663.70 652.11 3514.87 214.39 120.40 18.23 138.62 0.64 12.12 108.10 
23 Ha Tinh 1031.30 825.04 84.20 138.80 326.40 320.92 1729.76 105.80 65.40 11.27 76.66 0.40 7.49 59.93 
24 Quang Binh 533.00 426.40 27.20 115.30 241.00 214.80 1157.77 56.98 32.97 5.49 38.46 0.19 3.65 30.04 
25 Quang Tri 356.10 284.88 30.90 62.00 155.50 139.55 752.17 37.88 23 .39 3.98 27.37 0.14 2.65 21.39 
26 Thua Thien Hue 520.40 416.32 35.40 20.40 189.90 112.77 607.83 51.08 34.13 3.57 37.69 0.13 2.37 29.23 
.. 
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Table DA.2 The data set for constructing total current inputs for the rice industry (1993) (continued) 
No Province or city Population Night soil Buffaloes Cattle Pigs No of lar- Large Content Organic Chemical Content Insecticide Seed Total 
of ge animal animal organic fertiliser for fertiliser all current 
agriculture equivalent manure fertiliser rice industry fertiliser inputs 
(thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous tons) (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous 
pers) tons) head) head) head) head) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) 
27 Quang Nam -DN 1173.00 938.40 51.80 192.60 508.40 396.92 2139.40 121.84 76.86 12.44 89.31 0.49 15.48 71.01 
28 Quang Ngai 919.60 735.68 47.00 166.10 354.30 319.39 1721.51 95.90 60.63 7.99 68.62 0.31 9.94 54.21 
29 Binh Dinh 973.50 778.80 17.70 210.10 295.10 316.33 1705.02 100.50 69.90 10.28 80.18 0.40 12.79 63.56 
30 Phu Yen 531.70 425.36 3.50 152.50 155.80 202.74 1092.77 56.30 35.65 6.45 42.10 0.25 8.03 33.61 
31 Khanh Hoa 457.10 365.68 15.40 62.90 107.80 110.64 596.35 45.41 22.59 4.54 27.13 0.18 5.65 21.74 
32 Ninh Thuan 292.80 234.24 12.90 68.00 59.60 98.78 532.42 30.40 19.34 3.02 22.36 0.12 3.76 17.76 
33 Binh Thuan 542.40 433.92 19.70 83.10 120.40 138.92 748.78 54.25 24.60 10.39 34.99 0.41 12.92 29.06 
34 Gia Lai 378.30 302.64 15 .50 206.50 221.10 288.33 1554.10 46.81 19.06 12.57 31.63 0.50 15.64 26.98 
35 Kon Tum 135.90 108.72 8.10 51.70 79.40 83.62 450.71 15.88 7.90 3.72 11.62 0.15 4.63 9.71 
36 Dae Lac 799.00 639.20 20.70 120.30 308.10 233.43 1258.19 81.26 26.39 12.56 38.95 0.49 15.62 32.56 
37 Lam Dong 516.70 413.36 21.90 40.50 129.70 101.31 546.06 50.22 15.50 4.31 19.81 0.17 5.36 16.10 
38 Ho Chi Minh City 624.40 499.52 29.80 40.40 178.40 123.72 666.85 60.75 40.75 11.02 51.77 0.43 13.71 42.02 
39 Song Be 668.80 535.04 31.10 47.90 137.10 120.13 647.50 64.49 22.03 6.28 28.32 0.25 7.82 23.04 
40 Tay Ninh 588.80 471.04 51.70 50.10 87.90 128.17 690.84 57.82 30.85 20.72 51.56 0.82 25.77 44.02 
41 Dong Nai 1112.90 890.32 18.00 42.20 219.00 125.90 678.60 103 .84 22.18 10.98 33.16 0.43 13.66 27.79 
42 Baria-Yung Tau 320.50 256.40 2.40 19.90 86.60 48.28 260.23 30.47 6.36 3.21 9.57 0.13 3.99 8.03 
43 Long An 1062.40 849.92 34.20 18.80 174.90 105.47 568.48 98.44 87.58 34.52 122.10 1.36 42.93 101.00 
44 Dong Thap 1294.80 1035.84 7.80 5.10 177.10 66.03 355.90 117.04 105.70 35.38 141.08 1.39 44.00 115.69 
45 An Giang 1527.60 1222.08 5.50 38.20 188.40 100.22 540.19 139.13 121.68 41.59 163.26 1.64 51.72 134.02 
46 Tien Giang 1309.70 1047.76 7.20 8.00 380.50 129.35 697.20 121.32 97.50 19.29 116.79 0.76 23.99 93.54 
47 Ben Tre 1054.60 843.68 17.00 35.10 227.00 120.20 v47.88 98.44 57.79 11.48 69.28 0.45 14.28 55.49 
48 Vinh Long 784.70 627.76 9.00 10.50 176.70 72.51 390.83 72.45 60.00 14.30 74.30 0.56 17.79 59.96 
49 Tra Vinh 744.90 595 .92 19.30 26.60 163.70 95.01 512.10 70.01 55 .12 18.64 73.77 0.73 23 .19 60.52 
50 Can Tho 1388.30 1110.64 6.90 1.20 218.70 73.71 397.30 125.63 107.46 29.01 136.48 1.14 36.09 110.75 
51 Soc Trang 1042.70 834.16 22.10 5.10 172.30 78.89 425 .22 95.46 82.66 35 .31 117.97 1.39 43.92 98.02 
52 Kien Giang 1031.60 825.28 23 .80 9.10 243.30 105.89 570.75 95.75 88.10 42.84 130.93 1.69 53 .28 109.60 
53 Minh Hai 1385.00 1108.00 26.70 0.10 356.70 133.81 721 .24 128.15 105 .61 50.98 156.59 2.01 63.41 131.03 
.. 
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Table DA.3 The data set for constructing capital input for the rice industry (1993) 
Draft animals Total horse- Capacity of Capacity of Total 
Province or city power of large tractors small tractor capacity 
Buffaloes Cattle draft animal of tractors 
(thous heads) (thous heads) (thous) (horsepower) (horsepower) (ten thous 
horsepower) 
1 Ha Giang 70.69 17.30 47.14 1064.1 216.2 4.84 
2 Tuyen Quang 79.55 6.65 46.18 2962.7 2048.3 4.67 
3 Cao bang 96.59 49.85 78.45 179.0 1320.0 8.00 
4 Lang son 131.15 16.35 79.02 752.3 7470.1 7.98 
5 Lai Chau 66.57 7.05 39.44 540.2 1981.3 4.20 
6 Lao Cai 58.67 3.80 33.47 19324.2 533.5 3.55 
7 Yen Bai 46.72 11.55 31.21 1222.2 433.4 3.29 
8 Bae Thai 122.90 9.25 70.80 17729.6 4688.4 7.30 
9 Son La 66.16 41.95 57.92 17116.2 2245.3 5.99 
10 HoaBinh 63.34 15.00 41.97 1948.0 1719.0 4.56 
11 Quang Ninh 39.57 4.60 23.66 2555.0 6819.9 3.30 
12 Vinh Phu 80.17 78.35 84.92 311.5 498.6 8.57 
13 HaBac 121.53 41.35 87.26 14333.2 22041.6 9.03 
14 HaNoi 17.45 19.40 19.74 7718.0 17042.2 4.45 
15 Hai Phong 21.16 2.00 12.41 12261.2 16906.4 1.54 
16 Ha Tay 40.12 43.90 45.01 6872.8 31920.2 4.90 
17 Hai Hung 44.24 26.30 37.79 12232.6 31959.5 4.18 
18 Thai Binh 18.21 18.35 19.58 5249.0 9759.3 3.46 
19 Nam ha 23.36 18.70 22.53 11401.9 22565.6 2.55 
20 Ninh Binh 19.51 12.00 16.88 3271.0 11987.1 3.21 
21 Thanh Hoa 149.15 87.90 126.99 4958.0 10659.5 14.26 
22 Nghe An 159.59 110.35 144.61 8355.4 5202.2 15.82 
23 Ha Tinh 57.85 69.40 68.17 14010.5 3533.1 8.57 
24 Quang Binh 18.69 57.65 40.89 3210.6 2589.1 4.67 
25 Quang Tri 21.23 31.00 27.98 10828.7 2932.9 4.17 
26 Thua Thien Hue 24.32 10.20 18.49 3241.0 6730.0 2.85 
27 QuangNamDN 35.59 96.30 70.65 4589.8 4136.4 9.07 
28 Quang Ngai 32.29 83.05 61.79 3516.8 2959.5 7.67 
29 Binh Dinh 12.16 105.05 62.79 5566.2 17031.5 8.58 
30 Phu Yen 2.40 76.25 42.14 4937.1 5072.3 6.52 
31 Khanh Hoa 10.58 31.45 22.52 7681.4 5699.2 5.33 
32 Ninh Thuan 8.86 34.00 22.96 18886.1 1423.1 6.97 
33 Binh Thuan 13.53 41.55 29.51 34172.4 3453.1 11.60 
34 Gia Lai 10.65 103.25 61.02 15935.0 3365.0 10.54 
35 Kon Tum 5.56 25.85 16.83 1737.0 626.4 2.23 
36 Dae Lac 14.22 60.15 39.84 85863.0 170835.0 6.74 
37 Lam Dong 15.05 20.25 18.91 22238.0 14518.8 10.34 
38 Ho Chi Minh City 20.47 20.20 21.79 9272.0 9292.6 6.45 
39 Song Be 21.37 23.95 24.28 63218.6 7404.4 18.67 
40 Tay Ninh 35.52 25.05 32.45 46840.3 8699.0 16.02 
41 Dong Nai 12.37 21.10 17.93 92444.4 42835.1 8.69 
42 Baria-Yung Tau 1.65 9.95 6.21 29065.5 10590.4 9.74 
43 Long an 23.50 9.40 17.62 82434.2 20526.8 25.44 
44 Dong Thap 5.36 2.55 4.24 106476.7 47473.3 35.83 
45 An Giang 3.78 19.10 12.26 138151.5 27715.6 39.38 
46 Tien Giang 4.95 4.00 4.79 33949.7 24695.0 13.97 
47 Ben Tre 11.68 17.55 15.66 13319.3 12908.0 7.6 
48 Vinh Long 6.18 5.25 6.12 21008.2 32094.6 12.83 
49 Tra Vinh 13.26 13.30 14.23 12725.5 14972.0 7.79 
50 Can Tho 4.74 0.60 2.86 83402.8 27890.0 25.88 
51 Soc Trang 15.18 2.55 9.50 58627.7 18046.8 18.59 
52 Kien Giang 16.35 4.55 11.20 81907.7 9973.4 22.25 
53 Minh Hai 18.34 0.05 9.85 46012.3 18647.3 15.86 
.... 
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DA.2 Time-series data set for rice production 1976-94 
This data set is used for the analysis of the effects of internal and external trade 
liberalisation (Chapter 7) and the dynamic transitional path and long-run growth for rice 
production (Chapter 8). The duration of time-series data is from the year of unification 
or 1976 to 1994. Thus, this length of time encompasses all the stages of internal and 
external trade liberalisation. The concepts of rice output, labour, current inputs and 
physical capital were defined as in Section DA. I. However, some more adjustments for 
constructing the time-series data are still needed. 
(a) Index of rice output 
The time-series of rice output for Vietnam, the north and south (separately) are provided 
by the SDAFF and the MAFI (1991) for the period from 1976-1990, by the SDAFF 
(1995a) for the period 1990-93 and by the GSO (1995) for 1994, (see Table 7.1 in 
Chapter 7). 
(b) The labour force 
The time-series data of total man-days work used in rice production for Vietnam, the 
north and south respectively is indicated in Table DA.4. The data are obtained by 
multiplying average man-days work per hectare with the rice cultivated area in 1976-94, 
(Table DA.5) and dividing by 300 days (where 300 man-days work equals one standard 
labour unit in one year). 
All 
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Here the total man-days worked for rice production is used directly as a labour 
index since the data of structural changes in the agricultural labour during the process of 
trade liberalisation are not available. 6 Therefore, the approach to construct data using 
labour for agriculture alone ( see Section DA.1) can induce cumulative errors over time. 7 
The average man-days worked per hectare for rice production in the RRD and 
CRD does not seem to change over time (SRF, various years). 8 In fact, average man-
days worked per hectare depends mainly on natural conditions rather than social-
economic influences.9 Since the rice cultivated area has increased, so has the rice labour 
force. Here, the average man-days worked per cultivated hectare is computed from the 
average man-days work per hectare in wet and dry seasons, which is 245 .4 and 61 .5 for 
the north and south respectively (SRF, various years). 10 The total man-days worked for 
Vietnam is the sum of that for the north and south. 
Time-series data of labour force for the rice industry in Vietnam, the north and 
south are presented in Table DA.4. 
6 Hence, the approach in Section DA. I is not suitable to construct the time-series data as mentioned 
above. 
7Evidently, economic liberalisation has impacted on the labour structure and diversified farmer activities 
over time, and non-rice industries such as animal husbandry, small scale and service industries provide 
more secondary ( or 'moonlighting') occupations as well as income for farmers (GSO, 1995a, the 
Department of General Statistics (DGS) and the DAFF-GSO (1996), Nguyen V Tuan (1995) and Tran D 
Hien, ( 1995). A high rate of growth for the labour force in agriculture does not mean a high or same 
growth rate of labour for rice production. While the growth rate of the labour force in rural areas is about 
the rate of population growth generally (2 per cent per annum (GSO, 1996), the growth of the labour force 
in rice production depends on the growth in rice production itself. 
8 The data in the north under cooperatives (GSO, 1975) compared to the time of the survey by the SRF 
( 1995), shows the number of man-days worked per rice per crop hectare has even decreased during the 
period of reform. This case can be explained by errors in the working point system in the communal 
system, such as farmers shirking and magnifying the working time. After reform, farmers had incentives 
to work more productively and possibly use more equipment and at a higher rate of capacity utilisation. 
9 For example, the big difference of man days work per hectare between the north and the south is caused 
by different natural conditions ( such as natural drainage and the resulting time needed to prepare the land 
for seed) in those regions. 
10The SRF for 135 farm households in the RRD and 66 farm households in the CRD for 4 consecutive 
years (1989-92). 
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( c) The sown area of rice 
The time-series of rice area sown for Vietnam, the north and south are provided by the 
General Department of Land Management, the SDAFF and the MAFI (1991), the 
SDAFF (1994), the SDAFF (1995b) and the GSO (1995) (see Table DA.6). Because 
the data are not adequate in some years ( especially 1976-77 and 1980-84), the data are 
estimated from the annual average rate of decrease in sown area in those periods. Since 
the data gathering of the NIRR was conducted in July 1994, it is assumed to represent 
actual levels in both 1993 and 1994. 
Data sources of annual cultivated area, food cultivated area and rice cultivated 
area come from the SDAFF and the MAFI (1991) for 1976-90, from the SDAFF (1994) 
for 1990-93 and the GSO (1995) for 1994, (Table DA.6). The data will be used to 
construct other time-series data. 
) 
( d) Total current input 
Following a similar approach to that in Section DA.1, the construction for total current 
input includes the nutrition content of all fertiliser ( organic and chemical), insecticide 
and seeds (Tang, 1980; and Sicular, 1985). Tables DA. 7, DA.8 and DA.9 collect the 
data sources, which are used to construct total current input for the time-series data 
1976-94 for Vietnam and the north and south respectively. 
The construction of data for organic fertiliser is supplied from two main sources, 
the night soil and large animal manure, so it requires the time-series data of rural 
population and large animals (which includes buffaloes, cattle and pigs) from 1976-94. 
The time-series data of rural population and large animals come from the SDAFF and 
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the MAFI (1992) for 1976-90, the SDAFF (1995a) for 1990-93, and the GSO (1995) for 
1994. 
The time-series data of chemical fertiliser, insecticide and seeds for Vietnam is 
provided by the SDAFF (1996). The construction of time-series of chemical fertiliser, 
insecticides and seeds for the north and south comes from the average ratio of fertiliser, 
insecticide and seeds used per hectare between the north and south (see Table S.1 and 
S.2, Sub-Appendix) and the cultivated area in every year (SDAFF, GSO, various years). 
The main data sources and the constructed data of total current inputs for rice 
production in Vietnam, the north and south are presented in Tables DA.6, DA.7 and 
DA.8. 
(e) Total capital inputs 
The index of total capital inputs is defined as in Section DA. I so it is generated by 
adding the number of draught animals (buffaloes and cattle) and the capacity of tractors. 
Data sources for the number of draft animals are fully provided by the SDAFF and the 
MAFI (1992) for the period from 1976-1990, the SDAFF (1995a) for the period 1990-
93 , and the GSO (1995) for 1994, (see Table DA.9). The formula for conversion from 
the number of draught animals to the capacity of tractors is defined as in Section DA. I. 
However, the data sources for the capacity of tractors, especially for the north 
and south separately in 197 6-94 are poor and not complete, except for the full data 
sources for the capacity of tractors by the NIRR for 1993 or 1994 (SDAFF, 1995b ), so 
various adjustments are required. 
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The capacity of tractors for Vietnam is constructed from a series of publications 
by the SDAFF (GSO) ranging from 1991 to 1996. 11 The data are also complemented by 
the data from the GSO (1995). The data sources for constructing the capacity of tractors 
for the north and south (1993 and 1994) are based on the NIRR's figures (1994). In 
other years, there are no available data sources for the capacity of tractors in the north 
and south separately. Based on the rates of mechanisation for land preparation in the 
north and south, the capacity of tractors for the north and south are derived from the 
total capacity of tractors for the whole country. 12 In general, the percentages for 
mechanisation in the south increase faster and are much higher than in the north 
(Nguyen V Bich and Chu T Quang, 1994, MAFI, 1991, UNDP-FAO, Nguyen T Khiem, 
1995 and SDAFF, 1995b)13 • The main data sources and the derived data for capital (in 
terms of the capacity of tractors) for Vietnam, the north and south are presented in Table 
DA.9. 
11 The calculation for the capacity of large and small tractors is based on a similar evaluation to that used 
in the NIRR (DAFF, 1995b). For some years only the total number of tractors is available rather than 
number of large and small tractors separately, while for some other years there data are provided for 
'standard tractors'. Based on previous years, I converted all of these data to that of standard tractors (15 
horsepower) for use in other calculations. 
12 Those data are available from the MAFI (1991 ), in which the percentage of land preparation by 
machines is about 50 per cent in the CRD and 20.2 per cent in the RRD (for 1986-90). The evaluation 
and comparison of the rate of mechanisation between the north and south also were analysed by the VIE 
88/033, (1989), Nguyen V Bich and Chu T Quang (1994) and Nguyen T Khiem (1995). 
13 Based on those sources, I estimated that the percentage of tractor capacity from machines in the south at 
50 per cent, 60 per cent and 70 per cent for the total tractor capacity in Vietnam for 1976-80, 1981-88 and 
1989-92 respectively. 
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Table DA.4 Time series of the labour force for the rice industry in Vietnam as a 
whole, the north and the south taken separately (1976-94) 
VIETNAM THE NORTH THESOUTH 
Total labour Total man- Total labour Total man- Total labour Total man-
Year in agriculture days worked in agriculture days worked in agriculture days worked 
(thous persons) (thous standard (thous persons) (thous standard (thous persons) (thous standard 
labour labour labour 
1976 12596.4 764.1 6621.6 584.9 5974.8 179.2 
1977 12977.4 764.2 6852.3 571.0 6125.1 193.2 
1978 13103.8 782.1 6854.7 595.3 6249.1 186.8 
1979 13250.8 786.0 6601.9 598.7 6648.9 187.3 
1980 13885.0 768.6 6838.3 566.0 7046.7 202.6 
1981 14243.0 803.8 6942.9 608.8 7300.1 195.0 
1982 14601.4 810.1 7141.0 612.3 7460.4 197.8 
1983 15029.2 800.5 7298.4 607.7 7730.8 192.8 
1984 15627.7 803.4 7817.2 606.3 7810.5 197.1 
1985 15766.0 810.8 7659.3 613.9 8106.7 196.9 
1986 16135.5 798.9 7828.4 599.2 8307.1 199.7 
1987 16668.8 794.3 8018.7 601.3 8650.1 193.0 
1988 17047.9 805.5 8227.6 604.9 8820.3 200.6 
1989 17373.1 818.9 8672.7 608.9 8700.4 210.0 
1990 17723.9 827.4 8929.4 609.5 8794.5 218.0 
1991 18458.5 832.5 9417.8 615.8 9040.7 216.7 
1992 19538.8 862.1 9955.1 618.9 9583.7 243.1 
1993 20482.9 853.1 10682.7 614.2 9800.2 238.9 
1994 21699.1 866.7 15724.3 618.3 5974.8 248.5 
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Table DA.5 Land use in agriculture in Vietnam as a whole, the north and south separately (1976-94) (thous hectare) 
VIET NAM THE NORTH THE SOUTH 
Year Annual Food Rice Sown Annual Food Rice Sown Annual Food Rice Sown 
cultivated cultivated cultivated area cultivated cultivated cultivated area cultivated cultivated cultivated area 
area area area of rice area area area of rice area area area of rice 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1976 6746.1 6192.2 5297.3 4710 3267 2931.7 2383.6 1672 3542.7 3249.5 2909.6 3038 
1977 7243.2 6640.5 5468.7 4710 3463.6 3007.6 2326.9 1672 3714.4 3478.5 3034.3 3038 
1978 7411.3 6780.1 5462.5 4664 3578.2 3236.4 2425.9 1666 3762.6 3492.8 3010.2 2998 
1979 7545.7 6921.6 5485.2 4618 3571.4 3237.0 2439.7 1661 3886.6 3626.2 3011.4 2957 
1980 7772.8 7049.3 5600.2 4572 3562.4 3195.5 2306.5 1656 4114.4 3777.4 3236.2 2916 
1981 7769.0 6984.2 5651.9 4526 3347.6 3357.9 2480.7 1651 4021.9 3626.3 3171.2 2876 
1982 7769.0 6968.1 5711.4 4481 3731 3301.0 2495.2 1645 4087.7 3667.1 3216.2 2835 
1983 7671.8 6775.2 5611.0 4435 3626.6 3202.2 2476.5 1640 4045.2 3573.0 3134.5 2795 
1984 7816.3 6817.3 5675.0 4389 3634.2 3162.1 2470.6 1635 4182.1 3655.2 3204.4 2754 
1985 7840.3 6833.6 5703.9 4297 3661.3 3187.5 2501.5 1630 4179.0 3646.1 3202.4 2667 
1986 7846.3 6812.3 5688.6 4250 3623.2 3145.7 2441.9 1651 4223.1 3666.6 3246.7 2599 
1987 7789.0 6709.9 5588.5 4243 3688.6 3170.0 2450.4 1639 4100.4 3539.9 3138.1 2604 
1988 7999.4 6967.8 5726.4 4109 3783.4 3302.7 2464.8 1633 4216.0 3665.1 3261.6 2491 
1989 8071.3 7089.6 5895.8 4108 3757.9 3311 .9 2481.2 1628 4313.4 3777.1 3414.6 2490 
1990 8101.5 7110.9 6027.7 4108 3680.1 3223.8 2483.5 1618 4421.4 3387.1 3544.2 2490 
1991 8475.1 7448.0 6032.7 4101 3657.1 3301.0 2509.5 1618 4818.0 4147.0 3793.2 2531 
1992 8755.2 7707.4 6475.4 4100 3745.3 3397.8 2522.1 1570 5010.0 4309.6 3953.3 2517 
1993 8894.0 7796.7 6386.8 4039 3841.3 3391.4 2519.4 1583 5052.7 4405.3 4040.0 2456 
1994 8904.0 7809.0 6598.6 4039 na 3337.5 2506.1 1583 na 4471.5 4091 .7 2456 
------- ---------------------
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Table DA.6 The time-series data for constructing total current inputs for Vietnam (1976-94) 
Population Night soil Buffaloes Cattle Pigs Number of Large Nutritional Nutritional Chemical Total Insecti- Seed Total 
Year of agricul- large animal contents contents fertiliser nutritional cide current 
ture area animal manure for organic for organic fertiliser input 
equivalent fertiliser fertiliser 
for paddy 
(thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous tons) 
persons) tons) head) head) head) head) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) 
1976 33723.0 23606.1 2256.5 1595.2 8958.1 6539.1 35245.91 2903.3 2279.8 369 2648.8 18.0 635.00 2137.6 
1977 34365.0 24055.5 2289.7 1655.7 8739.2 6567.2 35396.99 2954.1 2230.3 403 2633.3 18.0 656.00 2129.6 
1978 35422.7 24795.89 2327.7 1646.0 8838.9 6625.4 35710.74 3038.2 2239.3 469 2708.3 18.0 655.00 2186.7 
1979 36092.2 25264.54 2293.0 1628.1 9348.0 6725.5 36250.45 3094.5 2249.5 381 2630.5 18.0 658.00 2127.7 
1980 37435.3 26204.71 2313.0 1664.0 10001.2 6977.4 37607.97 3209.7 2312.6 182 2494.6 18.0 672.00 2026.4 
1981 38254.3 26778.01 2380.3 1771.7 10493.4 7300.0 39347.11 3287.9 2391.9 219 2610.9 18.0 734.00 2126.3 
1982 38837.7 27186.39 2445.1 1944.4 10784.9 7625.0 41098.59 3348.1 2461.3 262 2723.3 18.0 685.00 2203.5 
1983 39686.6 27780.62 2500.2 2173.5 11201.9 8034.3 43304.72 3432.6 2510.5 376 2886.5 18.0 729.00 2336.0 
1984 40414.5 28290.15 2549.2 2418.0 11759.9 8495.2 45788.97 3510.3 2548.6 375 2923.6 18.0 737.00 2365.8 
1985 41243.8 28870.66 2590.2 2597.6 11807.5 8730.1 47054.97 3585.2 2608.2 386 2994.2 15.2 770.00 2425.4 
1986 41876.6 29313.62 2657.6 2783.5 11795.9 8979.9 48401.50 3645.6 2643.1 524 3167.1 11.5 768.00 2556.9 
1987 42774.7 29942.29 2752.7 2979.1 12050.8 9347.0 50380.55 3732.0 2677.6 421 3098.6 12.8 838.00 2517.2 
1988 43662.9 30564.03 2806.8 3126.6 11642.6 9426.2 50807.11 3804.1 2723.2 589 3312.2 13.9 910.00 2693.2 
1989 44629.5 31240.65 2871.3 3201.7 12217.3 9738.2 52488.84 3893.1 2843.8 542 3385.8 22.3 1002.00 2766.3 
1990 45420.8 31794.56 2854.1 3120.8 12260.5 9653.1 52029.94 3950.1 2938.9 544 3482.9 22.5 1024.00 2844.4 
1991 46734.0 32713.8 2858.8 3135.6 12194.3 9652.7 52028.00 4051.2 2883.7 743 3626.7 22.6 1071.00 2962.6 
1992 48183.2 33728.24 2886.5 3201.8 13891.7 10255.8 55278.82 4191.0 3099.7 902 4001.7 23.0 1100.00 3254.3 
1993 49474.5 34632.15 2960.8 3265.1 14873.9 10688.1 57608.70 4310.7 3095.5 1091 4186.5 23.3 1150.00 3404.4 
1994 50566.2 35396.37 2960.8 3400.3 15925.5 11138.7 77191.46 4565.2 3363.1 1321 4684.1 23.5 1183.00 3790.4 
~ e.::a-
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Table DA. 7 The time-series data for constructing the total current inputs for the north (1976-94) 
Population Night soil Buffaloes Cattle Pigs Number of Large Nutritional Nutritional Chemical Total lnsecti- Seed Total 
Year of large animal contents contents fertiliser nutrition cide current 
agriculture animal manure of organic of organic fertiliser input 
equivalent fertiliser fertiliser 
for paddy 
(thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous tons) 
versons) tons) head) head) head) head) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) 
1976 19014.5 13310.2 1844.4 680.8 6923.7 4602.3 24806.5 1679.93 1275.0 148.1 1423 .1 6.4 301.5 1141.3 
1977 19484.2 13638.9 1844.6 705.7 6148.3 4394.8 23687.9 1706.37 1211.1 155.4 1366.5 6.2 304.2 1098.5 
1978 19555.8 13689.1 1867.4 714.9 6332.1 4481.9 24157.6 1715.97 1181.5 186.4 1367.8 6.3 334.5 1104.9 
1979 19377.3 13564.1 1827.8 716.5 6642.9 4537.2 24455.3 1704.81 1172.7 151.9 1324.6 6.4 298.1 1065.4 
1980 19712.6 13798.8 1813.7 720.9 6738.8 4556.2 24558.1 1731.53 1149.9 67.0 1216.9 5.9 282.7 980.4 
1981 20050.8 14035.6 1852.3 746.9 6840.9 4651.5 25071.4 1762.03 1188.8 85.5 1274.3 6.2 344.3 1035.2 
1982 20460.8 14322.6 1879.0 678.9 7021.9 4664.5 25141.5 1794.21 1238.8 101.7 1340.5 6.2 314.0 1080.4 
1983 20934.1 14653.9 1898.3 905.8 7206.5 4966.1 26767.0 1844.80 1280.2 147.6 1427.8 6.3 319.7 1148.1 
1984 21350.7 14945.5 1916.1 1009.0 7496.0 5173.9 27887.3 1886.62 1304.6 145.1 1449.6 6.2 309.5 1162.9 
1985 21794.5 15256.2 1935.2 1093.3 7404.8 5249.9 28297.2 1924.36 1335.6 150.5 1486.1 7.0 321.2 1192.9 
1986 22228.7 15560.1 1986.3 1180.1 7480.4 5410.5 29162.7 1965.33 1351.3 199.6 1550.9 5.3 321.2 1242.3 
1987 22700.9 15890.6 2061.1 1278.8 7668.3 5640.4 30401.7 2012.46 1361.7 164.1 1525.8 5.9 363.6 1230.7 
1988 23170.2 16219.1 2103.9 1371.6 7487.2 5721.7 30839.7 2052.41 1368.0 225.0 1593.1 6.4 388.9 1286.7 
1989 23919.1 16743.4 2173.6 1452.4 7813.9 5970.2 32179.2 2121.73 1441.5 202.1 1643.6 6.4 417.0 1330.3 
1990 24554.9 17188.4 2210.7 1458.3 8018.6 6074.6 32742.0 2175.58 1516.5 198.2 1714.7 6.4 402.6 1382.1 
1991 25295.6 17706.9 2248.9 1967.8 7926.2 6594.6 35544.7 2257.00 1471.1 260.9 1732.1 6.4 381.6 1391.6 
1992 26137.9 18296.5 2322.9 1529.4 8571.6 6423.8 34624.2 2313.85 1618.4 309.4 1927.8 6.6 440.7 1551.6 
1993 26861.6 18803.1 2414.1 1552.5 9345.6 6770.3 36491.8 2385.82 1615.9 376.6 1992.5 6.7 486.9 1609.3 
1994 27454.3 19218.0 2414.1 1646.5 10180.9 7114.9 55502.9 2596.86 1906.5 446.3 2352.8 6.7 446.3 1877.3 
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Table DA.8 The time-series data for constructing the total current inputs for the south (1976-94) 
Population Night soil Buffaloes Cattle Pigs Number Large Nutritional Nutritional Chemical Total Insecti- Seed Total Year m of larger animal contents contents fertiliser nutritional cide current agriculture animal manure of organic of organic fertiliser input 
equivalent fertiliser fertiliser 
for paddy 
(thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous (thous tons) persons) tons) head) head) head) head) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) 
1976 14708.5 10296.0 412.1 914.4 2034.4 1936.8 10439.5 1223.4 1004.8 220.9 1225.7 11.6 333.5 996.4 
1977 14880.8 10416.6 445.1 950.0 2590.9 2172.4 11709.1 1247.7 1019.2 247.6 1266.9 11.8 351.8 1031.1 
1978 15866.9 11106.8 460.3 931.1 2506.8 2143.4 11553.1 1322.3 1057.9 282.6 1340.5 11.7 320.5 1081.8 
1979 16714.9 11700.4 465.2 911.6 2705.1 2188.3 11795.1 1389.7 1076.7 229.1 1305.9 11.6 359.9 1062.3 
1980 17722.7 12405.9 499.3 943.1 3262.4 2421.1 13049.8 1478.2 1162.7 115.0 1277.6 12.1 389.3 1046.0 
1981 18203.5 12742.5 528.0 1024.8 3652.5 2648.6 14275.7 1525.9 1203.1 133.5 1336.7 11.8 389.7 1091.2 
1982 18376.9 12863.8 566.1 1265.5 3763.0 2960.5 15957.1 1553.8 1222.6 160.3 1382.8 11.8 371.0 1123 .1 
1983 18752.5 13126.8 601.9 1267.7 3995.4 3068.2 16537.7 1587.8 1230.4 228.4 1458.7 11.7 409.3 1187.9 
1984 19063.8 13344.7 633.1 1409.0 4263.9 3321.3 17901.6 1623.7 1244.1 229.9 1474.0 11.8 427.5 1202.9 
1985 19449.3 13614.5 655.0 1504.3 4402.7 3480.1 18757.8 1660.8 1272.7 235.5 1508.2 8.2 448.8 1232.5 
1986 19647.9 13753.5 671.3 1603.4 4315.5 3569.4 19238.8 1680.3 1291.8 324.4 1616.2 6.2 446.8 1314.6 
1987 20073.8 14051.7 691.6 1700.3 4382.5 3706.7 19978.8 1719.5 1316.0 256.9 1572.8 6.9 474.4 1286.5 
1988 20492.7 14344.9 702.9 1755.0 4155.4 3704.5 19967.4 1751.7 1355.1 364.0 1719.1 7.5 521.1 1406.5 
1989 20710.4 14497.3 697.7 1749.3 4403.4 3768.0 20309.6 1771.4 1402.3 339.9 1742.2 15.9 585.0 1436.0 
1990 20865.9 14606.1 643.4 1662.5 4241.9 3578.5 19288.0 1774.5 1422.4 345.8 1768.2 16.1 621.4 1462.3 
1991 21438.4 15006.9 609.9 1167.8 4268.1 3058.1 16483.3 1794.2 1412.5 482.1 1894.6 16.2 689.4 1571.0 
1992 22045.3 15431.7 563.6 1672.4 5320.1 3832.0 20654.6 1877.2 1481.3 592.6 2073.9 16.4 659.3 1702.7 
1993 22612.9 15829.0 546.7 1712.6 5528.3 3917.8 21116.9 1924.9 1479.7 714.4 2194.0 16.6 663.1 1795.1 
1994 23111.9 16178.3 546.7 1753.8 5744.6 4023.9 21688.6 1968.3 1456.5 874.7 2331.2 16.8 736.7 1913.1 
~ 
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Table DA.9 The time-series data for constructing the capital input in Vietnam, the north and south (1976-94) 
VIETNAM THE NORTH THESOUTH 
Year Draught animals Total Capacity Total Draught animals Total Capacity Total Draught animals Total Capacity Total 
Draught Draught horsepower of capacity Draught Draught horsepower of capacity Draught Draught horsepower of capacity 
buffaloes cattle of draught machines of tractors buffaloes cattle of draught machines of tractors buffaloes cattle of draught machines of tractors 
animals animals animals 
(thous (thous (ten thous (ten thous (ten thous (thousand (thousand (ten thous (ten thous (ten thous (thousand (thousand (ten thous (ten thous (ten thous 
head) head) horsepower) horsepower) horsepower) head) head) horsepower) horsepower) horsepower) head) head) horsepower) horsepower) horsepower) 
1976 1542.0 682.2 119.2 117.6 236.7 1300.3 302.3 85.9 58.8 144.6 241.7 379.9 33.30 58.8 92.1 
1977 1569.3 710.4 122.1 121.7 243.8 1294.0 294.4 85.1 60.9 146.0 275.3 416.0 37.03 60.9 97.9 
1978 1570.2 689.1 121.0 116.9 237.9 1297.5 286.9 84.9 58.4 143.3 272.7 402.2 36.16 58.4 94.6 
1979 1553.8 715.3 121.6 123.7 245.2 1262.4 287.4 83.0 61.8 144.9 291.4 427.9 38.53 61.8 100.4 
1980 1563.1 736.7 123.2 140.5 263.7 1257.3 291.0 82.9 70.2 153.2 305.8 445.7 40.26 70.2 110.5 
1981 1629.8 764.4 128.3 152.9 281.2 1309.7 323.3 87.5 61.2 148.6 320.1 441.1 40.78 91.7 132.5 
1982 1676.3 810.4 133.2 141.5 274.7 1330.9 354.9 90.3 56.6 146.9 345.4 455.5 42.91 84.9 127.8 
1983 1718.5 889.7 139.7 133.4 273.2 1358.2 412.2 94.8 53.4 148.2 360.3 477.5 44.88 80.1 124.9 
1984 1736.1 930.3 142.8 138.0 280.8 1364.8 428.7 96.1 55.2 151.3 371.3 501.6 46.76 82.8 129.6 
1985 1734.0 1006.8 146.8 140.8 287.7 1350.5 469.7 97.5 56.3 153.8 383.5 537.1 49.32 84.5 133.8 
1986 1793.5 1065.0 153.1 161.0 314.2 1396.5 503.4 101.8 64.4 166.2 397.0 561.6 51.35 96.6 148.0 
1987 1868.4 1186.3 163.6 128.5 292.1 1457.5 556.1 107.9 51.4 159.3 410.9 630.2 55.77 77.1 132.8 
1988 1913.1 1261.8 170.1 128.5 298.6 1491.6 622.0 113.2 51.4 164.6 421.5 639.8 56.86 77.1 134.0 
1989 1946.1 1361.1 177.2 121.9 299.1 1532.8 717.2 120.5 36.6 157.1 413.3 643.9 56.64 85.3 142.0 
1990 1938.5 1420.8 181.2 115.3 296.5 1554.1 756.7 123.8 34.6 158.4 384.4 664.1 57.35 80.7 138.1 
1991 1944.0 1307.5 189.2 161.5 350.7 1585.3 841.2 125.4 48.4 173.9 358.7 466.4 63.79 113.0 176.8 
1992 1962.8 1335.2 192.0 226.1 418.1 1637.6 891.2 130.4 67.8 198.2 325.2 443.9 61.65 158.3 219.9 
1993 2013.3 1361.5 198.3 316.5 514.8 1658.4 945.4 132.6 95.0 227.6 354.9 416.1 65.65 221.6 287.2 
1994 2044.1 1417.9 202.4 359.8 562.2 1658.4 1002.1 140.7 107.9 248.6 385.7 415.8 61.75 251.8 313.6 
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DA.3 Time- series data of the composite price between output and factor inputs 
/Jp(l-Com) in 1976-94 
Combined with the data set in Section DA. I, the following data are used for the analysis 
of the effects of internal and external trade liberalisation (Chapter 7), the dynamic 
transitional path and long-run growth for rice production (Chapter 8). Corresponding to 
Section DA.I , the duration of time-series data also range from the years 1976 to 1994. 
As analysed in Section 4.1 (Chapter 4), the index of the composite price between 
output and factor inputs, or /Jp(J -C0m), reflects the changes in the structure (between 
inputs and outputs) and price level under the effects of trade liberalisation. Relying on 
the theoretical and empirical analyses conducted earlier, this section documents the data 
sources and the adjustments use to generate this composite price index from two time-
series data sets: the average goods price (/Jp) and the value of (I-Com) in terms of the 
average cost share parameter ( m). 
(a) The time-series data for the average rice price /Jp 
Returning to the average goods price (J3p) given in equation (3.6) and renumbering it 
here for convenience, gives 
/Jp = (/J oPs + f31PM + f3 2Pw) · (DA.4) 
The time-series data of the nominal rice price in years 197 6-94 is available from 
the State Department of Price (SDP). Of course, the nominal rice price is not the 
average nominal rice price (J3pN) and is more different from the average real rice price 
(/Jp) , as used in the theoretical framework in the chapters above. To obtain the time-
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series data for the average real rice price /Jp, the data for the nominal average rice price 
(/JpN) needs to be constructed. 
In the stage of the opening up of markets, where there is freedom to purchase 
and sell at a common market price and the barriers to market entry are removed ( see 
Section 1.1 in Chapter 1 above for more detail), the market (nominal) price for rice 
captures all of the components of equation (DA.3), and hence it is the actual nominal 
value for /JpN. However, Vietnam experienced periods of multiple rice prices (for 
example, a state rice price, a free domestic market rice price, etc.), each determined 
separately in their own market. Consequently, the time-series index of the market share 
(/J) in the periods of multiple prices and markets needs to be determined. For our 
purposes, in the period of the communal system, the market share of the state market 
(/30c) is equal to one and the market share of the domestic (/Jic) and international 
markets ( /J2c) is zero. In the output contract system, there were parallel markets with 
the market share set at 0.8, 0.2 and O for the state market (/Jt ), domestic market (/Jt) 
and international market (/3/) respectively. 14 Substituting the value of market share (/3) 
into (DA.4 ), the data for the nominal average rice price (/Jp) for Vietnam, the north and 
south respectively are obtained (see Table DA. I 0). 
It is easy to see in Table DA. IO that the average nominal rice price (/JpN) has 
experienced extreme fluctuation. It jumped by a factor of 5400 to 6000 from 197 6 to 
1994 (or from 0.4 to 2146.60 Dong15per kilogram in the north and from 0.3 to 2012.50 
14 This is average data which was computed from the GSO (various years) in which the market share is 
0.88, 0.12 (in 1986), 0.82, 0.18 (in 1987) and 0.82, 0.18 (in 1988) for the state and domestic markets for 
food grains respectively. The research by the State Planning Committee used the same rate (0.8 and 0.2) 
to adjust the multiple or various prices for grain at this time. 
15 The Vietnamese currency 
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Dong per kilogram in the south, see Table DA.13). The fluctuation of the average 
nominal rice price was affected by an extremely high inflation rate ( at the three digit 
level in 1987-88), some few short-run shocks (Nguyen D Chuc, 1995) and several large 
changes in the nominal value of the currency ( such as in the years 1977 and 1985) where 
the nominal value of the currency differed largely. For example, in 1985 one Dong in 
terms of the new currency was equivalent to ten Dong in terms of the old currency. 
Normally, the average real rice price f]p can be obtained by adjusting the average 
nominal rice price f]p according to the inflation rate. In this case, is impossible to do so 
directly because of the serious problems with the inflation rate data. (Clearly the 
problems with data reliability for the Vietnamese economy are not a new issue and 
certainly one that is impossible to deny. 16) In our case those problems are: (a) the 
reported measures of the inflation rate data are inconsistent even though they stem from 
one source, the General Statistics Office ( GSO) 17 ; (b) until the episode of three digit 
rates of inflation (the period 1987-88), the Vietnamese authorities still perceived 
inflation as a 'capitalist' phenomenon, so that the measurement of inflation generated 
virtually no interest and as a result was poorly constructed; ( c) a high and fluctuating 
inflation rate in the period 1986-89 caused measurement difficulties at that time18; and 
16 Many economists have already complained about the reliability of inflation rate data in Vietnam. For 
example, McCarty, Paunlagui and Vu (1993) give an example of the differences in the annual inflation 
rate from the sources of the World Bank, the GSO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) although 
all of those data supposedly came from one original source, the GSO. 
17 I collected three different time-series data sources for the annual inflation rate (general retail price 
index). Despite that, all of them come from the GSO, and surprisingly all of them differ markedly from 
each other. For example according to the GSO (various years) the reported annual inflation rate (as a per 
cent change from the previous year) is 487.3, 301.3, 308.2 74.3 (by the report by the GSO, 1993) and 
874.7, 323.1, 493.8, 134.7, 167.6 and 117.6 (GSO, 1994) for 1986, 1997, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 
1992 respectively. 
18 This applies to all three data sources for the inflation rate (mentioned above), and if we use any of them 
directly we can obtain unrealistic results, e g the rice price in a given year can be greater than the previous 
year by about 800 per cent, even though there was no obvious price shock to explain such a difference! 
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(d) before 1989, the basket of goods for calculating the rate of inflation and the Gross 
Domestic Product deflator was based on only nine consumption goods in urban areas so 
that it could obviously not represent anything like a representative basket of goods for 
the whole economy. 19 Indeed, until 1989 a subsidised price for those goods was 
achieved through a coupon system, with extremely cheap prices (almost free or given 
away) in urban areas relative to the rest of the country. Nevertheless, farmers paid for 
their consumption goods at the free market price so that the inflation rate (before 1989) 
reflected mostly just the change in regime from the state determined urban price to the 
free market price, rather than the prices farmers actually paid or received over time. 20 
Thus, because of these problems it is not possible (as mentioned) to construct the 
real value of average rice price (/3p) using a standard inflation rate adjustment. Instead, 
we measure the real value of the average rice price (/3p) in terms of an independent 
value standard such as gold or the value of the U.S. dollar (US$). Indeed, in doing so 
we are following a similar approach to that used by the Vietnamese people themselves, 
( especially during periods of hyperinflation) who commonly measure their durable 
goods, assets and even rice prices in terms of gold or the value of the US$.21 Besides, in 
practical terms, since many expenditures on factor inputs are already measured in terms 
of US$ ( e.g. , data in the SRF), I chose to determine the real value of the average rice 
price (/Jp) in terms of U.S. dollars. Moreover, given the arguments regarding a strong 
correlation between the inflation rate, the price of gold and the price of the US$ (study 
19 Based on the reports by the 'Action Group Against Inflation of the Vietnamese Government' in 1987-
1990. 
20 The government had attempted several times to cancel the heavy subsidy for consumer goods ( through 
coupons in the state sector) such as unsuccessful 'price, wage and money' reform in 1985, and later the 
successful reforms undertaken in 1990. 
21 This phenomenon is not unusual in the LDC's which experience hyperinflations, such as in Latin 
America (see Canto and Nickelsburg, 1987). 
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by the 'Action Group Against Inflation of the Vietnamese Government'), and a high 
correlation between inflation rate, the price of the US$ and the exchange rate in Vietnam 
(World Bank, 1994a, p.67-68) this is the best and most reasonable alternative. 
The time-series data for the average rice price (ftp) in terms of US$ is indicated 
in Table DA.13 where the data sources for the exchange rate in the period 1976-94 are 
provided from the State Department of Price (SDP) and the State Bank of Vietnam 
(SBV). 22 
During the various stages of trade liberalisation, the exchange rate went from a 
controlled and overvalued exchange rate to multiple exchange rates and eventually to a 
devaluated and unified exchange rate. In the period 1976-1985, the official exchange 
rate was the only rate available and was regulated by the State at an overvalued level 
(see Table DA.IO, column 3). During the period 1985-89, multiple exchange rates, 
which means a state exchange rate (regulated by SBV) and a parallel market exchange 
rate, had operated at one in the same time in the market, and at the very different 
values.23 Similar to the approach for adjusting the average nominal rice price above (see 
equation (DA.3)), here the average exchange rate is defined as a sum of the state 
exchange rate multiplied by the state market share, and the market exchange rate 
multiplied by the free market share. The average exchange rate in the period 1985-89 is 
thus obtained (see Table DA.10, column 3).24 From 1989 until now, exchange rate 
22 It should be noted that there is the fluctuations in the world price for agricultural goods (Deaton and 
Laroque, 1992) 
23 In fact, in this period three official dollar exchange rate existed at one time: Dong 18: US$ 1 to Dong 
900 US$ for the external trade rate, Dong 18: 1 US$ to Dong 3000: 1 US$ for inward remittances by 
Vietnamese living abroad and Dong 15: US$ 1 to Dong 3000 US$ for non-commercial transactions such 
as tourism, remittances or for foreigners (see Nguyen V Thanh, (1996)). 
24 Based on data by the GSO, in the period 1985-89 for the goods market, the share was 0.8 and 0.2 for 
the state market and free market respectively. It is firmly assumed that the share between state and free 
market for foreign exchange is the same rate so it is 0.8 and 0.2 for the state market and free market 
respectively. According to the SBV, the official exchange rate was 15 Dong (1985), 80 Dong (1986), 368 
rl 
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reform was successful in the unification and devaluation of multiple exchange rates, 
hence we can safely use the market exchange rate or the exchange rate of the SBV to 
represent the exchange rate during this time (see Table DA. I 0, column 3). 
We take the nominal rice price in Nam Dinh and Can Tho to present the rice 
price in the north and south respectively (following the practice of the State Department 
of Price, or SDP), and, based on our adjustments, the time series of the average real rice 
price in the north and south (1976-94) are constructed (see Table DAI 0, columns 5 and 
6,). To compute the average real rice price for Vietnam, we assume that the affect of the 
rice price in the south ( or the north) on the average rice price in Vietnam depends on the 
share of the south ( or the north) in the total rice output of Vietnam. Therefore, the 
weighted ratio of rice price for the south ( or the north) is defined as the ratio between 
rice output in the north ( or the south) divided by the total output of rice in Vietnam (see 
Table DA.11 ). Thus the average real rice price for Vietnam can be defined as 
p VN = Ratio N pN + Ratios ps (DA.5) 
where RatioN, pN, RatioN, and p N represent the weighted ratio and the average real rice 
price in the north and south respectively, with Ratio N + Ratios = 1 (see Table DA.10, 
column 4). Consequently, taking the numeric mean of /Jp in the period of communal 
system as a base, the growth of /Jp is showed in Table DA. I 0, columns 7, 8 and 9 for 
Vietnam, the north and south respectively. 
Dong (1987) and 3000 Dong (in 1988), while the free market exchange rate was 115 Dong (1985), 425 
Dong (1986), 1270 Dong (1987) and 5000 Dong (1988). 
ll 
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(b) The time-series data for the average cost share parameter (m) 
This data set is used to generate the time-series data of (I-Com), as a component in the 
composite price index between inputs and output. The value of Co is computed from 
equation (3 .8) and given as 1.4 for the case of rice production in Vietnam (see Appendix 
F). However, the value of average weighted cost share parameter (m) varies over time 
and is yet unknown. 25 
The value of m is defined from formulas given by equations (3.9) and (3.13), 
where a1 =0.4; a2 =0.3; a3 =0.2 and a4 =0. I (see Appendix 7 A). so that mis given as 
W(wi) 
m= f3p 
(WI) 0.4 ( W 2) 0.3 ( W 3) 0.2 ( W 4) 0.1 
f3p 
(DA.6) 
where w1,w2, w3 and w4 are the price of labour, land, current input and capital 
respectively. 
For simplification and to minimise the errors involved in adjusting the nominal 
value to the real value of the average weighted cost share parameter (m), I measure the 
input price (wi) in terms of rice units (wiRE), such as how many tons of rice farmers have 
to pay to get one ton of urea to employ one thousand man-day works, or to rent one 
hectare of rice-producing land etc. 26 In any case, some data sources for factor input 
expenditures are already measured in terms of rice units as a matter of practice. Thus 
equation (DA.6) can be rewritten as 
W(wi) 
m= f3p 
( w
1
RE f3p) o.4 ( w~ f3p) 0.3 ( w~ f3p) 0.2 ( w~ f3p) 0.1 
f3p 
25 
To make our work become more simple, I construct m for whole of country, and assume this value also 
applies to the north and south. 
26
This approach is common in Vietnam and even more popular in the episodes of high inflation when 
farmers not only bartered rice for factor inputs but also accounted for costs and benefits in terms of rice 
measurements. 
l~ j, 
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or 
m = (wtE )o.4 (w~ )0.3 (w~ )0.2 (w:,S )0.1 (DA.7) 
where w 1Re ;w2Re ;w3Re and w 4Re are the ratio of expenditure (called the relative input 
price) of labour, land, current input and capital in terms of rice unit respectively. 
Chapters 3 and 4 above referred to the average factor price W (w J as an explicit 
payment that farmers actually have to expend. In the case of Vietnam the most 
important part of that that explicit payment has been the expenditure on current input 
(Nguyen T Khiem, 1995 and UNDP-F AO, 1989). The facts in Vietnam show that the 
market for current inputs developed more rapidly and significantly in comparison to that 
for land and labour. Therefore, to make the calculation of m more simple, we pay the 
most attention to calculation of w 3Re in every year. In other words, assume that w 1Re and 
w2Re do not change much, that is,' while the price for rice becomes more expensive, the 
labour cost and land rent cost also becomes expensive, those prices rising at similar 
rates. Because capital plays a small share in rice production ( a value 0.1 ), for 
simplification , we also assume that the relative price of capital ( w 4 Re) can be ignored. 
By the definition of total current input (see Section DA. I) all the various items 
of current inputs are able to be converted into the standard nutritional content of 
fertiliser. Since the cost for chemical fertiliser takes on a major part in the cost for 
current inputs (see Nguyen T Khiem, (1995)), the relative price of chemical fertiliser or 
the relative urea/rice price can nicely be used to represent the relative price of current 
inputs (w3Re). The time-series data of the relative urea/rice price (GSO, and the CPC) 
during the period 1976-94 are indicated in Table DA.12 and come from the Central 
Price Committee (CPC), as quoted in Nguyen T Hien (1991) and Nguyen T Khiem, 
1 •. 
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(1995). It is noted that, the relative price in question was the free market price or barter 
exchange ratio between the State and farmer rather than the state price of urea, which 
was issued by the CPC27 . Since Vietnam is a heavy importer of chemical fertiliser, after 
the opening up of markets the urea/rice price ratio in Vietnam quickly decreased and 
converged to the world price ratio levei28. 
The relative price of labour to rice output or the ratio between labour cost to one 
unit of rice (w 1Re) is defined as 
ANA wfe =_W_l_ 
RAp (DA.8) 
where w1A, N4, R1A and p are the average wage for one man-work day, the average 
number of man-work days per one cultivated hectare, the yield per one cultivated 
hectare (ton/hectare) and the rice price respectively. Table S.3 in the Sub-Appendix 
shows the data (SRF) and the results for calculating the relative price of labour cost per 
one ton of rice output for the north (0.15) and the south (0.25). The approximate 
average relative price of labour per one ton of rice output for Vietnam is taken as 0.2. 
The relative price between land cost to output w2R\ is calculated as 
TA 
Re __ 
W2 - Rs A (DA.9) 
where r4 and ~ are the average tax levies per one sown hectare in terms of quantity of 
rice and the average yield of rice per one sown hectare respectively. The values of r4 
and ~ are computed approximately from the data provided by the GSO and the SPC 
27 Before 1980, the State decided that the relative urea/rice price was 1.0, but the equivalent amount of 
fertiliser in these terms was small and farmers had instead to pay a urea/rice price ratio of 2.0 to 3 .0 (SDP, 
1995a). Because there were a good deal of 'intermediate organisations' at least 20 per cent of the 
chemical fertiliser which was 'lost' from the state network and subsequently became available at a high 
price to farmers (UNDP-F AO, 1989). 
28The world relative urea/rice price was 0.62 (1986), 0.53 (1987), 0.58 (1988), 0.45 (1989), 0.64 (1990), 
0.8 (1991) and 0.78 (1992) (CPC and GSO, various years). 
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(1990) with r4 being roughly 0.3 ton/hectare and Jt4 about 3 ton/hectare. As a result 
w2Re is computed to be roughly the value 0.1 . From equation (DA.6), the average cost 
share parameter (m) is thus calculated as 
m = ( 0 .2) 0 .3 ( 0 .1) 0 .4 ( w: e ) 0.3 (DA.IO) 
where the value of w3Re is as indicated in Table DA.12. Since the time series of m is 
determined, the time series of (l-C0m) is easily obtained and indicated in Table DA.12. 
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Table DA.10 The time-series data for constructing the average rice price (1976-94) 
The nominal average price (JJpN) The The average rice price The growth rate of the average 
(Dong/ Kg) exchange (US$/ton) . . nee pnce 
The north The south rate VIETNAM The north The south VIETNAM The north The south 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1976 0.40 0.30 4.21 82.22 95.01 71.26 with average with average with average 
1977 0.39 0.30 4.21 80.18 91.62 71.26 price for this price for this price for this 
1978 0.57 0.47 8.00 64.99 71.43 58.93 period of period of period of 
1979 0.74 0.71 9.00 80.73 82.54 79.37 77.74 US$ 84.63 US$ 72.04 US$ 
1980 0.74 0.71 9.00 80.56 82.54 79.37 
1981 3.50 3.57 40.00 88.51 87.50 89.29 13.85 3.39 23.94 
1982 3.86 3.87 42.00 91.99 91.84 92.11 18.33 8.52 27 .86 
1983 4.47 4.13 45 .00 94.87 99.30 91.68 22.04 17.34 27.27 
1984 4.98 4.81 50.00 97.60 99.66 96.23 25.55 17.76 33.58 
1985 5.71 5.00 56.00 94.34 102.04 89.29 21.35 20.57 23.94 
1986 21.43 17.14 190.00 99.05 112.78 90.23 27.42 33.26 25.24 
1987 100.00 85.71 900.00 101.62 111.11 95.24 30.72 31.29 32.20 
1988 514.29 357.00 3400.00 123.26 151.26 105.00 58.55 78 .73 45.75 
1989 602.08 520.00 4000.00 137.86 150.52 130.00 77 .33 77.86 80.46 
1990 912.46 835.83 5575.00 151.04 163.67 143.87 94.29 93.39 99.71 
1991 2070.00 1741.67 11500.00 180.91 180.00 181.34 132.72 112.69 151.72 
1992 1898.05 1804.17 11000.00 164.89 172.55 160.48 112.10 103.89 122.77 
1993 1611.20 1795.83 10000.00 165.67 161.12 168.61 113.10 90.38 134.05 
1994 2146.60 2012.50 10000.00 197.29 214.66 186.34 153.79 153.65 158.66 
Note: (i)Since 1990, the price in term of US$ is provided from the CPC for the north and south; (ii) the price in 1991 in the north is measured in the 
normal situation rather than the short run shock of high prices; (iii) in the period of the dual price system (1981-88), the rice price is mainly taken as the 
'negotiated price', and calculated from the market share between the State and free market at their price level. 
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Table DA.11 The time-series of weighted ratio of rice price for the north and 
south 
Total output Output of rice in Ratio of weighted Ratio of weighted 
of Vietnam the north rate for the north rate for the south 
(equals (1)/ (2)) (equals 1-(3)) 
1 2 3 4 
1976 11827.2 5457.7 0.46 0.54 
1977 10597.1 4645.9 0.44 0.56 
1978 9789.9 4749.6 0.49 0.51 
1979 11362.9 4878.7 0.43 0.57 
1980 11647.4 4371.4 0.38 0.62 
1981 12415.2 5401.1 0.44 0.56 
1982 14390.2 6170.5 0.43 0.57 
1983 14743.3 6174.1 0.42 0.58 
1984 15505.6 6200.0 0.40 0.60 
1985 15874.8 6292.0 0.40 0.60 
1986 16002.9 6262.8 0.39 0.61 
1987 15102.6 6075.2 0.40 0.60 
1988 17000.0 6708.7 0.39 0.61 
1989 18996.3 7275.4 0.38 0.62 
1990 19225.2 6962.4 0.36 0.64 
1991 19621.9 6257.5 0.32 0.68 
1992 21590.3 7885.1 0.37 0.63 
1993 22836.6 8973.3 0.39 0.61 
1994 23528.3 9100.0 0.39 0.61 
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Table DA.12 The time-series of the average cost share parameter (m) and (1-Com) 
(1976-94) 
The total The average 
202 
. Year Relative The average Urea price component weighted The value of 
price between 
. . 
of relative cost share (l-C(O)m) nee pnce 
urea and rice price between parameter 
urea and rice 
(w~) (US$)/ton (US$)/ton (w3Re)U.3 m 
1976-
80) 3.0 90.5 271.5 1.39 0.31 0.56 
1981 3.0 113.6 340.9 1.39 0.31 0.56 
1982 3.0 122.9 368.8 1.39 0.31 0.56 
1983 3.0 129.9 389.8 1.39 0.31 0.56 
1984 3.0 131.4 394.2 1.39 0.31 0.56 
1985 2.2 136.3 305.4 1.27 0.28 0.60 
1986 2.2 133.4 298.9 1.27 0.28 0.60 
1987 2.0 136.5 273.0 1.23 0.28 0.61 
1988 2.0 131.1 262.2 1.23 0.28 0.61 
1989 1.6 137.9 224.7 1.15 0.26 0.64 
1990 1.5 151.0 228.1 1.13 0.25 0.65 
1991 1.0 185.1 190.6 1.00 0.22 0.69 
1992 0.9 164.9 155.0 0.97 0.22 0.70 
1993 1.0 165.7 165.7 1.00 0.22 0.69 
1994 1.1 197.3 221.0 1.03 0.23 0.68 
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Sub-Appendix,: soME DATA DETAILS FOR RICE PRODUCTION IN VIETNAM 
Table S.1: The average chemical fertiliser use for rice production in the Red River Delta and Cuu Long River Delta (kg/ hectare) 
Place 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Kind of fertiliser Kind of fertiliser Kind of fertiliser Kind of fertiliser 
Nitrogen Phosphate Potassium Nitrogen Phosphate Potassium Nitrogen Phosphate Potassium Nitrogen Phosphate Potassium 
(N) (P) (K) (N) (P) (K) (N) (P) (K) (N) (P) (K) 
The Red River Delta na na na 76.67 16.67 53.33 90.35 20.83 2.63 159.00 1.82 4.22 
The Cuu Long River Delta 109.45 58.58 4.90 112.82 50.78 7.18 104.55 43.04 3.98 131.83 53.949 7.18 
Source: The data is derived from the Survey of Rice Farmer (SRF) for 394, 335, and 313 rice farmers in the Red River Delta in 1990, 1991 and 
1992 respectively and for 231, 170, 208 and 189 rice farmers in the Cuu Long River Delta in 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992 respectively. 
Table S.2: The average insecticide use for rice production in the Red River Delta and Cuu Long River Delta 
RED RIVER DELTA CUU LONG RIVER DELTA Average weighted Average weighted 
Expenditures Expenditures Average Expenditures Expenditures Average ratio insecticide between ratio insecticide between 
amount use amount use the north over the whole the south over the whole 
country country 
(Dong/hectare) (US$/hectare) (kg/hectare) (Dong/hectare) (US$/hectare) (kg/hectare) 
1989 na na na 35 900 3.26 2.97 
1990 53 562 4.87 1.43 58 209 5.29 4.81 0.48 0.52 
1991 114 439 10.4 5.69 144 000 13.09 11.9 0.44 0.56 
1992 141 288 12.84 5.84 177 000 16.09 14.63 0.44 0.56 
Average 77 332 7.03 3.24 103 777 9.43 8.58 0.45 0.55 
Source: The same as in Table S.1 
-3ic 855 ~ ---~-=. 
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Table S.3: The relative price between labour cost and output in the Red River Delta and Cuu Long River Delta 
RED RIVER DELTA CUU LONG RIVER DELTA 
The cost, in tenns of Average Total Yield Output Ratio The cost, in tenns of Average Total Yield Output Ratio 
(US$) (US$) 
Land Trans- Weed- Harver- cost labour of rice per wage/ Land Trans- Wee- Harver- cost labour of rice per wage/ 
cost cost 
preparat planting ding ting per day per hectare output preparat planting ding ting per day per hectare output 
10n hectare (ton/ 10n hectare (ton/ (US$) 
(US$) (US$) hectare) (US$) (US$) hectare) 
1989 na na na na na na 2.63 395.87 na 1.4 0.9 0.75 1 1.01 60.8 3.44 447.2 0.14 
1990 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.5 0.41 98.4 2.73 412.34 0.24 1.5 0.97 0.8 1.07 1.09 65.1 3.46 479.79 0.13 
1991 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.54 0.5175 124.2 2.93 542.22 0.23 1.28 0.82 0.69 0.92 0.93 55.7 3.52 638.32 0.09 
1992 0.61 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.5225 125.4 2.8 461.69 0.27 1.98 1.27 1.06 1.42 1.43 86.0 3.46 555.26 0.15 
1993 0.71 0.67 0.57 0.62 0.6425 154.2 2.49 412.51 0.37 2.09 1.35 1.12 1.5 1.52 90.9 3.48 586.76 0.16 
1994 0.91 0.73 0.64 0.82 0.775 186.0 3.12 615.56 0.30 2.55 1.64 1.36 1.82 1.84 110.6 3.74 696.90 0.16 
.Source: The same as in Table S. 1. 
(Note: The average of labour expenditure(in terms of US$) for producing 1 US$ of output are 0. 25 and 0.15 for the north and south respectively. 
Take the average ratio as 0. 2 for the whole country.) 
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Table S.4 Monthly rice price in the Red River Delta and the Cuu Long River Delta in 1989-95 (Dong/ kg) 
January February March April May Jun July August September October November December 
1989 
In the RRD 700 850 660 630 660 650 550 505 500 500 480 540 
In the CRD 460 480 550 560 530 480 500 500 560 560 540 520 
1990 
In the RRD 670 680 750 840 900 700 800 800 800 900 1300 1900 
In the CRD 520 520 540 540 540 800 950 900 1000 1070 1300 1350 
1991 
In the RRD 2100 2100 2200 2200 2500 2100 2300 2300 2150 2000 2050 2400 
InCRD 1500 1700 1700 1600 1550 1550 1750 1700 1700 1900 2150 2100 
1992 
In the RRD 2450 2400 2300 2200 2250 1900 1850 1700 1500 1500 1750 1650 
In the CRD 2000 2000 1900 1800 1800 1750 1800 1700 1700 1700 1700 1800 
1993 
In the RRD 1800 1750 1900 2000 2000 1600 1600 1650 1600 1600 1600 1800 
In the CRD 1800 1700 1700 1700 1800 1800 1700 1900 1900 1700 1900 1950 
1994 
In the RRD 1950 2000 2200 2200 2320 2200 1900 2000 2450 2800 2800 3000 
In the CRD 2050 2300 2000 1900 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 2100 2200 2200 
Source: The State Department of Price (SDP) 
_ ,11_ 
206 
References 
Arrow, Kenneth. J., 1962. 'The economic implications of learning by doing' , Review of 
Economic Studies, 29 (June): 155-73. 
Barro, Robert.J and Sala-I-Martin. X., 1995. Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York. 
Blomqvist, Ake., 1986. 'The village and beyond: market and public policy (1 )'. In Scarp 
Marden Evaluation Baseline Study, edited by J. Freedman. Ottawa: Canadian 
International Development Agency. 
Brada, Josef.C., 1996. 'The variability of crop production in private and socialised agriculture: 
I 
evidence from Eastern Europe' , Journal of Political Economy. Vol.94, no.3 , 545-63. 
Canto, V. A. and G., Nickelsburg., 1987. Currency Substitution: Theory and Evidence from 
Latin America, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Boston. 
Cass, David. , 1965. 'Optimum growth in an aggregative model of capital accumulation ', 
Review of Economics Studies, 32 (July): 233-40. 
CCP (Congress of Communist Party). , 1976. 'Nghi quyet dai hoi Dang Ian thu tu', (The 
decisions by Congress Party IV), Su That Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Che T Nhu. , 1996a. 'A static model of the effects of internal and external trade liberalisation 
on agricultural growth ' . Paper presented at the AUSAID/NCDS Vietnam Economic 
Research Project workshop in Hochiminh City-July 1996, Unpublished, Canberra. 
Che T Nhu. , 1996b. 'The effects of internal and external trade liberalisation on agricultural 
growth: transitional periods'. Paper presented at the AUSAID/NCDS Vietnam 
Economic Research Project workshop in Canberra-December 1996, Unpublished, 
Canberra. 
If 
ii 
II, 
11: 
I 
Ii; 
ll 
le, 
~ 1 • t_ 
207 
Che V Tan., 1982. Ban Ve Phan Cong Lai Lao Dong Xa Hoi O Vietnam (The Issues of 
Reallocation of Labour Force in Vietnam), Su That Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Cheung, Steven. N ., 1968. 'Private property rights and share cropping', Journal of Political 
Economy, November, 1107-22, USA. 
Chinn, D. L., 1980. 'Cooperative farming in north China', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
March, 1980: 279-97. 
Chu V Lam, Nguyen T Nguyen, Phung H Phu, Tran Q Toan and Dang T Xuong., 1992. 'Hop 
tac hoa nong nghiep Vietnam, lich su-van de-trien vong', (Agricultural cooperatives in 
Vietnam, history-problem-prospective). Su That Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Congress of Vietnam., 1988. 'Luat Ve Su Dung Dat', The Law of Land, Pamphlet, Hanoi. 
Congress of Vietnam., 1993. 'Luat Ve Su Dung Dat', The Law of Land, Pamphlet, Hanoi. 
CPP (Communist Party Politburo)., April 5th 1988. Order No. I 0. 'Ve doi moi quan ly kinh te 
nong nghiep', (Reform of economic management in agriculture), Cong Bao, Hanoi. 
CPS (Communist Party Secretariat)., 1981. Order No. 100. 'Cai tien cong tac khoan, mo rong 
khoan san pham den nhom lao dong va nguoi lao dong trong hop tac xa nong nghiep', 
(Reform contract work, expand the use of output contracts with group and individual 
workers in agricultural cooperatives), Cong Bao, Hanoi. 
CPV., September, 1975. Order No 24. 'Danh gia tinh hinh nong thon nong nghiep mien Nam, 
(The assessments of situations of rural areas and agriculture in South Vietnam), Cong 
bao, Hanoi. 
De Vylder, S and Fforde, A., 1988. Vietnam: An economy in transition, SIDA, Stockholm. 
DGS (Department of General Statistic) and SDAFF (GSO)., 1996. 'Economic statistics data of 
rural, urban areas and regions in Vietnam' (The documentation for research purposes of 
Agricultural Group), Unpublished, Hanoi. 
11i 
208 
Duncan, Ron., 1993. "The determinants of agricultural growth country and cross country 
analysis", A research proposal, World Bank. 
Edwards, S., 1993. 'Openness, trade liberalisation, and growth in developing Countries' , 
Journal of Economic Literature 31(3): 1358-93. 
Fforde, A and Vylder, S.,1996. From Plan to Market-The Economic Transition in Vietnam, 
Westview Press-HarperCollins Publishers, United States of America. 
GSO (General Statistics Office)., various issues. Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Publishing 
House, Hanoi. 
GSO., 1995a. 'Ket Qua Tong Dieu Tra Nong Thon va Nong Nghiep Nam 1994 -Tap I: So lieu 
ca nuoc, 7 vung sinh thai va 53 tinh va thanh pho ', 'Statistics Data of General 
Investigation of Rural Area and Agriculture- Volume I: Statistics data of country, 7 
economic regions and 53 provinces and cities', Statistics Publishing House, Hanoi. 
GSO., 1995b. 'Ket Qua Tong Dieu Tra Nong Thon va Nong Nghiep Nam 1994-Tap II: So lieu 
ca nuoc tinh va huyen ' (Statistics Data of General Investigation of Rural Area and 
Agriculture- Volume II: Statistics data of country, provinces and districts), Statistics 
Publishing House, Hanoi. 
GSO., 1995c. 'Ket Qua Tong Dieu Tra Nong Thon va Nong Nghiep Nam 1994-Tap 3 So lieu ca 
nuoc tinh va huyen ', 'Statistics Data of General Investigation of Rural Area and 
Agriculture- Volume III: Statistics data of country, provinces and districts' , Statistical 
Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Hayami, Yujiro, and Ruttan, Vernon W., 1985. Agriculture Development: An International 
Perspective. Rev.ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
IH V (The Institute of History of Vietnam-The Committee of Social Science)., 1977. 'Nong 
thon Viet Nam trong lich su', (Rural area of Vietnam in history), The Social Science 
Publishing House, Hanoi. 
209 
Inada, Ken-Ichi., 1963. 'On a two -sector model of economics growth: comments and a 
generalization', Review of Economics Studies, 30 (June): 119-27. 
Ito. Shoichi, E. Wesley F. Peterson and Warren R. Grant., 1989. 'Rice in Asia: Is It Becoming 
an Inferior Good?', American Journal of Agriculture Economics, February, 71 (1): 32-
42. 
Koopmans, Tjalling. C., 1965. 'On the concept of optimal economic growth', The Econometric 
Approach to Development Planning, Amsterdam, North Holland. 
Laird, R. D., Hajda, J and Laird, B.A. (eds)., 1977. The Future of Agriculture in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, Westview Press, Bounder, Colorado. 
Lin, J. Y., 1990. 'Collectivization and China's agricultural cirrisis in 1959-1961 ', Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.98, No 6: 1229-1252. 
Lin, J. Y., 1991. 'Rural reform and development in China', Pacific Economic Papers, No. 200 
(October), Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Lucas, Robert. Jr., 1988. 'On the mechanics of development planning', Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, 1 (July): 3-42. 
Luu V Dat., 1993. 'Xuat khau gao cua nuoc ta', (About the rice export in our country), Journal 
of Foreign Trade and Tourism, N0-4, April, Hanoi. 
MAFI (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry)., various years. "Bao cao hang 
nam", Annual Reports, Unpublished, Hanoi. 
MAFI., (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry)., 1991. 'Bao cao tong ket cong 
tac co dien nam nam 1986-90 va phuong huong nhiem vu trong nam toi' (The report of 
the situation of mechanisation in five years 1986-90 and the strategy in the next yeas), 
Unpublished, Hanoi. 
MAFI., 1993. 'Tap hop cac bao cao ve dam bao luong thuc', Workshop of 'Ensuring of 
Foodstuff', Unpublished, February, 1993. 
11i 
210 
McCarty. A; Paunlagui. M and Huy. V., 1993. Vietnam-data bank 1976-91, National Centre 
for Development Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra. 
McKinnon, Ronald I., 1993. "Gradual versus rapid liberalisation in socialist economies: 
financial policies and macroeconomic stability in China and Russia compared", 
Proceedings of the World Bank Anual Conference on Development Economics 1993, 
World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
McMillan, J., Whalley. J and Zhu. L., 1989. 'The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on 
Agricultural Productivity Growth', Journal of Political Economy: 781-807. 
MIT (Ministry of Trade and Tourism) and GSO., 1992. 'Economy and trade of Vietnam 1986-
1991 ', April, Hanoi. 
MIT., 1995. 'Phuong huong phat trien thi truong xuat nhap khau cua Vietnam den nam 2010' 
(The strategy of development of import and export markets in Vietnam to 2010), May, 
Unpublished, Hanoi. 
MIT., various years. "Bao cao hang nam", Annual Reports, Unpublished, Hanoi. 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A and Vishny, R. W., 1992. 'The transition to a market economy: 
pitfalls of partial reform', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August: 889-906. 
MWR (Ministry of Water Resource)-GSO., 1994. So Lieu Thong Ke Thuy Loi Vietnam, 
(Statistical Data of Water Sources Sector of Vietnam 1986-90), The Gioi Publishing 
House, Hanoi 
MWR., various years. "Bao cao hang nam", Annual Reports, Unpublished, Hanoi. 
Nguyen D Chuc., 1995. 'Gia luong thuc thuc pham tang tro lai. Vi sao?', (Why Prices of Food-
Stuff Increase Again?), Bao Thuong Mai, Hanoi. 
Nguyen S Cuc., 1995a. Nong nghiep Vietnam 1945-95 (Agriculture of Vietnam 1945-95), 
Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi. 
211 
Nguyen S Cuc., 1995b. 'Nang than Vietnam vuot qua nhung buoc thang tram' (Vietnamese 
agriculture overcomes the extreme fluctuations), Tap Chi Con So va Su Kien: Nol , 
Hanoi. 
Nguyen T Hien., 1991. 'Chinh sach gia vat tu nong san nong nghiep Vietnam' (The policy of 
Vietnam about price of materials in agriculture). Paper presented at the workshop 
'The policies on development of agriculture of Vietnam' by the State Planning 
Committee (SPC) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (F AO) in Hanoi- August, 
20-22, 1991, Unpublished~ Hanoi. 
Nguyen T Khiem., 1995. 'Vietnam: Agricultural Policy Reforms and Microeconomic 
Environment', Paper presented at the Vietnam Update Canberra, Nov.30, Unpuplished, 
Canberra. 
Nguyen V Bich and Chu T Quang., 1994. " Doi moi quan ly kinh te nong nghiep-thanh tuu, van 
de va trien vong", 1994, (Renovation of agricultural sector: achievements, problems 
and prospects), National Politics Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Nguyen V Thanh., 1996. 'The effects of exchange rate on trade in Vietnam from 1990 to 1995'. 
Research Essay, Unpublished, National Centre for Development Studies, Australian 
National University. 
Nguyen V Tuan., 1995 ' Su chuyen doi kinh te nong nghiep, nong than nuoc ta hien nay va 
nhung van de xa hoi dat ra' (The issue of economic changing in rural area and the 
questions for society), edited by Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) -National 
Economics University (NEU)., 'Ky Yeu Khoa Hoc Nhung Van De Ly Luan Co Ban Ve 
Chuyen Doi Co Cau Kinh Te Nong Nghiep Nong Thon Vietnam', (The Science Guider 
of Basic Principles of Changing in Agriculture Structure in Vietnamese Rural Area:: 
156-161, Hanoi. 
{1: 
L 
212 
Perkins, Dwight, 1988. 'Reforming China's economic system', Journal of Economic Literature, 
26:2: 601-45. 
Perkins, Dwight., 1994. 'Completing China's move to the market', Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8, (2): 23-46. 
Pham N Cuong., 1991. Mot So Van De Kinh Te Cua Hop Tac Hoa Nong Nghiep o Vietnam 
(The Economic Issues of Agricultural Cooperative in Vietnam), the Social Science 
Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Ramsey, Frank., 1928. 'A mathematical theory of saving', Economic Journal, 38 (December): 
543-59. 
Riedel, J., 1995. 'Transitional to market economy in Vietnam' Paper presented in the seminar 
in Australian National University in March, 1995, Unpublished, Canberra. 
Roemer, Paul. M., 1986. 'Increasing returns and long-run growth', Journal of Political 
Economy, 90, 6 (December): 1257-78. 
Schwarz, Adam., 1995. 'Problems in the Unhusk Rice', Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 21. 
SDAFF, (the Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery)- GSO (General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam., 1991. 'So lieu nong nghiep Vietnam 35 nam (1956-1990), 
'Statistical data of agriculture, forestry and fishery in Vietnam for 35 years- 1956-90', 
Joint documentation by SDAFF (GSO) and Institute of Planning and Constructing for 
Agriculture, Hanoi. 
SDAFF., 1992. 'So lieu thong ke nong, lam, ngu nghiep Vietnam' 1976-1991, (Statistical data 
of Vietnam's agriculture forestry and fishery ( 197 6-1991) , the pivotal areas of 
commodity production), Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi. 
•1! 
r j 
213 
SDAFF., 1995a. 'So lieu thong ke nong, lam, ngu nghiep Vietnam' 1985-1995, (Statistical data 
of Vietnam's agriculture forestry and fishery (1976-1991), Statistical Publishing House, 
Hanoi. 
SDAFF., 1995b. 'So lieu thong ke tinh hinh co ban va co so ha tang nong thon Vietnam', 
(Statistical data on basic situation and infrastructure of rural region in Vietnam), 
Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi. 
SDAFF., 1996. 'Collection data of situation of rice industry' (The documentation for research 
purpose of the Agricultural Group), Unpublished, Hanoi. 
SDAFF., 1996b. 'Economic statistics data of rural, urban areas and regions in Vietnam' (The 
documentation for research purposes of Agricultural Group), Unpublished, Hanoi. 
SDP (State Department of Price), Project 93-98-120/DT (Part One)., 1995a. 'De tai khoa hoc 
cap ho ve thi truong va gia lua gao trong co che thi truong o Vietnam', (Research 
project of market and price for rice production in the market economy of Vietnam), 
Unpublished, Hanoi. 
SDP, Project 93-98-120/DT (Part two)., 1995. 'De tai khoa hoc cap hove san xuat- xuat khau 
gao tren the gioi va Vietnam', (Research project of rice production in the world and 
Vietnam), Unpublished, Hanoi. 
SDP., Various years, Tap Chi Thong Tin Thi truong va Gia Ca, (Journal of Information of 
Markets and Price), Hanoi. 
Sheshinski, Eytan., 1967. 'Optimal Accumulation with Learning by Doing', in Karl Shell, ed., 
Essays of the Theory of Optimal Economic Growth, Cambridge MA, MIT Press:31-52. 
Sicular, Terry., 1985. 'China's Grain and Meat Economy: Recent Development and 
Implications for trade'. America! J Agricultural Economic, December, Volume 67. 
Solow, Robert M., 1956. 'A contribution to the theory of economic growth', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 70, 1 (February): 65-94. 
214 
SPC (State Planning Committee)-NEU (National Economics University)., 1995. "Ky yeu khoa 
hoc nhung van de ly luan co ban ve chuyen doi co cau kinh te nong nghiep nong thon 
Vietnam", The science guide of basic principles of changing in agriculture structure in 
Vietnamese rural area, 1995, Hanoi. 
SRF ( Survey of Rice Farmers), various years, Unpulished. 
Swan, Trevor W., 1965. 'Economic growth and capital accumulation', Economic Records, 32 
(November):334-61. 
Tang, Anthony M., 1980. 'Food and Agriculture in China: Trends and Projections, 1952-77 and 
2000'. In Food Production in the People's Republic of China, by Anthony M, Tang 
and Bruce Stone. Research Report no.15. Washington: Intemat. Food Policy Res. Inst. 
Telser, L. G., 1980. 'A theory of self-enforcing agreements', Journal of Business, January, 
1980:27-44. 
The Rice Trader., various years. "Bao cao hang nam", Annual Reports, Unpublished, Hanoi. 
Tran D Hien,. 1995. 'Su tac dong cua thi truong doi voi qua trinh chuyen dich co cau kinh te 
nong thon Vietnam', (The role and the effects of markets on the process of changing in 
economic structure of Vietnamese rural area), edited by Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) -National Economics University (NEU)., 'Ky Yeu Khoa Hoc Nhung 
Van De Ly Luan Co Ban Ve Chuyen Doi Co Cau Kinh Te Nong Nghiep Nong Thon 
Vietnam', (The Science Guider of Basic Principles of Changing in Agriculture 
Structure in Vietnamese Rural Area: 113-119, Hanoi. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Program)-F AO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), 
Project VIE/88/033, 1989. 'The Overview of Agriculture and Food Processing 
Industry'. 
UNDP/W orld Bank., 1994. 'Vietnam: Policies for transition to an open economy', Country 
Report 13, February. 
215 
Various Sources, from the Reports by Vietnamese Government Offices, Unpublished, Hanoi. 
Viet, Vu. Q., Xuong, Dang. T., Chinh, Nguyen.V and Cuc, Nguyen. S., 1996. 'Kinh te nong 
thon Vietnam sau doi moi va vien tuong tuong lai', (Vietnamese economy in the rural 
area after reforms and prospectives), Unpublished, Project of Rural Area in Vietnam by 
Christopher Reyno Ids Foundation, New York. 
Vo T Xuan., 1995a. 'Lay lai uy tin gao Vietnam', (Gaining back the reputation about quality of 
rice of Vietnam), Bao Lao Dong 2211/1995. Hanoi. 
Vo T Xuan., 1995b. 'Rice production, Agricultural Research, and the Environment', Vietnam's 
rural transformation, WestviewPress, Colorado. 
Vousden, Neil., 1992. The Economics of Trade Protection, Cambridge University Press. 
WB (World Bank)., 1994a. Vietnam -Chuyen Sang Kinh Te Thi Truong, (Vietnam-Toward the 
Market Oriented Economy), The National Political Publishing House, Hanoi. 
WB., 1994b. Bao cao 13200-VN 'Vietnam- cac chinh sach va chuong trinh ve moi truong cho 
mot nen kinh te xa hoi chu nghia trong thoi ky qua do', (Report 13200-VN 'Vietnam-
the policies and programs of environment for the transitional socialist economy), 
Washington D .C. 
WB., 1995. 'Vietnam- Poverty Assessment and Strategy', Country Operation Division, East 
Asia and Pacific Region, Washington D.C. 
WB., 1996. Report No. 15041-VN- 'Vietnam- Water Resources Sector Review, Agricultural 
and Environment Division, Country Department I, East Asia and Pacific Region, 
Washington D.C. 
